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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
ENGINEERING ACCESS CONTROL FOR
DISTRIBUTED ENTERPRISE APPLICATIONS
by
Konstantin Beznosov
Florida International University, 2000
Miami, Florida
Professor Yi Deng, Major Professor
Access control (AC) is a necessary defense against a large variety of security attacks on
the resources of distributed enterprise applications. However, to be effective, AC in some
application domains has to be fine-grain, support the use of application-specific factors in
authorization decisions, as well as consistently and reliably enforce organization-wide
authorization policies across enterprise applications. Because the existing middleware
technologies do not provide a complete solution, application developers resort to embed-
ding AC functionality in application systems. This coupling of AC functionality with
application logic causes significant problems including tremendously difficult, costly and
error prone development, integration, and overall ownership of application software. The
way AC for application systems is engineered needs to be changed.
vii
In this dissertation, we propose an architectural approach for engineering AC mechanisms
to address the above problems. First, we develop a framework for implementing the role-
based access control (RBAC) model using AC mechanisms provided by CORBA Secu-
rity. For those application domains where the granularity of CORBA controls and the
expressiveness of RBAC model suffice, our framework addresses the stated problem.
In the second and main part of our approach, we propose an architecture for an authoriza-
tion service, RAD, to address the problem of controlling access to distributed application
resources, when the granularity and support for complex policies by middleware AC
mechanisms are inadequate. Applying this architecture, we developed a CORBA-based
application authorization service (CAAS). Using CAAS, we studied the main properties
of the architecture and showed how they can be substantiated by employing CORBA and
Java technologies. Our approach enables a wide-ranging solution for controlling the
resources of distributed enterprise applications.
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Introduction
Software systems today are increasingly integrated and interconnected to achieve
organization-wide, agency-wide and industry-wide automation and interoperation. Such
integration results in enterprises that consist of autonomous, heterogeneous and distributed
systems called enterprise software systems. Applications within each enterprise may be
developed independently and based on different design and technology. National defense,
industry, commerce and health care are increasingly dependent on the function of these sys-
tems [Sumner 1999].
Because of the magnitude and complexity of distributed systems and information
resources interconnected by the Internet and/or enterprise networks, designing security
mechanisms that protect the systems and resources becomes an increasingly complex and
difficult challenge. This is why it is an essential concern to every enterprise [NSF 1999].
The problem of securing information enterprises has been the focus of intensive efforts
from industry. As a result, several well-known security system architectures and models for
network, operating, DBM, and middleware systems have been developed for constructing
scalable and flexible security for distributed environments. This represents significant
progress yet it is only the first step for attaining the goal. The issues that remain are the fol-
lowing: handling complex and fine-grained security policies; supporting changes not only
in application systems and their underlying platforms, but also in business process and
security policies, as well as in user population and their roles; supporting dynamic config-
uration of enterprise applications without affecting security integrity; and achieving
required performance.
In this dissertation, we consider one particular security functionality -- access control
(AC) [Sandhu 1994]. It is a necessary defense against a large variety of security attacks on
information enterprise resources. However, the control of access to application resources
more and more needs to be fine-grain and support the use of application-specific factors in
authorization decisions. It must also consistently and reliably enforce organization-wide
authorization policies across enterprise applications.
The existing network, OS, DBMS, and middleware technologies are inadequate for
doing such control, and they will never be because they are designed for general purpose
usage, and their controls are too coarse and concern only certain resources [CIST-NRC
1999]. Because of this, application developers resort to embedding AC functionality in
application systems in order to support complex, fine-grain and context dependent autho-
rization policies.
The coupling of AC functionality with application logic causes significant problems.
Enterprise security administrators end up having to configure AC logic on application-by-
application basis [Beznosov 1998a]. This application-based multiple point AC makes
enterprise security administration tremendously difficult, costly and error prone [Beznosov
1997, Wilson 1997], makes it harder to change security policies and control mechanisms,
and makes it difficult to develop, change and dynamically reconfigure application software
[Beznosov 1999b, Grimm 1999, Hale 1999].
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The way application systems are constructed needs to be changed so that the problem
of protecting application resources is addressed and yet the systems can be developed, inte-
grated, and managed in the enterprise computing environment in a cost-effective way.
1.1 Objectives of the Work
In this dissertation, we propose an architectural approach for engineering AC mecha-
nisms capable of addressing the problem of controlling the access to enterprise application
resources. The approach is twofold. First, we develop a framework for implementing role-
based access control (RBAC) model using AC mechanisms provided by CORBA Security.
For those application domains where the granularity of CORBA controls and expressive-
ness of RBAC model suffice, our framework addresses the stated problem. The second and
main part of our approach develops an architecture for an authorization service that
addresses the problem of controlling access to distributed application resources, when the
granularity and the support for complex policies in middleware AC mechanisms are inad-
equate and application developers embed additional AC functionality in their systems.
1.2 Summary of the Main Results
Security provided by middleware technologies is important and necessary for protect-
ing distributed applications and their resources. Therefore, it is important to have means for
modeling authorization policies using middleware AC mechanisms in order to fully utilize
them. We define a configuration of the CORBA protection system state. Using the defini-
tion language, we specify an algorithm for authorization decisions in CORBA security. The
configuration along with the authorization algorithm mathematically define the state and
the behavior of the CORBA Security authorization system.
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Using the previously defined configuration of the CORBA protection system, we show
how RBAC models could be supported by the CORBA Security service. We provide defi-
nitions of RBAC0 and RBAC1 implementations in the language of CORBA Security. Fur-
thermore, we describe what is required from an implementation of the CORBA Security
service in order to support RBACO-RBAC 3 models. Our approach allows an implementa-
tion compliant with the CORBA Security specification to support RBAC models. This
work advances the understanding of the CORBA AC mechanism's capabilities and by this
maximizes their utility, which is vital to the use of middleware in protecting application
resources.
Our main contribution is the resource access decision service (RAD) -- a novel archi-
tectural approach for constructing authorization mechanisms that are functionally adequate
for protecting fine-grain application resources using application-specific information in
authorization decisions. The approach allows separation of application and authorization
logic, which makes application development, deployment, and management more cost-
effective. It also enables consistent enforcement of organizational policies across multiple
applications. We show its functional capabilities by modeling authorization policies that
require the use of such application-specific information as the relationship between the user
and the resource owner.
Through the prototype implementation of the CORBA-based application authorization
service (CAAS), which was constructed according to RAD architecture, we gained some
important insights on the design of RAD-based authorization services. In addition, we
showed how the main features of RAD architecture, such as flexibility, configurability, and
4
extensibility, can be substantiated using standard CORBA middleware and Java program-
ming technologies. Our experience of developing CAAS provides a guideline to the design
of RAD-based services.
Using CAAS as a test-bed, we obtained quantitative estimates of CAAS performance
for different compositions of its components. We found that depending on the ratio of the
application execution time to the number of authorization requests and the performance
constraints, one or the other CAAS configuration can deliver the required performance.
1.3 Dissertation Content
In the next chapter, we give background information on the subject of access control
in computer systems, explain main concepts and terms, and then introduce the area of appli-
cation-level access control. Then we state in detail the problem addressed in this disserta-
tion. Finally, we define a framework for evaluating the existing technologies, related work
and our approach.
Chapter 3 provides an overview and analyses of the technologies, where we show that
the existing middleware technologies are important and necessary for protecting resources
of distributed enterprise systems but are not sufficient. The chapter also contains a review
of the related work conducted in the research community.
In Chapter 4, we propose CORBA protection system configuration that formally
defines the state of the system. Using the definition, we specify an algorithm for making
AC decisions in CORBA, and show how RBAC models could be supported using CORBA
Security.
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Chapter 5 introduces our main contribution -- RAD service architecture. There, we
also demonstrate its utility on examples with complex access control policies.
We present a design of CAAS and show how the main features of RAD architecture
can be substantiated using CORBA and Java in Chapter 6.
Chapter 7 discusses performance experiments, which we conducted using CAAS, and
draws conclusions from the results.
We conclude in Chapter 8 by discussing the achieved results and outlining what should
be done next in the problem area.
6
2 Background and Problem
Statement
Before stating the problem addressed by this dissertation in detail, it is necessary to
give background information on the subject of access control in computer systems, explain
main concepts and terms, and then introduce the area of application-level access control.
This chapter's objective is to provide all of the above.
In addition, we define criteria for critiquing existing technologies, related work, and
for analyzing the solution we propose. In short, the criteria are the granularity of protected
resources, the support for policies specific to the application domain, the variety of infor-
mation available for making authorization decisions, the use of application-specific infor-
mation in authorization decisions, the consistency of policies across multiple applications,
the support for application and enterprise evolution, and performance and administration
scalability.
2.1 Background Information and Terminology
Security of modern software systems is conventionally achieved via protection and
assurance, as shown in Figure 2-1. The former is usually provided by some security sub-
systems or mechanisms, which are designed to protect the system from specific threats. A
threat is any potential occurrence that can have an undesirable effect on the assets and
resources associated with a computer system [Amoroso 1994]. Protection is based on the
7
Assurance
Non-
dh Repudiation
Figure 2-1. Main Concepts of Computer Security
premise that it is possible to list most of the threats which can happen in a computer system,
and it is possible to build mechanisms which can prevent the threats [Blakley 1999]. The
protection mechanisms can be classified in three groups: accountability, availability and
authorization. Accountability mechanisms make sure that users (or programs executed on
behalf of them) -- conventionally called subjects -- are held accountable for their actions
towards the system resources and services. Sometimes, subjects are also called principals.
We will use these two terms interchangeably. Availability mechanisms ensure either ser-
vice continuity or service and resource recovery after interruption. Authorization mecha-
nisms ensure that the rules governing the use of system resources and services are enforced.
They are further qualified as either access control or data protection ones. Access control
(AC) mechanisms allow system owner to enforce those rules when rules check and enforce-
ment are possible. The term "authorization" also implies the process of making AC deci-
8
sions. When checking and/or enforcement of the rules are not possible, data protection
mechanisms, such as data encryption, are used.
The structure of traditional AC mechanisms can be viewed using the conceptual model
of reference monitor [Anderson 1972]. A reference monitor is a part of the security sub-
system, responsible for mediating access by subjects to system resources (traditionally
called objects), as illustrated in Figure 2-2. The mediation consists of making authorization
Authorization
D se
uthoriza ion
Rules
Referee
acti monitor * *
Subjects Access Control
Mechanism
Figure 2-2. Reference Monitor
decisions, by checking access requests against authorization rules from the authorization
database -- a storage of such rules -- and enforcing them. A set of the rules is sometimes
called a policy. Conventionally having subject-action-object structure, authorization rules
specify what subject(s) can perform what action(s) on what object(s). Permitted actions are
also called access rights. Thus a subject has a particular access right to an object if it can
perform the action, defined by the right, towards that object. Furthermore, all authorization
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rules can be conceptualized into access matrix [Lampson 1971], where there is a row for
each subject and a column for each object, and each cell specifies access rights granted to
the subject for the corresponding object.
In order to make an authorization decision, a reference monitor takes as its inputs
authorization rules and three groups of information: 1) about the access request, 2) about
the subject who made the request, and 3) about the object to be accessed. It is necessary to
discuss what information is in these groups because we will use it for stating the problems,
evaluating the existing and analyzing our work.
The information about access request usually carries the request type, for example
"read" in a request for reading a file. However, some application domains have a need for
AC decisions based on additional attributes of the request. For instance, a banking system
might deny a withdrawal request if its amount exceeds a pre-determined threshold.
Information about the subject can be divided in two types -- related and unrelated to
security. Originally, only security-related information was used in AC decisions. Con-
trolled by security or user administrators, this information describes subject's identity,
group membership, clearance, and other security attributes. Some times, we will use term
privilege attributes to refer to those security attributes that are intended to be used for noth-
ing else but AC.
In some application domains, security-unrelated information about the subject needs
to be taken into account. For example, access to rated materials in public libraries could be
granted according to the age of the accessing user. Another example is information derived
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from the organizational work-flow process. This information is not controlled by security
or user administrators and it is not always provided to the reference monitor in the form of
subject security attributes. The monitor needs to obtain it via other means. The information
about the object to be accessed can also be divided into the related and unrelated to security.
An example of an object security attribute is its security level. All this information is used
for evaluating authorization rules.
Depending on the capabilities of a particular AC mechanism and the availability of
information about the subject, request and object, either only limited or elaborate informa-
tion can be accessible for making authorization decisions. This information availability will
be used as a criterion for evaluating expressiveness (or power) of AC mechanisms.
AC mechanisms are part of most operating, database management (DBM), and mid-
dleware systems. They are also present in such control systems as firewalls, and many
applications.
2.2 Controlling Access to Application Resources
Application resources can be in the form of data processed by applications, their ser-
vices (e.g. Telnet [Postel 1983], SMTP [Postel 1982] or WWW servers), particular opera-
tions performed on them (e.g. GET access requested from a WWW server via HTTP
protocol, operation invocation on a CORBA-based application server), or even menus of
the application interface.
Some application resources, such as files, database records, or network sockets, can be
protected by an operating, DBM, or middleware system. However, there are resources that
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are application-specific and not recognized by anything except the application itself [CIST-
NRC 1999], for example the execution of particular parts of the application business logic.
In other words, the granularity of application-specific resources is finer than of general-pur-
pose computing systems. Figure 2-3 illustrates the difference in the scope of middleware
Middleware Object
method A scope of applic access control
method B non-object resources
3 method C
method D
method E
-o 0
Figure 2-3. Separation of Access Control Scope between Middleware and Application
and application-level AC. This is one essential distinction between application-level and
general purpose AC.
Another vital difference is that authorization rules used for application-level AC
require the use of such information about access operations, subjects, or objects, that is spe-
cific to the application domain or more elaborate (more expressive) than the information
used by AC mechanisms of general purpose systems.
In order to meet the requirements, applications commonly have their own AC mecha-
nisms in addition to the use of those provided by the underlying general purpose systems.
And this practice is becoming more and more commonplace than exceptional.
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2.2.1 Examples
Let us present fragments of actual interfaces brought from formal OMG specification
of Person Identification Service (PIDS) [OMG 1998b]. They illustrate the need to exercise
AC on the level of method argument and/or return values. Each PIDS-compliant applica-
tion server must provide access to its functionality and data via interfaces defined in PIDS
specification. Let us consider some operations specified by PIDS interfaces.1
First we demonstrate the need to control what values of operation arguments can be
used by different subjects. The processing of invocations on the operations shown in
Figure 2-4 require access control on the level of input argument values. The
interface DemographicAccess : IdentificationComponent
{
Profile get profile ( in Personld personid,
in SpecifiedTraits specifiedtraits);
void update traits( in Personld id, in Profile the profile);
};
Figure 2-4. PIDS DemographicAccess Interface
getpro f ile ( ) operation returns a profile, which is a collection of traits describing a
person, or its subset available to the PIDS service. The traits provided as input argument
indicate what subset of the profile is required by the client [OMG 1998b]. The
updatetraits () is used to modify an already existing profile by adding new traits
and overwriting any values for existing traits that are also passed in. Any traits already
stored for that person but not mentioned in the provided profile are left intact [OMG
1. The interfaces are from module org/omg/PersonIdService. We omit some elements of operation defini-
tions, such as exceptions, since their presence does not contribute in the discussion. Also, only relevant oper-
ations are reproduced in the definitions.
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1998b]. Because different person traits could have different confidentiality level it is real-
istic to foresee security policies that require PIDS-compliant server to control what subject
can access what traits of what person in what mode (e.g. "read" or "modify").
Second, we show that control over data returned to the client has to be enforced too.
Operation getall_ids () in Figure 2-5 returns profiles for all patients the service
interface SequentialAccess : IdentificationComponent
{
ProfileList get-all-ids( in TraitNameSeq traits requested,
in IdStateSeq statesof_interest);
Figure 2-5. PIDS SequentialAccess Interface
knows about that match one of the provided "states." The returned profiles contain the traits
indicated by the "state" parameter. The service is not supposed to return those profiles, to
which the subject does not have access even though it might list them in the operation input.
2.3 Problem Statement
The central problem we address in this dissertation is inadequacy of the architectural
solutions for controlling access to enterprise distributed applications and their resources. In
order for an AC mechanism to be sufficient it must support functional requirements. In
addition, the mechanism architecture must support and be supported by the architecture of
the information enterprise where the system is installed. The current solutions are inade-
quate because they are either functionally deficient in protecting fine-grain application
resources according to the application-specific policies or do not support the objectives of
the information enterprise architectures, or both.
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In this section we define the problem. First, we expand on the subject of information
enterprise architecture problems and their causes and show what architectural properties a
system must have in order to support the enterprise architecture. Then, we zoom into the
discussion of the requirements for controlling access to application resources at the system
scope. Finally, we substantiate the general discussion with real-life example of a health care
enterprise and describe concrete issues with AC in it. We complete the problem definition
with a summary.
2.3.1 Information Enterprise Perspective
It is necessary to place the problem of engineering access control to application
resources in a larger context in order to discuss the requirements and the validity of the
work. Such a context is the architecture of information enterprises (IE) because distributed
applications are parts of them, and the goals of engineering distributed applications should
support the goals of IEs.
We must clarify the notion of an enterprise before discussing the problems that have
to be addressed at this level. An intuitive perception of an IE tells us that it is a system of
information systems. Such a description, although correct, is far from rigorous. We will use
the following more precise definition of an enterprise as "an organizational scope upon
which a common set of information technology policies can be imposed" [Mowbray 1997].
The technological scope of 1E is defined by the following hierarchy: object, module, col-
lection of modules, framework, program, application, system, department, enterprise, con-
glomerate enterprise, industry enterprises, and global infrastructure.
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We discuss extensively the problems of information enterprise architectures (IEA)
[Beznosov 2000]. Here we merely summarize the main results for the sake of briefness. The
major problems encountered in the IEA construction are low semantic compatibility of
resulted systems, high re-alignment and maintenance cost, and its exponential increase to
the increase in the number of deployed applications [Zachman 1997]. In addition, enter-
prise modeling takes too long and becomes outdated too soon [Fowler 1997]. The main
causes of the problems are the lack of efficient solutions to manage changes accumulated
across an enterprise; the lack of an efficient and precise way to describe, analyze, and com-
municate the architecture; architectural mismatch; poor abstraction; and poor support for
legacy, component-based and multi-paradigm systems. The main constraints are the
amount and nature of change on the enterprise level [DeBoever 1997, Mowbray 1997], and
the necessity to reuse the existing information infrastructure [DeBoever 1997, Fowler
1997].
Clearly, the main goal of an enterprise, which must be supported by constituent appli-
cations, as any other informational construction, is to satisfy its functional and non-func-
tional requirements. For an enterprise, the former is the business work-flow it is to support.
Today, business work-flow changes more and more rapidly. The rate of change has grown
from a full cycle period of approximately 7 years in the 1970s and 1980s to 12-18 months
in the 1990s [DeBoever 1997]. Essentially, the non-functional goal is not only to align the
enterprise with the business work-flow but also "to have such an enterprise that will allow
quick re-aligning when the business work-flow changes" [DeBoever 1997]. Another
important goal for an enterprise is to allow the gradual migration towards new technologies
with the retirement of old ones as well as the evolution of systems comprising the enter-
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prise. We define a well constructed IE as one that fully supports business work-flow and
allows sufficiently quick re-alignment according to the work-flow changes while requiring
only a reasonable amount of resources to maintain and manage the enterprise. In each case,
the notion of quick and reasonable has to be determined.
Therefore, we suggest that the architecture of a system or a service functioning in the
enterprise environment must aim to 1) reduce the amount of change associated with it and
other systems, 2) reduce the cost associated with maintaining and re-aligning it and other
systems, and 3) enable solutions that scale well with the increase in the number of deployed
applications.
For instance, solutions currently available in the industry control access to application
protected resources at several points, as Figure 2-6 shows. They are network (e.g. firewall),
middleware, database and operating system controls. Making all these controls to work in
concert and consistently enforce enterprise-wide access control policies is a daunting task,
when there are hundreds of application and supporting systems (e.g. operating systems).
Such solutions considerably increase the amount of change associated with administering
authorization policies and applications, increase the maintenance and re-alignment costs,
and do not scale well with the increase of the number of applications.
2.3.2 System Perspective
The main problem at the system level is that middleware AC mechanisms do not pro-
tect fine-grain resources or they provide limited capabilities for handling complex policies,
which is required in some application domains, e.g. health care [Beznosov 1997, Wilson
1997]. In addition, there is a need for domain-specific factors (e.g. relationship between the
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user and the patient [Barkley 1999], emergency context) to be used in access control poli-
cies. This complexity and granularity level often force application designers to embed
domain-specific authorization logic inside their applications. Some even document patterns
of designing "application security" [Yoder 1997]. As a result, this increases the complexity
of software design and makes it difficult to ensure system integrity and quality. It also sig-
nificantly increases the difficulty and cost of system administration and management.
2.3.3 Problems with Access Control in a Health Care Enterprise
In the previous sections, we outlined general problems that architectures of informa-
tion enterprises face, suggested what architectural properties enterprise systems and ser-
vices should have. We also showed what functional requirements mechanisms controlling
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access to application resources should have. Now we substantiate our discussion with par-
ticular problems in AC for the information enterprise of a health care organization -- Baptist
Health Systems of South Florida (BHS). BHS is the largest non-for-profit healthcare orga-
nization in South Florida, which is comprised of six major hospitals and clinics. Due to the
technical and historical reasons BHS information enterprise is referred as Computerized
Patient Record (CPR). We will use this name through out the section. Parts of the section
are based on the materials from [Beznosov 1998a, Beznosov 1998b].
2.3.3.1 Introduction
CPR enterprise is and will be a heterogeneous environment for long time if not forever.
Legacy computing technologies and architectures, such as stovepipe systems [Mowbray
1995], are going to co-exist with new component-based systems as well as with new mid-
dleware and other technologies such as CORBA and its services, common and vertical
domain facilities. The enterprise will always have to accommodate emerging technologies
with old disappearing ones. The main goal for CPR security architecture is to provide a
security environment where the view of an enterprise user will be consistent across all its
components, and AC decisions will be made according to one set of enterprise-specific pol-
icies. We list the main issues that make this goal difficult to achieve and maintain. We
present our vision on how a CPR enterprise architecture can be designed so that the
described problems can be addressed in the realm of existing constraints. The problems dis-
cussed here are based on the experience from the ongoing project of designing CPR secu-
rity architecture at BHS.'
1. More information about BHS can be found at htttp://www.baptisthealth.net
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In order to facilitate understanding of the issues and constraints, we first provide back-
ground information on CPR enterprise and describe its specifics next.
2.3.3.2 CPR Enterprise
CPR is a long-term initiative at BHS. Wreder et al. [Wreder 1998] describe its ultimate
goal as to provide the mechanism to capture, manage and present information required
throughout the continuum of care in a manner that optimizes the business process by taking
advantage of distributed object computing technologies. BHS's CPR can be viewed as a set
of object services and clients distributed across a healthcare enterprise. Since all clinical
and some business services are eventually expected to be integrated into the CPR infra-
structure, it is considered as an enterprise itself. CPR architecture is being constructed uti-
lizing the Object Management Architecture described in [Soley 1996]. CORBA-compliant
ORBs constitute a distribution backbone for CPR components.
All deployed application systems are selected according to the criteria of the best fit
for a particular business process they serve and according to the mandatory requirement to
comply with CPR architecture. Particularly, application systems and services are required
to provide CORBA-compliant interfaces to their main functionality and to use services
available within CPR enterprise to avoid redundancy. For example, any application system
and service that has a notion of patient is required to utilize a CORBA-compliant Patient
Identification Service (PIDS) [OMG 1998b] and expose any data related to clinical obser-
vations via interfaces compliant with Clinical Observation Access Service (COAS) [OMG
1997] standard from the OMG. The very first CORBA-based CPR service was deployed at
BHS in February 1998. The service provides access to clinical transcription records. BHS
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is in the process of deploying a Master Patient Index service that will provide PIDS among
other services. An anatomic pathology system that will be using PIDS and will also provide
access to its data via COAS-compliant interfaces is expected to be deployed as well.
Even though all new components deployed in CPR enterprise are based on CORBA
technology, there are legacy systems that have to be integrated in CPR architecture at some
point. Also, some new non-CORBA-compliant services will be deployed within CPR
enterprise. Such systems and services have to be integrated in CPR enterprise including its
security infrastructure. We will discuss the issues of designing CPR security architecture in
the next sections.
CPR enterprise has its own features that affect its architecture. Some are common to
any enterprise, some are specific to health care, and others are BHS distinctive. They serve
as constraints to the enterprise, including its security infrastructure. We identified the fol-
lowing significant features:
- As we discussed in Section 2.3.1, like with any other IE, due to the increasing rate of
information enterprises growth and the replacement of conventional monolithic, multi-
purpose solutions by component-based specialized ones, the amount of maintenance
and administration is rapidly increasing. The increase of enterprise size and complexity
exacerbates all other factors.
" CPR business processes change much faster than they used to do. This forces CPR
enterprise configuration to be adjusted at the same rate. For a security architecture, this
means decentralized administration and extensive delegation of administration privi-
leges, as well as more frequent AC policy changes driven by business processes.
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" Many different application systems are used across the enterprise. Y2K inventory
revealed about 200 different applications from word processor to multi-million dollar
clinical systems.
" Some products come from narrow niches with few vendors, which eliminates fair com-
petition of products forcing customers to select sub-optimal solutions or contract condi-
tions.
" Heterogeneous operating system (OS) environments serve different needs of different
departments. The heterogeneity is also due to tight coupling between applications and
the underlying OS. Major clinical applications are available only on particular OS or
even hardware platforms.
" Vendors are oriented towards numerous more conservative customers. Those custom-
ers are usually technically less educated and, as a consequence, concerned only with the
functional properties of the products.
" Outside visitors have the potential for physical access to desktops and network infra-
structure. Unlike financial or manufacturing enterprises, in health care organizations
patients, and often their guests, have access to most facilities thus making it almost
impossible to introduce the notion of trust boundary dividing the facilities.
" Different departments have different levels of urgency and different requirements for
confidentiality and service availability. This makes security protection of the same high
strength unjustifiable and some times even conflicting with the support of business
practice specific to the particular department.
22
e The information technology (IT) department cannot afford in-house development due
to the lack of resources and qualified staff, which mandates the use of COTS applica-
tions, external consulting, integration and outsourcing services.
2.3.3.3 Security Architecture Issues
Given the general constraints imposed on CPR, we discuss the issues related directly
to its security infrastructure, and first present four groups of issues related to the CPR secu-
rity architecture. We limit our discussion to the issues only directly related to access con-
trol. Its full version can be found in [Beznosov 1998a, Beznosov 1998b]. To ease the
understanding of how the groups relate to each other, we place them on a discrete 2-dimen-
sional space depicted in Figure 2-7. The horizontal dimension identifies if the issue can be
0
Any Enterprise CPR Enterprise
Figure 2-7. CPR Security Issues Space
found generally in any information enterprise or only in a CPR enterprise. The vertical
dimension identifies if the issue is related to any technology or it is specific to CORBA-
based enterprises.
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General issues are propagated into more specialized areas. For example, those prob-
lems that exist in any information enterprise are propagated also into a CPR enterprise. To
illustrate it, we present the same issue space in the propagation pyramid shown on Figure 2-
8. More general problems and requirements at the foundation of the pyramid, if not
0
CPR / CORBA
CPR / Any Any / CORBA
Any Enterprise / Any Technology
Figure 2-8. Propagation of Problems
addressed, would propagate to the upper layers. We discuss the problems in groups moving
from generic to specific.
Any Enterprise Based on Any Distributed Computing Technology
Coupled AC logic. Conventional applications have their own AC decision logic
tightly coupled with an application itself. Enterprise security administrators end up having
to configure such logic on application-by-application basis, which brings tremendous
administration overhead and highly increases chances of human error.
Decisions about which users can have what access to what assets of the information
enterprise should ideally depend only on the following factors: user privilege attributes,
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enterprise security policies, business workflow and its constraints. All these items are prop-
erties of a particular enterprise and not of any application in it. Also, AC models must have
a common denominator to map enterprise security policies and business workflow con-
straints uniformly into particular authorization rules. Therefore, all access decisions should
be foreign to an application service and native to the enterprise security infrastructure as
well as the enterprise business workflow.
No standard administration interface. Among those applications that have their own
AC mechanisms, each has its own proprietary interface to administrate the mechanism.
This makes it impossible to administrate AC and other security mechanisms for multiple
applications using a single administration environment. Therefore, the automation of AC
administration is a very resource-consuming and error-prone task.
Inconsistent AC models. Due to the replication of security information over applica-
tions and coupling of authorization and application logic, multiple inconsistent AC models
co-exist in the same information enterprise. In this case, it is highly difficult to insure con-
sistency of AC rules across the enterprise. Most of the time, security administrators end up
having no guarantee, whatsoever, that authorization rules and, especially, changes to them
are consistent across all application systems and comply with organizational policies.
CPR Enterprise Based on Any Distributed Computing Technology
YES/NO AC. It is hard to draw exact borders between what a care giver, as a user of
medical systems, is supposed to have access to and what he/she is not. Some scenarios are
clear (e.g., a registration clerk trying to change lab test results of a patient) and some are
not (e.g., emergency room physician browsing encounter history of a patient). There is a
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need for, so called, "soft AC" when a principal is granted access; however, audit and
(maybe even) non-repudiation "alarms" go off for later investigation. Meanwhile, the user
is warned that they are accessing information they are not supposed to. Such "soft AC"
notion is missing from most models including CORBA Security. Additional abstraction is
needed in security administration solutions to accommodate "soft AC."
Vanilla security administration. A low-level generic security administration model,
where authorization (and other) rules are expressed in terms of security attributes of sub-
jects and (maybe groups of) objects/interfaces, does not support needed abstractions spe-
cific to the business process. Domain-specific AC languages that abstract the access model
to the level of business model are necessary.
CPR Enterprise Based on CORBA Technology
Heavy security policy domains. Ideally, the notion of security policy domains should
be used actively in order to leverage AC mechanisms of CORBA Security service. All
information about a patient can be represented as a collection of objects that belongs to the
same AC policy domain. When a new patient is registered and his/her record is created, all
data about the patient is accumulated in the objects belonging to the patient's domain and
AC (as well as other security) policies are instantiated appropriately. Consider a common
situation when a healthcare enterprise serves thousands of patients. We do not have empir-
ical knowledge but it seems that the current security technologies (e.g. SESAME and Ker-
beros) used for CORBA Security implementation would not scale to scenarios with
thousands of security policy domains.
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Coarse-grain AC. Preliminary modeling of a CPR AC [Beznosov 1997, Wilson 1997]
shows that the basic CORBA Security AC model does not take into account such important
for a healthcare enterprise factors of authorization decisions as the content of requests and
replies, and the context of client/server interactions.
2.3.3.4 Goals for CPR Architecture
Not all the issues are as urgent in the short term period or as important in the long term
period as others. Some of them are highly critical for CPR enterprise success. Below, we
state the goals that we believe will impact significantly the way CPR enterprise security
architecture will evolve.
Long Term Most Important Goals
Achieving long term goals will enable integration of applications with CPR security
infrastructure. The goals are difficult to implement quickly because they require re-struc-
turing of the infrastructure and re-design of the applications. However, once realized they
will enable creation of a well constructed CPR enterprise which will support organizational
work-flow and its changes. Besides generic goals, CPR security infrastructure has several
specific long term objectives in the area of AC.
Enterprise-wide logically single repository of user security attributes is paramount to
any well structured organizational security infrastructure. It will provide a single view of a
user no matter what underlying security technology and applications are used. When a user
initializes a session, information from the repository is used for their identification and
authentication. The main advantage is, however, the existence of logically single location
for security information related to the user which allows inherent coherence of any changes
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to it. Such a repository will allow significant reduction of enterprise-wide user security
information administration.
Second goal is the realization of fine-grain uniform access controls across all applica-
tions. Otherwise complete CPR automation will risk a health care organization to face lia-
bilities of various degree. For instance, breaching the regulations on patient information
privacy and confidentiality [DHHS 1999], which are part of health insurance portability
and accountability act (HIPAA) [USA 1996] imposed on US health care industry, would
jeopardize the company ability to compete on the market and could bring legal actions
against its administration. The keys here are the granularity and uniformity of AC. Without
needed granularity, service-based health care applications would not provide protection
necessary for controlling access on the need-to-know basis. On the other hand a lack of uni-
formity would introduce inconsistencies in AC enforcement thus considerably decreasing
its usability, manageability, and maintainability.
Another important goal is the use of domain-specific high-level abstraction for admin-
istering security in general and AC in particular. We describe below those factors that
should be used to make elaborate authorization decisions in order to comply with patient
information discloser requirements.
Affiliation -- what subsidiary of the health care system a particular care giver works
for or is a partner with. Due to frequent mergers and to the fact that many physicians consult
in several hospitals, this factor affects authorization decisions.
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Role -- what role the user is assigned to in the current session. This factor is important
to use because the same user can act in different roles performing his or her responsibilities
and because RBAC decreases security administration overhead. However, modeling of
health care AC policies shows us that the type of relationship between the user and the
patient is also used very extensively in making authorization decisions.
Relationship -- what is the relationship between the user and the patient whose records
are to be accessed. Today health care practise increasingly employs shared care approach
in which the patient is managed by a team of care professionals each specializing in one
aspect of care [Grimson 2000]. Some types of relationships that need to be managed in the
healthcare context are: patient's primary care provider; admitting, attending, referring, or
consulting physician of a particular patient; part of the patient care team; healthcare staff
explicitly assigned to take care of the patient; patient's immediate family; patient's legal
counsel or guard; personal pastoral care provider.
Location -- where the user is accessing information services from. Location informa-
tion is used in several types of authorization policies. One type is represented by the fol-
lowing example of an AC policy: a nurse should have access to medical records of a patient
if the nurse is currently working on the same "floor" as the patient. Another type uses loca-
tion to identify the trust domain where the user is accessing information services from. A
reasonable policy would deny access to any sensitive information for anyone accessing it
from untrusted areas or via unprotected communication channels. Location can also be
used to derive the emergency level of access. A policy can allow read access to all patient
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information of all patients for any user assigned to the role physician and accessing the
information from an emergency room.
Time -- when access is requested. The time factor is useful for authorization rules on
users assigned to shift-related positions such as nurses and for task-based AC [Thomas
1994] when access to patient records is granted for the task duration to the users responsible
for accomplishing it.
All this information is essential in order to make authorization decisions at health care
enterprises. To achieve integral use of the described factors, an effective domain-specific
authorization language that would incorporate the concepts of role, affiliation, location,
relationship and time is needed.
Putting all these goals together, we believe that if the security infrastructure of a health
care enterprise can be designed in such a way that AC can be enforced at fine level of gran-
ularity, in a uniform way across the enterprise, and a domain-specific high-level authoriza-
tion language is used, then CPR security infrastructure can be well structured.
We used CPR security architecture at BHS as a concrete example for illustrating the
context in which the problem of engineering access control in distributed applications is
stated. Familiarity with the context will help to the understanding of the problem require-
ments and its solution proposed in this dissertation. We outlined the main issues in con-
structing CPR security architecture. In addition, we grouped them into four categories
according to the type of information enterprise (general or healthcare) they can appear in,
and the type of distributed computing technology they characterize (any or CORBA-spe-
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cific). Finally, we defined most important long and short term goals for CPR security infra-
structure.
2.3.4 Summary
The issues central to the problem of controlling access to the resources of distributed
enterprise applications are of two types: functional and architectural. The functional are 1)
the granularity of protected resources, 2) the enforcement of policies specific to the busi-
ness domain of the enterprise, and 3) the decisions based on elaborate security-related and
unrelated information about the accessing subject, the access operation and the object. Last
but not least, ways must be provided to ensure the consistency of policy enforcement across
multiple applications.
Architecturally attractive solutions must effectively support the evolution of enterprise
systems, i.e. changes to existing applications, their insertion or deletion, changes in busi-
ness processes and security policies, changes in hardware/software platforms, etc. These
qualities need to be achieved at reasonable cost during the development, operation, and
evolution of application systems and the enterprise they comprise. Above all, the solution
shall scale well with the number of applications.
2.4 Evaluation Criteria
Before proposing our solution to the problem, we will review the state of the practise
and research in the next chapter. In this section, we define a framework containing criteria
for evaluating the existing technologies and related work, as well as for analyzing our
approach.
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Any existing or proposed solution should be evaluated on the basis of its adequacy in
addressing the problem. Therefore, the problem statement is the main source for the crite-
ria. Particularly, how well does it address the following main issues?
1. Granularity of protected resources. If a technology or solution does not allow autho-
rization decisions on fine-grain resources, then it cannot be used for protecting applica-
tion resources. We will use the following granularity hierarchy: application, interface,
method, arbitrary resource.
2. Support for policies specific to the organization application domain. There is a
wide range of supported AC models and policies, as it will be shown in Chapter 3. At
one end there are AC mechanisms that support only one model (and the corresponding
policies), for example lattice-based mandatory AC (MAC) [Bell 1975]. At the other
end are solutions that allow implementation of any authorization logic and their support
for policies is limited only by the interface to the logic. In general, the more AC policy
types a mechanism can support the easier it is to configure for required organizational
policies. When applying this criterion we will look at the range of supported AC mod-
els.
3. The variety of information available for making authorization decisions. As we
discussed above, authorization decisions are made by evaluating rules with the use of
information about the subject and object, as well as the operations to be performed by
the former on the latter. The available information is limited. For example some tech-
nologies allow obtaining only authenticated identity of the subject but not the informa-
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tion about group membership or activated roles, which ultimately limits the functional
capabilities of the AC mechanism based on such a technology. We will look into what
information is available and what information is used in authorization decisions.
4. The use of application-specific information. The use of information which is applica-
tion-specific and becomes available only while the application processes the client
request is critical for some application domains (e.g. health care). If a solution does not
allow the use of such information, then full automation of protecting application
resources would not be possible.
5. Support for consistency of policies across multiple applications. It was discussed
earlier that in the enterprise environment, the issue of consistent policy enforcement is
a critical one. We will consider the support for enterprise-wide consistent AC policy
enforcement while examining the available and proposed approaches.
6. Support for insertion and deletion of applications, changes in policies and the
computing environment. No matter how functionally perfect the support for the AC
of application resources is, if it is highly ineffective to accommodate all these changes,
then it is of no good in enterprise settings. Most available approaches support the
changes to some degree. We will evaluate how good the support is. Unfortunately,
there are not any objective quantitative criteria for determining the level of support.
This is why we compare the solutions with each other in regards to this criterion.
7. Solution scalability. Performance and administration scalability highly affects the
approach utility. Regardless of all other merits, if an approach does not scale well it can
not be more then just an academic exercise. Since there is not any benchmark available
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for evaluating the scalability of AC solutions, we will use common knowledge to rea-
son about the scalability. For instance, when it is possible, we will examine the amount
of data that needs to be modified, in order to accommodate a policy change. Another
commonly known measure that we will use is the communication complexity, which is
still regarded as the major factor in the performance of distributed systems.
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3 Related Work
This chapter provides a survey and analyses about available solutions in the area of this
dissertation, i.e. controlling access to the resources of distributed enterprise applications. In
sections 3.1 and 3.2, we survey the existing work in detail, then summarize the discussion
in Section 3.3.
The idea of treating authorization logic as an independent component of software sys-
tems is not new. An abstract model of a reference monitor [Anderson 1972] is a classical
example of authorization decisions being made and enforced outside of applications. The
concept has being employed in the AC design of operating systems from the early days of
computer security. Most operating systems implement authorization logic in the security
part of their kernels [Benantar 1996, Curry 1992, DEC 1989, Gligor 1986, Grampp 1984,
Heydon 1994, Hommes 1990, Karger 1991, Luckenbaugh 1986, McCauley 1979, McIner-
ney 1999, Mullender 1990, Pfleeger 1989, Quarterman 1985, Saltzer 1974, Walker 1980].
Among special-purpose ad-on security software packages, Computer Associates'
Access Control Facility 2 (CA-ACF2) [CA 1998a] and CA-Top Secret [CA 1998b], as well
as IBM's Resource Access Control Facility (RACF) [Benantar 1996, IBM 1976] are the
most known ones. RACF is a security system for MVS and VM operating systems. It acts
as a central control point that mediates access to various system resources by authenticated
users. The operating system's resource managers send user requests to RACF for valida-
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tion. Computer Associates' packages are integrated in operating systems and work in a way
similar to RACF. As a matter of fact, MVS installations have the option to use CA-Top
Secret or CA-ACF2 as their choice of access control software package [Benantar 1996],
which underlines the separation of AC mechanisms from application and even operating
system functions.
3.1 Access Control for Distributed Applications: State of
the Practice
In this section, we review the capabilities and discuss what the main-stream technolo-
gies provide for engineering of AC in distributed software applications. We evaluate their
fitness by applying the criteria described in Section 2.4. Ideally, all security functionality
should be engineered outside of an application system, therefore making it, so called,
"security unaware." This is why we also examine if the distributed security technologies
can enforce AC externally to the application.
In general, there are two types of technologies used for securing distributed software
systems. One type is the technologies that merely provide party authentication, communi-
cation protection, and AC independently of the underlying communication layers. They are
Kerberos [IETF 1993, Neuman 1994a], GAA API [Ryutov 2000a], and SESAME [Kaijser
1998, Parker 1995]. Application developers deliver inter-application communications by
other means (e.g. ONC RPC [Bloomer 1992]). This enables the use and mix of any desired
communication protocols and media. However, developers are overburdened with the
efforts to integrate security with the underlying communication technology.
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Another type is middleware technologies, such as CORBA [OMG 1996b], DCE [Git-
tler 1995], Java [Lai 1999], and DCOM [Microsoft 1998], that provide an underlying com-
munication infrastructure along with the security subsystem, thus enjoying reasonable
integration of both and much more seamless use of the former by developers. Moreover,
some of them (CORBA and DCOM) enable basic AC completely outside of an application
system because access decision and enforcement occur before the remote call is dispatched
to the application.
3.1.1 Java Authentication and Authorization Service
The release of the Java 2 platform introduced a new security architecture [Gong 1997],
which uses a security policy to decide about granting access permissions to the running
code. It uses factors relevant to the code for authorization decisions, such as where the code
is coming from and whether it is digitally signed and, if so, by whom. Such a code-source-
centric style of AC is very different from user-centric authorization policies supported by
conventional computing environments. Java has recently become widely used in enterprise
application systems where different users run the same code. The Java Authentication and
Authorization Service (JAAS) [Lai 1999] is designed to provide a framework and standard
programming interface for authenticating users and for assigning privileges to users. Using
JAAS together with Java 2, an application can provide code-source-centric, user-centric, or
a combination of both types of authorization.
In Java 2 and JAAS (we will refer to the combination as "JAAS"), AC is enforced by
the security subsystem only on Java Virtual Machine (JVM) protected resources, such as
files, sockets, etc. Java objects or other application resources are not protected, so AC has
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to be implemented by an application itself. Application developers can program against the
same authorization API as the one used for the rest of Java 2 run-time if they employ JAAS
authorization.
For an application to use the JAAS authorization mechanism, it needs to 1) construct
an instance of class java. security. Permission representing the protected
resource(s) in question, 2) locate global instance of Po1icy object, 3) obtain permissions
granted to the code and the subject via Policy: : ge t Permiss ions ( ) ,1 and 4) deter-
mine if the returned collection of granted permissions contains the required one.
JAAS supports any level of resource granularity because it specifies a flexible mecha-
nism for defining application-specific protected resources. This is done via access rights
which are permissions in the terminology of Java security architecture. Java permissions
are classes with the common ancestor j ava. security. Permission. Depending on
the semantics of a permission, a group of resources could be associated with it. For example
java. io. SocketPermission is associated with all port numbers in the example
policy in Figure 3-1. There are several pre-defined permissions. They are f ile,
//JAAS principal-based policy
grant
Codebase "http: / /bar . com",
Signedby "bar",
Principal bar.Principal "duke"
{
permission java.io.FilePermission "/cdrom/duke", "read";
permission java.io.SocketPermission "*", "connect";
}
Figure 3-1. Example of JAAS Policy Entry (adopted from [Lai 1999])
1. An application can obtain permissions for processing a client request only once as long as the subject
privilege attributes, code base, and code signer do not change.
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socket, property, runtime, AWT, net, reflect, serializable,
and security. New subclasses of Permission can be defined in order to implement
new types of permissions, including those which are application-specific.
JAAS model defines a generic concept of authorization engine via abstract class
j ava. security. Policy, implementations of which are responsible for determining
what permissions are granted to the code source executing on behalf of the given subject.
The main method of this class, getPermissions (subject, codesource),
returns a collection of permissions granted to the subject with privilege attributes presented
in argument subject, and executing code that came from codesource. A subclass of
Policy can implement a different authorization policy, which should comply with the
class definition. Therefore, the main constraint on such an implementation would be the
syntax of getPermissions () method. JAAS provides a default subclass Policy-
File, which supports authorization decisions according to the source code base, the iden-
tity of the code signer, and the value of privilege attributes possessed by the subject. These
all are used to determine permissions for a particular resource. The flexibility of JAAS
comes from the property that the authorization logic can be implemented in various ways
without deviating from the JAAS AC model. Since Policy is an abstract class and its
main method ge t Permis s ions () could be implemented in many different ways, JAAS
does not constrain implementers to any particular authorization model, which enables sup-
port for policies specific to the organization or to the application domain. It is up to the
implementers of Policy instances to achieve performance and administration scalability.
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JAAS has a generic and extensible support for different authorization factors. Privilege
attributes are not limited to the predefined ones. New attributes can be easily defined via
new Java classes. Moreover, JAAS supports the composition of privilege attributes into
hierarchies, which is important for implementing AC models with relationships between
attributes, for example role-based AC (RBAC) with role hierarchies [Sandhu 1996]. On the
other hand, even semantically the same attributes, if they are implemented as different
classes, are considered dissimilar by JAAS, which introduces a basis for confusion. A
notion of an attribute type, as in CORBA or SESAME, would sufficiently address the prob-
lem.
JAAS architecture does not explicitly support the consistency of authorization deci-
sions across multiple applications because Policy instances used for authorization deci-
sions must be local to the application. However, this does not preclude an implementation
of Policy to delegate authorization decisions to a remote service.
JAAS architecture is relatively adaptable to the changes in applications, authorization
policies, and computing environment. Changes to the policies can be accommodated via
the replacement of the Policy object. Java's dynamic loading mechanism allows the
addition and removal of applications as well as adaptation to various changes in the com-
puting environment.
Because JAAS architecture is defined as a set of several Java abstract classes and inter-
faces, allowing the implementations of very different scalability, we can only analyze the
scalability constrained by the interfaces to its components. We found that the semantics of
Policy: : getPermissions (), which returns the amount of data proportional to the
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number of all permissions in the system granted to the subject, can cause performance scal-
ability problems for policies of some types. Consider for example an implementation of
Policy, which supports, or maps to, an owner-based discretionary AC (DAC) policy
[NCSC 1987], similar to UNIX file permissions. In such systems, there is a set of permis-
sion bits declaring access rights for the owner, the members of the primary and other groups
of each file. Thus ge t Permi s s ions () should return permissions to all files that the user
has. This is justified only when an application needs to make many authorization decisions
for the same subject running the same code. However, when only one authorization deci-
sion is needed in order to process a request or when the code base or signer change, return-
ing all permissions granted to the subject seems inefficient. A more scalable solution would
be a one in which the result of the authorization decision is returned instead.
3.1.2 Distributed Computing Environment
The Open Software Foundation's (OSF) Distributed Computing Environment (DCE)
[Kong 1995], is an underlying RPC infrastructure and a collection of integrated services
that support the distribution of applications on multiple machines. The functionalities pro-
vided by DCE security services include: user authentication, secure data communications
to protect data communicated by an application to other applications over DCE infrastruc-
ture, and authorization for applications [Gittler 1995].
DCE Security is based on Kerberos [IETF 1993, Neuman 1994a], which performs
authentication of users and applications based on cryptographic keys so that communicat-
ing parties can trust the identity of each other. DCE augments Kerberos with a way to trans-
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fer additional privilege attributes to a server that may choose to perform AC based on those
attributes.
The service does not control access to applications or their resources, and DCE appli-
cations are expected to enforce and provide administrative access to authorization policies
on their own. To do so, an application has to implement AC functionality, including an
access control list (ACL) manager and an ACL storage, as shown in Figure 3-2. In order
Client Process 6 Dispense $100.00 permission to
User=jane, Acut
Auo ae Te' Accunrt=1234, ppiain- ACL Mange
Request=Withdraw Yes$100.00
13
Update Permissions
Management Process Give User jane Permission information
Permission to
Withdraw from
Account1 Editing
Cot" Accun Interface ACL Database
Figure 3-2. Authorization Process and ACL Management in DCE-based Application
Systems (from [Caswell 1995])
for an application to use DCE security service for AC, it needs 1) to determine the DCE
object ID (OID) of the resource in question, and 2) to obtain authorization decision from its
ACL manager using the OID.
If an application uses the DCE ACL model for authorization, it associates an ACL with
a protected resource via OIDs, which are used by the ACL manager to determine right
ACLs. The exact definition of "resource" is entirely at the discretion of the application. For
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example, an object could be an item of stored data (such as a file), or could be a purely com-
putational operation (such as matrix inversion). Thus, the concept of OIDs enables any
granularity of protected resources.
DCE ACLs support a limited number of privilege attribute types -- only identities of
the user, who is the resource owner, the owner group, and other group(s). There are also
distinctions between:
" "local" and "foreign" (from another DCE cell) subjects,
" those acting as delegates and primary invokers, and
" entries that specify specific and default policy, i.e. in the absence of any other appli-
cable ACL entry (ACLE).
DCE ACL language is also considerably limited allowing security administrators to
either explicitly grant or deny rights to the subject based only on its identity or group
attributes. The language capability to support policies specific to application or organiza-
tion remains to be seen.
The following simple example from [Caswell 1995] demonstrates (Figure 3-2) how
AC is expected to be implemented by an application system. User j ane makes a request
to withdraw $100.00 from her account number 1234 (step 1). The application interface
passes this information to the ACL manager asking for an authorization decision (step 2).
The ACL manager retrieves the authorization policy for account 123 4 from the ACL data-
base (3) and applies the policy to derive the answer (4). If user j ane is authorized, the
withdrawal is performed (5 and 6).
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In order for an ACL associated with application resources to be administered, DCE
applications are expected to provide a means for it. They can implement DCE standard
ACL administration interface (rdac 1). When Jane's account is first set up, a bank
employee would use an administrative tool to give user j ane the permission to withdraw
money from account 123 4. The editing interface enables the ACL manager to change the
policy. An ACL manager changes a policy by retrieving the current policy, modifying it,
and writing it back to the ACL database. Rdacl interface seems to be the only means of
ensuring the consistency of authorization policies across application boundaries unless
access to the ACL database is implemented as a global service. In the latter case, policy and
application changes could also be accommodated by the DCE environment easier than in
the basic configuration shown in Figure 3-2.
As seen from the discussion above, DCE security service provides rudimentary help to
applications to make AC decisions, and it enforces no AC externally to an application.
Comparatively to its predecessor, Kerberos, it advances privilege attribute management by
enabling attribute types other than subject identity in EPACs. However, the expressiveness
of DCE ACL language is fairly limited, and we could not determine how application-spe-
cific factors could be used in authorization decisions if the mechanisms of DCE ACLs are
utilized. It seems that the increase of the application client or server population would not
drastically affect overall DCE-based enterprise performance because AC decisions are
made using local data. However, administration scalability is poor because policy changes
have to be reflected in the ACL database of every application unless the database is central-
ized. Then the performance scalability would suffer.
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3.1.3 Microsoft Distributed Component Object Model
The Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) [Grimes 1997, Rubin 1999] is a
middleware technology from Microsoft, which extends the Component Object Model
(COM) to support communication among COM objects on different computers running
some flavor of MS Windows OS. A schematic representation of DCOM middleware is
shown in Figure 3-3. DCOM protocol, known as "Object RPC" or ORPC, extends the stan-
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Figure 3-3. DCOM Middleware (from [Microsoft 1998])
dard DCE RPC protocol. At the wire level, ORPC uses standard DCE RPC packets, with
additional DCOM-specific information.
Since DCOM RPC is a derivation of DCE RPC, it is not surprising that its security
model resembles DCE security. ACLs, with the language similar to the one in DCE, are
used to code authorization policies. In DCOM, they are named Discretionary ACLs
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(DACL) to signify the default right of the object owner to modify DACL entries. DACLs
can be configured using DCOMCNFG configuration tool or programmatically using the
Windows NT registry and Win32 security functions. However, these do not change the
essence of the model. What does, though, is the capability of enforcing policies outside of
a DCOM object, and the presence of a hierarchy of policies. This is a considerable advan-
tage over the DCE AC model, where no control is enforced by the security environment,
and an application has to implement its own.
DCOM provides two choices for controlling access to applications and their resources
[Eddon 1999]. With "declarative security," DCOM can enforce AC without any coopera-
tion on behalf of the object or the object's caller; the policies for an application can be exter-
nally configured and enforced. The declarative security policies can be divided into default
policies and component-specific ones. A default policy specifies the default launch and
access settings for all components running on the local machine that do not override these
settings. Component security settings can be used to provide security for a specific compo-
nent, thereby overriding the default security settings.
With another, "programmatic security," DCOM exposes its security infrastructure to
the developer via security APIsi so that both clients and objects can enforce their own
application-specific authorization policies in regards to resources of any granularity, and
using any information as input for the decisions. Programmatic security can be used to
override both default and component security settings in the registry. Figure 3-4 shows the
hierarchy of DCOM authorization policies: 1) policy encoded in the behavior of the com-
1. For example, calling subject identity can be obtained using methods
IObjectContext::IsCallerInRole() and ISecurityProperty::GetCallerSID()
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3. Host-wide Declared Authorization Policy
2. Process-wide Declared Authorization Policy
1. Method-wide Programmed Authorization Policy
Figure 3-4. The Hierarchy of DCOM Authorization Policies and their Scope
ponent implementation, 2) the declarative process-specific, and 3) the declarative host-spe-
cific policies. Policies 2 and 3 are enforced before the call is dispatched to the object
method. In this hierarchy, the inner policies override the outer ones in the following way:
before the invocation reaches the method implementation, statements, if any, from process-
wide policy override corresponding statements in the host-wide policy. If the invocation is
allowed, then it will be dispatched to the method implementation, which will be able to
exercise its own AC policy (policy 3), if any.
A significant hindrance to the authorization model is the granularity of "component-
specific" declarative policy (policy type 2 shown in Figure 3-4). The granularity is per OS
process, and there is no distinction among different object methods. That is, the policy uses
the same DACL to control access to all objects and methods on those objects that a system
process implements. However, if an application needs to have finer level of granularity and
still use the DACL mechanism, it can achieve it, though with more effort and not transpar-
ently to the application logic. An application can associate its fine-grain resource with a
protected resource of the operating system, such as an MS Windows registry key, assume
the identity of the subject, and try to access the OS resource. If this access fails, the assumed
subject did not have permission to access the resource.
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Process-wide and host-wide policies (types 2 and 3) implicitly introduce the notion of
access policy domains for DCOM objects. Unfortunately, the partitioning of objects can be
only according to their locations and not according to their sensitivity or the value of other
parameters. The limitation of authorization policy domains to the host boundaries restricts
the administration scalability of DCOM-based distributed applications because it has to be
performed individually on each host or even for each process.
As we have shown, no application-specific information can be used or application-spe-
cific policies are enforced when declarative AC is exercised. Declarative authorization pol-
icies and their changes have to be administered on a machine-by-machine basis, which
hinders administration scalability and rules out automatic policy consistency across appli-
cation boundaries unless applications are located on the same host.
3.1.4 SESAME
Secure European System for Applications in a Multi-vendor Environment (SESAME)
is an European research and development project, which was started in late the 1980s. It is
also the name of the technology that came out of that project. This technology [Kaijser
1998, Parker 1995] defines components of a security architecture providing the underlying
bedrock upon which full managed security productsl can be built using the following ser-
vices defined by the architecture: authentication, authorization, confidentiality, integrity
and audit.
1. Examples of such products are ICL's Access Manager [McMahon 1995] and Bull SA's Integrated System
Management AccessMaster [BullSoft 1995].
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The work of SESAME components (shown in Figure 3-5) could be described in the
following way. The user logs in the SESAME environment by interacting with a user spon-
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Figure 3-5. SESAME Components
sor (US) client, which then contacts the authentication server (AS) via the authentication
privilege attribute (APA) client. The US authenticates itself to the AS, and then contacts
the privilege attribute server (PAS) and receives from it a privilege attribute certificate
(PAC) containing the subject privileges used for AC decisions. The user is now authenti-
cated and has a PAC, which can be used when starting application clients. The PAC allows
a user to access applications on a computer, which knows nothing about the user, but can
verify the user privileges from the PAC. If the user wants to start an application, the US
contacts the secure association context manager (SACM) for the application client. The
client SACM then contacts the server SACM and they exchange subjects' credentials.
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Next, server SACM contacts the PAC validation facility (PVF) to validate the subject's
PAC. Finally, the user can start the application client and exchange data with the server.
A PAC can be used more than once at more than one target application. It is digitally
signed to prevent it being undetectably tampered with. Privilege attributes can have any of
the following syntax representations: access identity, role(s), primary group, and secondary
group(s).
SESAME technology is not a middleware. Rather it is an architecture for security ser-
vices. It does not provide a means for communication such as ORB bus in CORBA, or RPC
layer in DCE or DCOM. Thus it cannot control pre/post invocation events. This is why AC
and other security functionality has to be specifically invoked by an application system.
This prevents SESAME from providing AC external to an application, as in DCOM
"declarative security" or CORBA. On the other hand, authorization logic is provided to an
application by SESAME-compliant infrastructure, as opposed to DCE where an application
even has to implement ACL storage as well as run-time and management functionality.
Authorization decisions in SESAME are made by the SACM of the target application,
which is responsible for receiving Generic Security Service (GSS) token and passing it to
the SACM using GSS API [Linn 1997]. The target SACM passes the incoming security
information to the PVF for analysis and validation. If all is valid, the SACM receives an
integrity and confidentiality dialog keys from the PVF for protecting exchanges between
the client and the target application. But if the PAC checks made by the PVF fail, the secu-
rity context is not made available to the application.
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Even if the checks succeed, besides routine checks of matching initiator and PAC iden-
tities, the SACM performs an additional AC check according to authorization rules [Parker
1995] represented as a set of access control entries (ACE) compliant with POSIX.6 [IEEE
]. An entry can specify a certain application or "all applications," to be accessible or not
accessible by either an identity, a role, a group or "all initiators."
The smallest unit of AC check in SESAME is an application system. Therefore, either
access is granted to the whole system or any access is denied at all. For distributed appli-
cations, which commonly expose their functionality via several operations with different
AC requirements, such a level of AC granularity is frequently insufficient. Consequently
an application system has to implement additional functionality in order to exercise per-
operation AC. Also, the architecture lacks the capability of applying one authorization
policy to several applications thus requiring each application to be configured individually
to support the policy.
The concept of domain in SESAME pertains to various authorities that manage keys,
identities and privilege attributes. SESAME domains affect AC in the way that the same
user can be granted different identity and privilege attributes in different domains, and the
attributes can be mapped with restriction [Ashley 1997] thus influencing decisions made
by the target SACM. Identity and privilege attribute domains make user security adminis-
tration more scalable for large or multi-organizational environments.
The lack of external AC, coarse granularity of authorization decisions, and the need to
administer the policies on application-by-application basis make SESAME less attractive
then JAAS, DCE, DCOM or CORBA technologies for AC in enterprise distributed appli-
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cations. However, SESAME can be deployed over most communication technologies, and
is known for its advanced model of privilege attributes management and propagation,
which is best suitable for large multi-domain heterogeneous environments [Ashley 1997].
These make it indispensable for building heterogeneous, multi-vendor, high-performance
distributed application systems that require the use of different communication layers, and
authorization based on privilege attributes other than user identity.
3.1.5 CORBA Security
The Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA) technology, including
CORBA Security Service, provides a general-purpose infrastructure for developing and
deploying distributed object-based systems in a broad range of specialized application
domains. All entities in the CORBA computing model are identified with interfaces defined
in the OMG Interface Definition Language (IDL) [OMG 1999a]. A CORBA interface is a
collection of three things: operations, attributes, and exceptions. An implementation of a
CORBA interface is called a CORBA object. Hence, we use "CORBA object" or just
"object" to mean "implementation of a CORBA interface," where it does not cause confu-
sion. Object functionality is exposed to other CORBA-based applications only through the
corresponding interfaces. Objects have object references by which they can be referenced.
An object reference is a handle through which one requests operations on the corresponding
object.
3.1.5.1 Security Model Overview
CORBA Security (CS) standard [OMG 1996b] defines the following functionalities
visible to application developers and security administrators: identification and authentica-
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tion, authorization and AC, auditing, message integrity and confidentiality protection,
authentication of clients and target objects, optional non-repudiation, administration of
security policies and related information. One of CS objectives is to be totally unobtrusive
to application developers. Security-unaware objects should be able to run securely on a
secure ORB without any active involvement on the site of application objects. In the mean-
time, it must be possible for security-aware objects to exercise stricter security policies than
the ones enforced by CS. In the CS model, all object invocations are mediated by the appro-
priate security functions in order to enforce various security policies such as AC.
Every user authenticates when he/she logs into the CS environment. The main result
of authentication is a set of security-related data -- Credentials. The information in
Credentials constitute the identity of the new subject, which initiates requests on
CORBA objects on behalf of the user. Authenticated security attributes are part of the infor-
mation stored in the Credentials object and are used for the purpose of enforcing var-
ious security policies. Because CS defines advanced concepts of privilege attributes,
similar to SESAME, it enables AC policies based on roles, groups, clearance, and any other
security-related attributes of subjects.
CS architecture achieves performance and administration scalability by the means of
policies and policy domains, where any security policy is associated with a policy domain
(or just "domain"). Policies of more than one type could be associated with the same
domain and each object can belong to more than one policy domain. Domains could be
organized in federations, hierarchies or be completely unrelated. AC decisions could be
specific for each object, if the object is located in a separate domain, or a large group of
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objects could be associated with one policy domain. This means that the model scales (in
terms of performance as well as administration) very well without loosing fine granularity.
Unlike DCOM, CORBA objects residing on different computers can be associated with the
same domains.
As in DCOM Security, AC can be enforced completely outside of an application
system because the enforcement occurs at the ORB level. Everything, including obtaining
information necessary for making authorization decisions, is done before the method invo-
cation is dispatched to the target object. As Figure 3-6 shows, policy enforcement code is
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Figure 3-6. Enforcement of Policies in CORBA Security (from [Blakley 1999])
executed inside of CS enforcement sub-system, when a message from client application to
a target object is passed through the ORB. Executed at the client ORB as well as at the
target ORB, the enforcement code uses three sources of information for making decisions
before it enforces them. First is the policy of the domain(s) to which the target belongs.
Second is the information from credentials of the client. In case of AC policy enforcement,
these are client privilege attributes (such as access identity, group membership, role and
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clearance). The third source of information is the message itself which, in case of AC
enforcement, is a request to invoke an operation on the target object.
CS controls access by clients to object methods. Objects, in their turn, are placed in AC
policy domains, which allow the same policy to govern access to the methods of all the
domain members. CS allows stating AC policies in terms of subject and object security
attributes as well as operations implemented by those objects. Operations are grouped via
rights required for invoking them. The rights granted to a subject according to its privilege
attributes should match the required rights of the operation. AC policies control what sub-
jects can invoke what operations on what objects in the domain the policies are defined on.
The expressive power of CORBA AC mechanisms was analyzed by [Karjoth 1998], where
it was shown to support lattice-based mandatory AC (MAC) [Bell 1975]. We discuss in
greater detail the CS authorization model in Chapter 4. We also show there that it is possi-
ble to configure CORBA AC mechanisms to support role-based access control (RBAC)
models, which means that DAC models can be also supported, as Sandhu and Munawer
show in [Sandhu 1998a].
User grouping via privilege attributes, object grouping via policy domains, and method
grouping via the concept of required rights enable high scalability of CS administration,
which is an important factor in object-oriented enterprise distributed environments. Still
there will be applications, in which additional AC has to be exercised (a so called security-
aware application). A security-aware application can do so with the help of CORBA Secu-
rity interfaces. For enforcing conventional AC policies, an application system needs to
know who, wants to access, what protected resource, and in what way. CORBA Security
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provides to an application a means to find out "who." Interface
SecurityLevell : Current, available to an application, defines method
ge t_at tr ibutes ( ) for obtaining subject security attributes.
3.1.6 Generic Authorization and Access Control API
Generic Authorization and Access Control API (GAA API) is published as an IETF
Internet draft authored by Ryutov and Neuman in [Ryutov 2000a]. It defines a framework
for application authorization aiming to address the lack of standard authorization API for
applications using GSS API. Kerberos [IETF 1993, Neuman 1994a] was the first security
technology providing GSS API functionality, and it did influence the model behind GSS
API. Kerberos had only rudimentary support for AC in networked applications: if a client
did not have an authenticated ticket for a particular network server, then it could not estab-
lish a connection with it thus being denied access.
The GAA API model is based on the assumption that the distributed nature of Internet-
based computing requires interactions between entities across autonomous and mutually-
suspicious security domains. The authors also put in the front corner a requirement for a
mechanism which provides authorization decisions on fine-grained resources for a wide
range of systems.
The framework consists of two major parts: a programming interface for obtaining
authorization decisions by application systems, and a "universal" language for AC policy
representation, Extended ACL (EACL) [Ryutov 2000c], which is an extension of the tradi-
tional ACL model. The subject of our discussion is the API itself, which goals are 1) to sup-
port the needs of most applications, thus allowing application developers to refrain from
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designing their own authorization mechanisms, 2) to allow better integration of multiple
mechanisms with application servers (for example, GSS API [Linn 1993] and GAA API
can be integrated to provide authentication of an invoking subject and authorization deci-
sions).
GAA API does not enforce AC externally to an application. Instead, it provides autho-
rization decisions which can be described as follows [Ryutov 2000a]. An authentication
service performs authentication of users and supplies limited credentials, in the form of
GAA API security context, to the application via authentication API, as shown in steps 1
and 2 in Figure 3-7. Then, the application calls GAA API routines (steps 3, 4, and 5) to
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Figure 3-7. Sequence of Events in GAA API Model
check authorization against the policies. The API routines obtain subject identity from
authenticated credentials of the client (step 4a) as well as policies (steps 3a and 4b) from
local files, distributed authorization servers, or by some other means. They combine local
and distributed authorization policies and information. For example, it is possible in the
GAA API model to combine global EACL with the machine or application-specific list,
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which enables the use of application-specific policies. The way the combination happens is
not defined in [Ryutov 2000a] and depends on the concrete implementation of GAA API,
which means that changes in the computing environment and the policies behind the pro-
gramming API are not supported in a standard way and are implementation-specific.
For the purpose of our discussion, the most important API function is
gaacheck_authorization (), which provides applications with authorization
decisions, or indicates if additional checks are required, in regards to the requested opera-
tion(s). Its inputs are 1) a handle1 to the data structure containing rules governing access to
the resource in question, 2) security context containing privilege attributes of the accessing
subject, 3) operations for authorization, and 4) parameters for a parameterized operation.
The output consists of short, yes/no/maybe, and detailed answers. Specifying additional
conditions which have to be met or time limits of the decision, the concept of detailed
answer is unique to GAA API and provides capabilities required in many application
domains. It is a data structure, used only when the short answer is "maybe," that contains a
time window, during which the answer is valid, and a list of zero or more rights granted or
denied to perform requested operations. Each right can be accompanied by the correspond-
ing conditions, if any. Each condition is marked as evaluated or not evaluated. An evaluated
condition could be also marked as met, not met or "further evaluation or enforcement is
required." This tells the application which policies must be enforced.
The application must understand the conditions that are returned unevaluated, or it
must reject the request from the client. If understood, the application checks the conditions
1. It is supposed to be obtained prior to the invocation via function gaaget__objectpolicyinfo() described
below.
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against the information about the request, the protected resource, or environmental condi-
tions to determine whether the conditions are met. The enforcement of the returned condi-
tions is up to the application. An example of condition enforcement is the use of CPU
utilization. It could be specified in the policy that processing of the client request can be
performed as long as the CPU is utilized less than 20%. Such a requirement could not be
enforced by an authorization service. In the GAA API model, it would be passed to an
application as a condition expected to be further enforced. Some other examples of condi-
tions are printer load, provision of payment for access to the resource, and location of the
subject [Ryutov 2000a]. As it can be seen, these authorization conditions give substantial
flexibility for enforcing application-specific policies. Still, it remains to be seen if the con-
cept will not cause tight semantic coupling of authorization service implementation with
the application systems it serves.
The detailed answer may also mean that authorization is not completed yet, and addi-
tional privilege attributes are required. The application requires them from the client
because GAA API attempts to build an authorization model that would fit into the existing,
and, we believe, outdated' model of GSS API implemented first by Kerberos. It reuses Ker-
beros's authentication model, in which only authenticated subject identity is provided. This
is why the GAA API model assumes group membership service, the definition of which it
left beyond the scope of the model. A group server furnishing group membership infor-
mation is the only way by which subject privilege attributes can be obtained. In order to
do it, the client should request group (non)membership certificates from the server
1. We believe GSS API is outdated because some other architectures, such as SESAME, attempted to
extend it. This indicates that the API does not satisfy the needs any more.
59
explicitly. The server is not part of the specification [Ryutov 2000a], although it was intro-
duced earlier by Neuman in [Neuman 1993] and is described in Section 3.2.3.2 as part of
the discussion of the authorization service from the University of Texas at Austin.
Because the client is asked to provide group certificates after it already made an applica-
tion request, it is possible to use application and even request-specific information for
authorization decisions, which gives advantage to GAA API over other authorization
solutions.
However, the use of a group server has significant drawbacks. First a communication
scalability problem is created because some policies might require an undetermined
number of interactions with the server causing possibly remote communications, which
are usually expensive, unless the server and the client are co-located. But such a co-loca-
tion means that the number of group server instances should be proportional to the
number of clients, which is an obvious performance, maintenance and administration
scalability problem. Second, it is very inefficient to obtain subject privilege attributes
over and over even when they are the same during user session.
Another drawback of the approach is that the service, or at least its proxy, should be
co-located in the same process because the only language binding available as of May 2000
is defined in C language [Ryutov 2000b]. The main advantage of the API over the other
reviewed models is the support for a very flexible and powerful concept of additional con-
ditions that should be enforced by the application or met by the client.
GSS API provides very generic low-level abstraction, the use of which by application
developers requires significant integration efforts. This prompted new generations of secu-
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rity technologies for distributed application systems such as CORBA and DCOM, in which
an application can be developed without any notion of underlying security, including AC,
unless it requires the enforcement of complex policies. However, if an application does use
bare GSS API and it requires the authorization on fine grain resources or enforcement of
complex AC policies, then GAA API, not the EACL, meets most authorization needs of
such applications.
3.2 Access Control for Distributed Applications:
State of Research
There are three main research directions in addressing the problem of controlling
access to the resources of distributed enterprise application systems. They are policy
agents, interface proxies and interceptors, and enterprise-wide authorization servers. In this
section, we describe and critique each of them.
3.2.1 Policy Agents
By the term "policy agents," we refer to a direction in the area of AC distributed appli-
cations, the approaches of which suggest the enforcement of AC policies by the means of
native mechanisms available locally in the computing infrastructure of each application
system, as shown in Figure 3-8. They could be the OS AC or add-on packages, AC pro-
vided by the middleware (Section 3.1), by DBMS security layers, or even by AC mecha-
nisms of the application integrated environment. The main feature of these approaches is
achieving the consistency of authorization policies across application boundaries by the
means of centralized AC management via translation of authorization rules into languages
supported by local mechanisms, and the distribution of the rules across application systems.
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All approaches under this direction have the following advantages:
e Inherent fault tolerance. If a mechanism responsible for AC decisions and
enforcement fails, only the application system protected by the mechanism
becomes affected, while all other systems remain protected.
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" For an intruder to gain unauthorized access to all protected resources in a policy
domain, either all AC mechanisms or the policy management, mapping and
distribution infrastructure have to be subverted. Since the latter can be
implemented using off-line techniques, it can be secured much more, without
penalizing run-time performance.
" Locality of the decision making process. In a distributed architecture based on
policy agents, all AC decisions are made locally and this allows achieving
minimum performance penalty.
* Performance scalability. Since the authorization process is naturally distributed
over the computing environments of application systems, authorization is an
issue local for those environments. Thus a greater number of applications does
not cause longer response latency experienced by each application client.
The main challenges facing the approaches are as follows: 1) automation of mapping
a global policy into various representations specific to local AC mechanisms, where even
for the same AC model there could be different implementations and configurations, 2) the
consistency of the enforced global policy, as Hale et al. point out in [Hale 1999], and 3) the
preservation of policy semantics when they are mapped into local mechanisms, similar to
the problem of translating a program written in a high-level language into architecture-spe-
cific binary code.
As the author's experience of performing similar mappings with such commercial sys-
tems as Unicenter/TNG [CA 1999] from Computer Associates shows, the process of
administering the mapping of the subject's global credential information into local creden-
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tials could be so costly and resource-consuming that only very advanced IT departments
could afford it. There might be no other way to solve the problem of managing AC in enter-
prise applications when they are already deployed.
Approaches based on policy agents also suffer from a number of inherent limitations.
First, the granularity and expressiveness of AC policies in a policy domain can be only as
good as those supported by its most coarse-grain and least expressive mechanism. Second,
policy changes can be very slow. For example, on some operating and DBM systems acti-
vation of such changes requires re-initialization of system components or even the entire
system, which makes policy changes an expensive and prone to temporary inconsistency
and frequent downtime periods. This can easily make policies based on periodic authoriza-
tions [Bertino 1996a] unaffordable. Because of these challenges and limitations, we believe
it is very difficult to support a positive answer to the question of whether this approach
employed for new applications is best. Below we describe in details one of the approaches
representing the direction of policy agents.
3.2.1.1 Security Policy Mediators from the University of Tusa
Hale et al. propose in [Hale 1999] an approach for the coordination of security policies
and subject credentials across heterogeneous information systems with the focus on loosely
coupled federations, where no central authority for federation management is possible.
Their approach is twofold. The first part is a ticket-based simple authorization model, to
which a number of authorization models (owner-based DAC [NCSC 1987], lattice-based
MAC [Bell 1975], RBAC [Sandhu 1996], TBAC [Thomas 1994]) are shown to be mapped.
This enables the employment of a single language for authorization rules. The part of their
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work we are interested in is an architecture for authorization process and the policy medi-
ation, which enables the consistency of enforced authorization policies.
In the model, each enterprise manages its own policy mediators [Weiderhold 1992]. A
security mediator is installed on each computer system that manages protected enterprise
resources, as well as on the client systems from which subjects access those resources. Sub-
jects hold a partially implicit and potentially heterogeneous collection of rights to various
information resources to which they need to have access. When subject access resources
across organizational boundaries, they are called "foreign subjects." Security mediators
determine access rights according to the global policy. In case of foreign subjects, the medi-
ators translate subject credentials according to trans-organizational authorization policy.
Each mediator installed on the server host contains the following: a model of the database
containing resources, to whom the local system provides access; global security policy
expressed in the language of simple authorization model, which Hale et al. developed as
part of their work; and coordination policy for managing access by foreign subjects. Coor-
dination policies can take different forms -- mapping foreign subjects to local subjects,
assigning local proxies to act as trusted delegates of foreign subjects, requesting vouchers
from trusted sources for foreign subjects, or mandating joint authorization with local sub-
jects.
Client mediators bundle subject credentials with query fragments to distribute the
query to remote systems. Mediators at the application systems, translate the incoming
requests into local requests according to the database model of the local system resources,
apply their coordination policy to the incoming requests based on the received credentials,
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and then authorize the requests according to the global security policy. The authorization
might be performed by the application AC mechanism.
The major advantage of this approach to the problem of controlling access to applica-
tion resources is the support of multiple AC models where each system or enterprise can
enforce a model most suitable for its own environment without requiring any changes to
what already exists, while continuing the enforcement of the organization-wide authoriza-
tion policy. Such a global policy is mapped into a concrete authorization model. This
enables high adaptability to the changes in applications and computing environments,
although it does not accommodate changes in policy types well.
Another significant advantage is that mediators can hide from the application the pro-
cess of correlating foreign and local subject privilege attributes. This solves the problem of
multiple inconsistent subject privilege attribute sets maintained independently in most
commercial systems today, and the problem of accessing application systems across orga-
nizational boundaries. However, security technologies like SESAME already have
addressed this problem by the means of single sign-on when a subject has one set of privi-
lege attributes used for accessing multiple applications.
The approach of security policy mediators inherits all the disadvantages of policy
agents direction. In addition, the use of mediators on the clients makes it less scaleable
because the amount of change becomes not proportional to the number of application serv-
ers but to the number of clients, which is usually significantly larger.
66
3.2.2 Proxies and Interceptors
The approach of proxies and interceptors, or just "proxy approach" for short, is due to
the obvious desire to add new functionality, AC in this case, on top of the old one. This way,
existing applications can be enhanced with new features and behavior without changes to
their internals. Most capable security services such as CORBA and DCOM follow the
approach by using invocation interception in order to enforce various security policies.
The idea is based on either proxing an application interface or intercepting communi-
cations between interacting application systems by some other means. Access to an appli-
cation is controlled externally to it because authorization decisions are made before a
system gains control and/or after it dispatches an invocation to another system. In order to
achieve it, invocations are intercepted either in the communication or middleware layers,
as illustrated in Figure 3-9. Interception can also occur at the application layer, when a
P ro x A lication
ccess
Figure 3-9. Proxies and Interceptors
system is "wrapped" into its interface surrogates, or additional code is inserted by a com-
piler or other similar tool.
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The main advantage of the direction is that it requires hardly any changes to the appli-
cation system since the reference monitor is implemented externally to it. Another advan-
tage is the ability to make all the decisions locally because interceptors and proxies can be
deployed even in the same process space. Also, if authorization decisions are made locally
and use local data, the approach features inherent performance scalability.
There are a number of significant limitations however. First, AC granularity cannot be
finer than the method level and its arguments (but only when the arguments can be inter-
preted outside of the method implementation). That is, no approach under this direction
allows the control of access to the resource other than interface instances, methods defined
on them, and arguments. Second, authorization decisions cannot be made just-in-time.
They always have to be made either before or after an application system is in the posses-
sion of execution control. Third, because of the above reasons, variables, whose values
become available at some point after the method is invoked but before the decision needs
to be made, cannot be used in authorization rules.
The main disadvantage is that insuring the consistency of enforced policies as well as
the coherency of data used for authorization decisions becomes a challenge,' since there
are as many instances of access controls as application systems. The administration of
proxy-based AC mechanisms will have significant overhead and a high human error rate
unless thoroughly automated, which brings us back to the main objective of the policy
agents.
1. Although it can be partly solved using the policy agents approach.
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We describe and analyze several main approaches following this direction: views rep-
resented as objects and used for enforcing AC, role classes, SafeBots, AC in Legion sys-
tems and security meta objects.
3.2.2.1 Views as Objects
Hailpern and Ossher describe a model in which application objects can have multiple
"views" [Hailpern 1990] whereas each view represents a certain set of methods invokeable
by a specified collection of clients. They suggest the model of views for controlling access
of clients to servers in object-oriented systems. Even though their approach was originally
made in the context of local inter-object invocations, views can be used in distributed het-
erogeneous application systems.
One of the proposed methods for implementing views is to materialize views as objects
(view objects) [Hailpern 1990]. Specifically, all method invocations are addressed to a par-
ticular view with the server, client, and method selector as arguments. The view object then
checks if the client has access permissions for the given server and method. If the check
succeeds, it invokes the server on behalf of the client using a primitive form of invocation
not available to the client. View objects act as proxies for server objects, and perform and
enforce authorization decisions. The approach is a common representative of the direction.
3.2.2.2 Role Classes
Similar to views as objects, Barkley suggests to use proxies ("role classes" according
to his terminology) in order to implement (role-based) AC for application systems [Barkley
1995]. Having methods with the same signatures as the original classes, proxy objects
mediate invocation requests. Barkley deviates from a simple proxy model by introducing
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another layer of proxies -- now on the client side ("client proxies"). Client proxies are used
in order to determine what AC proxy should be used and to direct the call to that proxy. It
is assumed that client proxies can be automatically produced and linked to the client appli-
cation, hence making it completely transparent to the client developers and users. If the
environment used for client-server communications cannot determine the right proxy and
direct the invocation to it, then some mechanism similar to client proxies must be imple-
mented.
3.2.2.3 SafeBots
SafeBots [Filman 1996a, Filman 1996b] is a concept based on software, possibly
mobile, security agents. According to its vision, software security controls are active agents
that "wrap" insecure components, communicate with each other, and are smart enough to
adapt their actions to the local and global interaction contexts. These agents monitor com-
munications by wrapping an application's components and can be programmed to perform
authentication, AC, intrusion detection, or other security controls. They can be structured
either as wrappers for application components, or as independent SafeBot agencies that
support the coordination of SafeBot activities, and may confederate with each other for dif-
ferent purposes.
In order to use SafeBots as security wrappers, the authors make a number of assump-
tions: application systems have well-defined interfaces, can be sequestered (i.e. cannot be
invoked directly without going through SafeBots), and can be substituted. They propose the
automation of application system wrapping.
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SafeBots approach attempts to marry mobile agent technology with security controls
and brings advantages and disadvantages of the former to the latter. SafeBots enable the
implementation of cost-effective, redundant, extendable security controls including AC.
The authors themselves list several inherent limitations [Filman 1996b]: it is difficult to
wrap application systems with complex or rich interfaces (e.g., applications with complex
GUIs, shells or other programming scripts and environments); SafeBots complicate and
increase enterprise security administration; subverting a SafeBot could become a way to
attack systems; and inept security designers could design SafeBots that actually reduce
overall system security; at a time of crisis, SafeBot activity could tie up a system when the
resources are most needed. In addition to these limitations, change of policies requires re-
deployment of SafeBots over all systems affected by the change, which is very expensive
and lengthy in large enterprise settings.
3.2.2.4 Legion
The Legion system [Grimshaw 1998, Grimshaw 1997, Wulf 1996], developed at the
University of Virginia, defines a software architecture designed to support the use of large
collections of heterogeneous computing resources distributed across local- and wide-area
networks as a single, seamless virtual machine. Legion's components include a run-time
system, Legion-aware compilers that target this run-time system, and programming lan-
guages that provide application programmers with a high level abstraction of the system.
The system itself creates, schedules, and utilizes distributed objects to execute the applica-
tion programs.
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Legion security architecture follows the overall design philosophy of the project -- "No
single policy or static set of policies will satisfy every user, so users must be allowed to
determine their own priorities and to implement their own solutions as much as possible"
[Grimshaw 1998]. The architecture requires that every class defines a special member func-
tion Mayl, which has default behavior granting access. Legion security automatically calls
this function before any method invocation, and permits the invocation only if Mayl grants
access. The approach supports mandatory AC via implementation inheritance or delega-
tion. In order to exercise MAC, an implementation of the Mayl method must either dele-
gate its behavior to or inherit it from an organization-wide implementation of MayI. This
raises the question of performance scalability. DAC policies are supported via custom
implementation of MayI for a class. Class implementers can resort to the default imple-
mentation of May I, granting access unconditionally, or inherit implementation from a class
they trust, or write a new one. The code for implementing the security policy is localized
to the MayI method rather than distributed among the member methods. Method IWan-
tTo, a counterpart of Mayl, is invoked by Legion security mechanisms every time an
object makes an invocation on other objects. This enables the enforcement of lattice-based
mandatory security policies [Bell 1975], which control the flow of information to and from
objects.
By enabling nominal initial overhead with simple AC policies, Legion security design
features minimality principle. The use of class-specific Mayl and IWantTo methods
makes the implementation of arbitrary discretionary policies on class-by-class basis easy.
However, the enforcement of mandatory policies or those discretionary policies that need
to be consistent across several systems, seem to be difficult because security administrators
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do not have control over what logic is implemented by application objects launched by
users. Futhermore, the change of enterprise policies requires changes in implementations
of MayI and IWantTo methods, which is not a realistic requirement for contemporary
enterprises with large-scale deployments of service-based and object-based applications.
This can be avoided by using only one instance of these methods across multiple applica-
tions but then the performance should be addressed. Also, implementation inheritance or
delegation requires control over the implementation of an application system, which
becomes less and less realistic with advances of COTS and component systems provided
by various vendors.
3.2.2.5 Security Meta Objects
Security meta objects (SMOs) [Riechmann 1997, Riechmann 1998] is a paradigm pro-
posed recently by Riechmann and Hauck from the university of Erlangen-Nurnberg, Ger-
many. The area of its application is strictly object-based systems.
They propose to "attach" one or more special objects to an object reference. These spe-
cial objects are invoked for each security-relevant operation on the object reference. The
special objects are not visible to the application; that is, protected and unprotected object
references look the same to it. Such special objects can be considered as meta objects [Maes
1987]. SMOs are attached on a per-reference basis. There may be many references to an
object which are not protected or protected by a different SMO. If a client invokes a method
via a protected reference, a special check method of the meta object is implicitly invoked.
This method gains access to some meta information, such as name and parameters of the
method to be invoked. The check method can decide whether it wants to grant access or
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not. To grant access, it returns control to the run-time system, which continues with the
method invocation. If access is to be denied, an exception is raised or the invocation is ter-
minated with an error result. If several SMOs are attached to the same reference, then they
are "asked" sequentially before access is granted. A single SMO can be used to protect mul-
tiple references. It is not possible to detach SMOs from a reference unless the SMO
removes itself.
Meta objects can be used for enforcing arbitrary AC policies as well as for implicit and
transitive AC of object references passed as a parameter or result. Another advantage of the
approach is that it allows the development of SMOs totally independent of the objects they
protect and vice versa.
The approach provides flexibility lacking from other paradigms in this direction, such
as Legion (Section 3.2.2.4). In particular, it allows "attaching" multiple SMOs to the same
object reference so that several policies or additional functionalities can be composed. This
is very similar to CORBA request interceptors [OMG 1996a], which are invoked before an
invocation is scheduled on an interface implementation by the ORB or before it is prepared
to be sent to another CORBA object. However, SMOs are "attached" to an object reference.
Whereas, CORBA interceptors are "attached" to an instance of an interface implementation
identified by an object key in the scope of the object adapter. Thus, the same interceptors
are used to control access to an object, as opposed to the SMO paradigm, where different
SMOs can be attached to different object references that "point" to the same object.
In addition to the general limitations of proxies and interceptors direction discussed in
Section 3.2.2, SMO paradigm has a number of its own drawbacks. First, in order for the
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SMO approach to be realistic, support for meta-objects is needed in the desired middleware
technology. SMO authors use MetaJava system [Kleinoder 1996] to prototype the concept.
However, to the best of our knowledge contemporary industrial middleware systems such
as CORBA, DCE, Java, and DCOM do not support attachment of (meta) objects to object
references. Second, they assume that object references are safe, that is, the references are
only generated and controlled by a trusted run-time system and cannot be tampered with.
It is a very restricting assumption. Third, we cannot find a solution for the problem when
the policies governing access to an object change, in such a way that new SMOs need to be
added or old ones removed or replaced, after the object's reference has been released. This
means that policies for an object cannot be changed after an object reference is released to
the world. This renders SMO-based solutions unusable for the real-life computing enter-
prises, unless the limitation is somehow addressed.
3.2.3 Authorization Servers
The third direction in AC for distributed application systems is based on authorization
services. Such a service is logically one per policy domain, even though its instances can
be replicated in order to achieve desired level of availability, fault tolerance, performance
and scalability. Authorization decisions are made by an instance of the service -- authori-
zation server. An application system enforces decisions made by an authorization service
without knowing how they have been made, as shown in Figure 3-10. Thus both the appli-
cation and the authorization server are part of a reference monitor [Anderson 1972].
We consider a research project on generalized framework for AC (GFAC) [Abrams
1991, Abrams 1990a, Abrams 1989, Abrams 1990b] at the MITRE Corporation as a pre-
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Figure 3-10. Authorization Servers
decessor of all other attempts to develop the concept of authorization service. The project
endeavored to build a theoretical framework that explicitly recognizes the main informa-
tion components for AC -- subject and object security-related attributes, access context,
authorities, and rules, where they showed that "the rules for AC are an entity that is separate
from, although necessarily related to, the model of the trusted computing base (TCB) inter-
face" [LaPadula 1990]. Moreover, La Padula concludes that in a networking environment
"one can conceive of an access control engine realized as a server, with access requests han-
dled via a remote procedure call mechanism" [LaPadula 1990].
The main advantages of approaches based on the concept of an authorization server
are:
e Logical centralization of AC rules, which gives inherent consistency and
coherency of authorization policies enforced throughout a policy domain.
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* Ease of policy change and update because authorization is made in a logically
single place.
* Since authorization logic is centralized and decoupled from the application
logic, it is possible to replace a policy with a new one of a different type
without affecting application systems.
. Centralization of authorization rules naturally features single point of
administration for all systems belonging to one AC policy domain, significantly
lowering the cost of administration.
. Since an application system decides when to obtain an authorization decision
from the server, it can do so right at the time when such a decision is needed.
. Authorization decisions on resources of any level of granularity can be obtained
from the server because an application uses the server while it is processing a
request. This lifts the limitation of the other approaches, namely Proxies and
Interceptors, in which the granularity can be only as fine as a method on an
interface instance.
For this approach to be feasible, several important issues must be addressed. First, it is
much more challenging to design an implementation of such a server so that it does not
become a bottleneck in terms of performance. Second, if the server fails, all application sys-
tems served by it will have to resort to a simplistic and very limiting policy such as "always
deny" or "always grant," which would render systems un-operational. Thus provision of
high degree fault-tolerance needs to accompany such servers. We describe in detail the
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reported work on authorization servers since it directly relates to the subject of this disser-
tation.
3.2.3.1 Authorization Server from HP
The design principles described by Varadharajan et al. in [Varadharajan 1998] were
used in the development of Praesidium Authorization Server [HP 1996], which is a rule-
based authorization facility for distributed application systems. The work, according to the
paper, began in 1993, although the paper, apparently the first research reporting the work,
appeared in 1998. This is one of the first works in the area of authorization service practical
design and implementation for distributed systems that has been reported in the literature.
Varadharajan et al. outline several design principles for authorization in distributed
systems that some architects of enterprise security systems might find useful, although
these principles are not supported with any study on their validity. The authors propose to
classify security information in a two-dimensional space: one dimension is the generality
and the other is the dynamics of the information. Hence, they identify three groups of infor-
mation: generic and static, specific and static, and specific and dynamic. Using this classi-
fication, they suggest to design distributed security infrastructure in such a way that the
information is stored either in a central server and is "pushed" to the target by the client, or
near or on the target and "pulled" at the time of the decision process. The design sugges-
tions outline three main parts of an authorization infrastructure: 1) a domain-wide central
authority storing and managing generic-static security information, 2) a domain-wide cen-
tral authority dealing with specific-static information, and 3) a per target (or per a group of
related targets) component dealing with specific-dynamic information.
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Another contribution of the work is the location and the types of authorization checks.
Although it is not a novel point of view, we did not encounter similar considerations in the
literature. The paper suggests considering three points of authorization checks: a check if a
subject should access an application at all (Level I), then a check on the type of the function
to be performed (Level II), and a check from within the application program (Level III).
We believe that the value of this classification is in the establishment of the common lan-
guage and conceptual points for reasoning about authorization in distributed systems.
The authors distinguish between two stages in the functionality of their distributed
authorization service: the administration phase and the "run-time" phase. They make such
a delineation because they bring forward two arguments for maintaining distinct represen-
tations of authorization information in the service. The arguments are the existence of infor-
mation captured during the administration phase that can be compiled before access
decision time for the performance purposes, and the possibility to use different replication
strategies for the administrative information versus the information needed for access eval-
uation decisions at the application servers. This premise is the driving force behind the
design of the authorization server, which considers the system as two domains -- adminis-
tration (the management of privileges and profiles granted to subjects) and run-time (fur-
nishes authorizations to applications).
The run-time domain consists of an evaluation engine and the run-time database of pre-
compiled rules. The authorization decisions are made in regards to the following:
Level I DCE IDL interface name (process names for GSS-API),
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Level II Name of the procedure specified by the DCE IDL file (application-
defined for GSS-API),
Level IlIl authorization rule.
The service design outlines several elements and approaches that have been employed
in other similar works including Adage (Section 3.2.3.3 on page 86) and the work
described in this dissertation. The main elements are the encapsulation of authorization
functionality into a service available in the distributed environment and the explicit divi-
sion of the server into administrative and run-time domains.
The main drawback of the reported work is the lack of any study on the validation of
the design principles and evaluation of the authorization service proposed in the paper. No
research analyzing the suggested approach is in the paper or published separately.
3.2.3.2 Distributed Authorization Service from the University of Texas
Woo and Lam from the University of Texas at Austin researched the theory and prac-
tice of constructing a distributed authorization service [Woo 1993a, Woo 1993b, Woo
1993c, Woo 1993d, Woo 1998]. As as result, they designed such a service [Woo 1993c,
Woo 1998], the key features of which are a language-based approach for specifying autho-
rization rules and authenticated delegation. Their design is based on the prior work of
Neuman [Neuman 1993], where he outlines an authorization protocol for distributed appli-
cation systems.
They observe that most existing application systems perform their own authentication,
authorization, accounting and auditing [Woo 1993c]. Even though authorization is often
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perceived to be tightly coupled with an application and hence cannot be easily abstracted,
Woo and Lam suggest that a better approach would be to factor these functions out and
implement them separately as a set of core services. The set can in turn be used as a basis
for building other generic services and application systems.
The main motivation of their research was to study two problems in the construction
of an authorization service for distributed systems: (1) how to identify the commonalities
in authorization requirements of application systems and to design an appropriate abstract
representation to capture these commonalities, as well as (2) what secure protocols should
be used for off-loading authorization from application systems to authorization servers and
for interactions among various enterprise entities. Apparently they identify these problems
by drawing an analogy with authentication services in distributed systems [Burrows 1990,
Lampson 1991, Woo 1992], where common representation of user credentials and interac-
tion protocols for secure exchange of authentication information are the distinguishing fac-
tors of various architectures [IETF 1993, Molva 1992, Neuman 1994b, OMG 1996b, OSF
1996, Schiller 1988, Tardo 1991]. However, it is not evident that those are really the main
problems in constructing a distributed authorization service. An application system, for
example, might just use RPC over secure (i.e. authenticity, confidentiality, and integrity
protection) channel to obtain an authorization decision from an authorization server
[Beznosov 1999b, Varadharajan 1998, Zurko 1998] thus avoiding the issue of the interac-
tion protocols.
The authors claim the following advantages of a separate authorization service [Woo
1993c]: 1) savings in re-implementation effort for each application system, 2) application
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systems are relieved of the authonzation task, which can lead to higher throughput, 3) a
specialized authorization service can afford the use of better methods in making AC deci-
sions than would be justified for individual application systems, 4) an authorization service
can be verified to be secure once and for all, reducing the complexity in verifying the secu-
rity of an application system, 5) anonymity (if desired) can be achieved with the use of a
trusted authorization service, 6) a uniform authorization service can contribute to the uni-
formity of accounting and auditing functions, hence facilitating the construction of distrib-
uted accounting and auditing services.
The architecture of the distributed authorization service, proposed by Woo and Lam,
consists of five main entities:
1. Service Locator. It responds to a client's request with a list of application
systems that implement the requested service, and possibly a list of authorization
servers for the application systems. In its functions, such a locator is very similar
to CORBA directory or trader services.
2. Authentication server. An authentication server authenticates users during their
initial sign-on and supplies them with an initial set of credentials, as well as
enables mutual authentication between clients and servers.
3. Authorization server. An authorization server performs authorization on behalf
of an application system if the system elects to off-load its authorization to the
server. To do so, an application needs to contract an authorization server for this
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purpose using a contracting protocol. An authorization server provides clients
with authorization certificates which are to be forwarded by clients to
applications along with their requests.
4. Group server. A group server maintains and provides clients with group
membership information in the form of (non)membership certificates to be
forwarded to the authorization server together with the client's requests.
5. System monitor. By the means of several processes executing a distributed
algorithm, a system monitor tracks the values of system predicates indicating
overall system status. It is not clear why Woo and Lam included a system
monitor, pertaining more to the network management then to security, in the
architecture of an authorization service.
The entities are services that in concert provide the functionality required for an appli-
cation system to delegate authorization and to monitor the systems. While being logically
disjoint, all or some of them can be integrated into one server.
Woo and Lam designed a protocol enabling the interaction among the five entities. We
are going to omit a detailed description of the interaction and the supporting protocol,
which can be found in [Woo 1993c]. Here, we will point to the key features of the interac-
tion required for the successful use of authorization in the model.
Application system E locates, possibly through a service locator, an authorization
server A, and, after mutual authentication via authentication service, contracts it to autho-
rize access to E. The contract is enacted using a contracting protocol at the end of which A
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Figure 3-11. Authorization-related Interactions (from [Woo 1993c])
has an authorization specification, which is a description of authorization policies,
expressed in generalized ACL (GA cL), governing access to E services. Upon success in
contracting, E notifies service locator that A is delegated to perform authorization for E.
From now on, every client is responsible for obtaining a reference to A from a service loca-
tor, and acquiring an authorization certificate from A, before E will serve the client. A group
service comes into play, when a client requests an authorization certificate from A, which
might require the client to obtain one or more (non)membership certificates from a group
server, before A can authorize the client.
The ideas used by Woo and Lam (we will refer to it as WL architecture/service) are
very similar to the ones in Kerberos -- a client goes to a trusted third party (TGS in Ker-
beros, and authorization service in WL work) and gets a ticket (session key in the former
and authorization certificate in the latter) in order to access a server. The work seems to be
an effort to cure Kerberos and provide authorization service that would be in harmony with
it. Kerberos lacks the management of subject privilege attributes and does not assume any
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middleware infrastructure in place. This is why such different functionalities and corre-
sponding services, as authentication, privilege attribute management (via group service),
location discovery, authorization, and even system monitoring are mixed into WL architec-
ture.
The concept of a group service deviates from the traditional model where subject priv-
ilege attributes (including group membership ones) are identified during authentication
phase, and fixed during the session lifetime. The group service allows the use of authenti-
cation technology that is not capable of identifying all privilege attributes of the subject
during authentication phase. This can potentially make the authorization process very inef-
ficient, if the client has to interact additionally with the remote group server for each appli-
cation request.
The granularity of authorization decisions in WL solution cannot be fine because prior
to contacting an application, the client needs to know exactly for what authorization it
should ask the authorization service. For example, in a health care organization that has a
service allowing various queries of type "give me records of those patients that have
attribute X," the client would have to obtain authorizations for accessing records of all
patients selected by the query, which is not possible to know before the query is performed.
In some cases, a client knows at most the application and its function that it wants to invoke,
and the invocation arguments, and not what resources have to be accessed in order to per-
form that function. This makes WL authorization service architecture useful only for such
network services as Telnet [Postel 1983], FTP [Postel 1985], etc., where the only authori-
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zation required is to open a session with the server. The rest is controlled via operating
system AC mechanisms.
Another critique about WL approach is the contracting protocol between an applica-
tion system and the authorization server. The authors assume that the application is the
owner and the source of its authorization policies. However, in most mid to large size orga-
nizations, authorization policies are enterprise-specific, and not application-specific. Thus,
the policies should not reside on the application. An application ideally should not be
involved in policy management, administration, or distribution.
WL architecture cannot be used in those distributed computations which require an
invocation chain with the delegation of client privileges to the intermediate services,
because the client is involved in obtaining authorization for any invocations on its behalf.
This limits the approach to those invocations where there are no delegated sequences of
calls among remote application servers.
Overall, the WL approach to application authorization achieves its goals listed above.
However, it has significant limitations that render the applicability to only simple distrib-
uted systems that have Kerberos as their primary security technology, and do not have
requirements for fine-grain AC or invocation with delegation of client privileges.
3.2.3.3 Adage
Zurko et al. report on the design and their studies made on the Authorization toolkit for
Distributed Applications and Groups (Adage) [Zurko 1998], which is mainly an authoriza-
tion service for distributed computing environments. Adage architecture was based on the
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following principles: user-centered design, policy neutrality, modularity and the use of
RBAC foundation. The primary goal of their work was to prototype an authorization ser-
vice for use with distributed applications whose emphasis was on the usability of its admin-
istrative interface and tools.
The Adage system consists of a policy definition client for administering policies and
a policy decision server for furnishing authorization decisions. The client contains the GUI
and Authorization Language (AL) interpreter and communicates with the Authorization
Decision Server (ADS) through the administration API. The GUI and AL can be replaced
with other clients. Applications wishing an authorization decision access the ADS through
the authorization API. Administration and authorization APIs are defined using CORBA
IDL and implemented via CORBA technology.
The ADS stores policy information supplied by the administrative clients in a database
called the User Authorization Database (UAD). The ADS contains a translator for trans-
forming the information in the UAD into a form more suitable for making fast authorization
decisions. This database is called the Engine Authorization Database (EAD). The authori-
zation engine is the other major piece of the ADS, which uses the EAD to find rules appli-
cable to a given decision.
The main research objective of Adage project is to design an authorization service for
distributed application systems that would enable the use of administrative and application
interfaces constructed according to the principles of psychological acceptability and usabil-
ity and to perform usability study of the system. Such a goal is orthogonal to the goal of this
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work described in Chapter 2. Hence, we believe that studies reported in this dissertation are
complemented by the results reported by the Adage project.
3.3 Chapter Summary
The idea of authorization decisions being separated from application logic is not new.
An abstract model of a reference monitor [Anderson 1972] is a classical example of autho-
rization decisions being made and enforced outside of applications. The industry achieved
considerable results in regards to the control of access to operating system and middleware
resources. Most operating systems implement authorization logic in the security part of
their kernels. There are also special-purpose ad-on security software packages that furnish
authorization decisions to operating systems [Benantar 1996, CA 1998a, CA 1998b, IBM
1976].
Middleware technologies provide several means to control the use of distributed ser-
vices exposed via application interfaces. There are two groups of technologies used for
securing distributed software systems. One group is the technologies that merely provide
party authentication, communication protection, and access control independently of the
underlying communication technology: Kerberos [IETF 1993, Neuman 1994a], SESAME
[Kaijser 1998, Parker 1995] and GAA API [Ryutov 2000a]. This enables using and mixing
any desired communication protocols and media, but developers are overburdened with
significant efforts to integrate the security technology with the underlying communications.
Another group is middleware technologies, such as CORBA [OMG 1996b], DCE [Git-
tler 1995], Java [Lai 1999], and DCOM [Microsoft 1998], that provide the underlying com-
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munication infrastructure along with the security subsystem, thus enjoying reasonable
integration of both and much more seamless use of the former by developers. Moreover,
some of them enable basic access control completely outside of an application system
because access decision and enforcement occur before the remote call is dispatched to the
application server.
The Java Authentication and Authorization Service (JAAS) is designed to provide a
framework and a standard programming interface for authenticating users and for assigning
privileges to users. Access control is enforced only on system resources, such as files, sock-
ets, etc. but not on Java objects and other application resources. JAAS has very generic and
extensible support for different privilege attributes which can be easily defined via new
classes. The source code base, the identity of the code signer, and the value of the subject
privilege attribute are passed to the authorization code via Policy class interface for
authorization decisions. JAAS allows any granularity of authorization decisions, and it
does not constrain implementers of authorization policies to any particular mechanism or
to the information used for the decisions. It also enables seamless change of policies. How-
ever, the architecture does not address the consistency of authorization policies across mul-
tiple applications. Nor does it have any provisions for achieving performance and
administration scalability.
In the DCE, application systems are expected to enforce and provide administrative
access to authorization policies themselves. An application system can use DCE access
control list (ACL) but it has to implement most of access control functionality, including
ACL storage and manager, and its administration. DCE Security supplies an application
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only with the caller's subject and group identities. Cross-application administration of
authorization logic is not directly supported although administrative interface for doing the
administration on per-application basis is defined, yet it is not a scalable solution.
The security model of DCOM resembles DCE security. As with DCE, ACLs are used
to code authorization policies. The main advance of DCOM is the capability of enforcing
policies outside of objects with the presence of process and host-specific policies in addi-
tion to the capability for an application to use DCOM Security API for its own AC. The
authorization model is significantly hindered by the granularity of the so-called "compo-
nent-specific" policy where there is no distinction among different objects and their meth-
ods in the same OS process. Component- and host-wide policies implicitly introduce the
notion of access policy domains; still it is not clear if such domain partitioning is an admin-
istratively scalable and functionally successful solution. The administration has to be per-
formed individually on each host or even for each process, which is better than in DCE but
still limited. Although DCOM Security provides ways for application systems to exercise
fine grain AC in an application-specific way, application-specific policies cannot be
enforced and only security-related attributes of subjects and objects can serve as input for
external AC.
SESAME is an architecture for security services which does not specify a communi-
cation layer. Thus it cannot control pre/post invocation events. This is why AC and other
security functionality has to be specifically activated by an application. This prevents
SESAME from providing AC externally to applications. Another drawback of SESAME
authorization is the lack of support for applying one policy to several application systems
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located on separate hosts. The unit of authorization check is an application system. All
these, especially the granularity of AC, make SESAME less attractive then JAAS, DCE,
DCOM or CORBA technologies for engineering access control to application resources.
However, SESAME is neutral to the underlying communication protocols, and is known
for its advanced model of privilege attributes management and propagation. This makes it
indispensable for building heterogeneous, multi-technology and multi-organization distrib-
uted applications that require authorization based on privilege attributes, other than user
identity, and the use of different communication technologies.
In CORBA Security, access control can be enforced completely outside of an applica-
tion system. AC decisions are based on subject privilege attributes, required rights of the
method, and the access control policies of the domains to which the object belongs. The AC
model scales very well without losing fine granularity, for the decisions could be specific
to each object, if the object is located in a separate domain, or a large group of objects could
be associated with one policy domain. Unlike DCOM, CORBA objects residing on differ-
ent computers can be associated with the same policy domains. Because CS defines
advanced concepts of privilege attributes, it enables AC policies based on roles, groups,
clearance, and any other security-related attributes of subjects. User grouping via privilege
attributes, object grouping via policy domains, and method grouping via the concept of
required rights enable high administration and performance scalability of AC mechanisms.
If an application system is to enforce its own AC, it can do so with the help of CORBA
Security API, which allows it to obtain subject security attributes, including privilege
attributes. However, application-specific policies are difficult to enforce and the use of
application-specific information in the CORBA AC is limited.
91
Generic Authorization and Access Control API (GAA API), published as an IETF
Internet draft, defines a framework for application authorization. The API aims to address
the lack of standard authorization interfaces for those applications which use the generic
security service (GSS) API. This is why GAA API's authorization model specifically fits
into the existing GSS API. If an application uses GSS API, which provides very generic
low-level abstraction, and it requires the protection of fine grain resources or the enforce-
ment of complex authorization policies, then GAA API defines interface with enough capa-
bilities for most applications. The main advantage of the API over the other reviewed
models is the support for the very flexible and powerful concept of additional conditions
that can support application-specific policies. The drawbacks of the API are that it only
defines the interface between an application and an authorization mechanism, and the
model addresses neither administration scalability nor the consistency of authorization pol-
icies across multiple applications.
Ideally, all security functionality should be engineered outside of an application sys-
tem, therefore making it so called "security unaware." However, this is difficult to achieve
for the majority of application systems, where access control, and other security policies,
are too complex, or require too fine control, to be supported by the general-purpose security
technologies. This is why fine-grain control of distributed application resources is done tra-
ditionally in an ad-hoc manner [Wilson 1997], and there are no automated means to ensure
enterprise-wide consistency of such controls.
The research community has being working towards systematic ways of controlling
access to resources in distributed heterogeneous application systems. There are three main
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research directions in addressing the problem. They are policy agents, interface proxies and
interceptors, as well as enterprise-wide authorization services.
The direction of policy agents is motivated mainly by the goal of accommodating the
existing body of products and technologies already deployed in organizations. The key
property of the direction is centralized AC management via the translation of authorization
rules into languages supported by local mechanisms, and the distribution of the rules across
systems, which is achieved with the help of policy agents residing on computers hosting
applications systems.
Approaches under this direction have a number of advantages: there is inherent fault
tolerance; enterprise security is naturally compartmentalized without penalizing run-time
performance; the architecture facilitates achieving nominal performance overhead; there is
high degree of run-time autonomy -- a trait essential for achieving performance scalability
and fault tolerance.
The main challenges facing the approaches are the consistency of enforced global pol-
icies and automation of mapping a global policy into various instances of AC mechanism
languages and representations. The approaches also suffer from a number of inherent lim-
itations. First, the granularity and expressiveness of AC policies in a policy domain can be
only as good as the policies supported by the most coarse-grain and least expressive AC
mechanism in that domain. Second, distribution of policy updates can be very slow, which
would easily make policies based on periodic authorizations un-affordable. The direction
of policy agents becomes irreplaceable, if other approaches, such as proxies and authoriza-
tion services, fail in those circumstances when application systems are already deployed.
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The question if it is the best way to address the problem of application-level AC for newly
developed systems remains opened.
The approaches under another direction employ either interface proxies or interception
of inter-application communications. Access to an application system is controlled exter-
nally. Authorization decisions are made before an application system gains control and/or
after it dispatches an invocation to another system. In order to achieve it, invocations are
intercepted either in the communication, middleware, or at the application layer.
The main advantages of the direction are that it does not require almost any changes to
the application system, the reference monitor is implemented externally to it, and its size
can be controlled by security developers. This makes the direction a good alternative to
policy agents approach for controlling access to resources of already deployed applications.
Moreover, if an existing application lacks any AC mechanism, proxies and interceptors
become the only choice. Another advantage is the ability to make all the decisions locally
to an application system, which facilitates performance scalability.
There are a number of significant limitations though. First, the granularity of AC
cannot be finer than method and, when arguments can be interpreted outside of method
implementation, its arguments. Second, the decisions always have to be made either before
or after an application system is in possession of control. Third, variables, whose values
become available at some point after the method is invoked but before a decision needs to
be made, cannot be used in authorization decisions. Fourth, since there are as many
instances of access controls as application systems, insuring the consistency of enforced
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policies as well as the coherency of data used for authorization decisions becomes a chal-
lenge.
Another direction is based on authorization services. Decisions provided by an
instance of the service, authorization server, are enforced by an application system. Both
an application system and an authorization server constitute a reference monitor, which
requires an application system to be trusted to enforce AC decisions.
The goal of authorization services is to factor common AC decision functions out of
application systems and implement them separately as an infrastructure service. The main
advantages of the direction are inherent consistency and the coherence of authorization pol-
icies; the ease of policy changes and updates because authorization is made in a logically
single place; the ability to change policies and their policy types without affecting applica-
tion systems; the relatively low cost of access control administration; the ability to obtain
authorization decisions just when they are needed; and potentially any level of granularity
of protected resources.
However, in order to construct a successful architecture for a distributed authorization
service, one must address several key problems. They are performance, fault tolerance,
scalability, security of communicating authorization information, the guarantee of authori-
zation decisions being enforced, and the common representation of information used for
making the decisions.
We expect that successful architectural solutions most probably will employ a combi-
nation of proxies, interceptors, policy agents, and authorization services because solutions
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from all three groups complement each other. For systems with existing AC mechanisms
tightly integrated into applications, policy agents is the only choice. In those existing sys-
tems where AC mechanisms are missing, weak, or have too coarse granularity, interceptors
and proxies, combined with the ideas from policy agents and authorization services could
cure the problem. New applications with requirements for fine-grain access control, com-
plex or very dynamic authorization policies or to be deployed in organizations of different
types (e.g. military, government, finance, health care, telecommunications) and sizes, will
be best constructed with the use of the authorization server approach.
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4 Supporting RBAC Using
CORBA Security
We surveyed the AC mechanisms of the existing middleware technologies in the pre-
vious chapter and showed that they are inadequate for solving the problem of controlling
access to application resources completely. However, some of the mechanisms, such as in
CORBA and DCOM, allow the enforcement of authorization policies outside of applica-
tions. In addition, they are very well integrated with the corresponding services. These two
factors make the use of middleware AC mechanisms, when they are sufficient, more favor-
able than application-level control. The latter is used when the mechanisms are functionally
inadequate. Before a system architect opts to employ application-level AC, it is important
to take maximum advantage of middleware AC. This is why the study of middleware AC
capabilities is crucial for engineering the protection of application resources.
In this chapter, we make two contributions. First, we show the capabilities of the
CORBA AC mechanism by providing a detailed and illustrative description. More impor-
tantly, we propose a CORBA protection system configuration which formally defines the
state of the system. Using the definition, we specify an algorithm for making authorization
decisions in CORBA. In addition to the precise explanation of the CS AC semantics, the
algorithm fills in the gap in the specification [OMG 1996b], which uses only English prose
to explain how AC decisions are performed. Second, we show how role-based access con-
trol (RBAC) models could be supported using the CORBA Security service. Using the
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defined configuration of the CORBA protection system, we provide definitions of RBACo
and RBAC1 models in the language of CORBA Security. Furthermore, we describe what
is required from an implementation of the CORBA Security service in order to support
RBACo-RBAC 3 models. Our approach allows an implementation compliant with CS spec-
ification to support RBACo. Additional functionality, which is beyond the scope of CS
specification, should be implemented in order to support RBAC, and/or RBAC 2. This work
advances the understanding of CORBA AC mechanisms' capabilities, which is vital to the
use of middleware in protecting application resources. The content of this chapter is based
on the materials from [Beznosov 1999a].
4.1 Overview of RBAC and Motivations
RBAC [Sandhu 1996] is a family of reference models in which permissions are asso-
ciated with roles and users are assigned to appropriate roles. A role can represent compe-
tency, authority, responsibility or specific duty assignments. Some variations of RBAC
include the capability to establish relations between roles, between permissions and roles,
and between users and roles. There are four established RBAC reference models: unrelated
roles (RBACo), role-hierarchies (RBAC 1), user and role assignment constraints (RBAC2),
and both hierarchies and constraints (RBAC3). RBAC supports three security principles:
least privilege, separation of duties and data abstraction.
A major purpose of RBAC is to facilitate access control administration and review.
RBAC is a promising approach to address the needs of the commercial enterprises better
than lattice-based mandatory access control (MAC) [Bell 1975] and owner-based discre-
tionary access control (DAC) [Lampson 1971]. Recent series of papers describe ways to
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model or implement RBAC using the technologies employed by the commercial users:
Oracle [Notargiacomo 1995], NetWare [Epstein 1995], Java [Giuri 1998], DG/UX [Meyers
1997], object-oriented systems [Barkley 1995], object-oriented databases [Wong 1997],
MS Windows NT [Barkley 1998], and enterprise security management systems [Awischus
1997]. Evidence of RBAC recognition in the US government is the fact that the proposed
rules on security from the Department of Health and Human Services [DHHS 1998]
include RBAC as one of the required choices for access control.
At the same time, the commercial market is experiencing the spread of systems based
on CORBA technology. Due to its general nature, CORBA Security (CS) is not tailored to
any particular access control model. Instead, it defines a general mechanism which is sup-
posed to be adequate for the majority of cases and could be configured to support various
access control models. For example, it was shown how to implement lattice-based MAC
using the CORBA authorization model [Karjoth 1998]. In the next few years we expect to
witness significant financial investments in the enterprise-wide deployment of CS in com-
mercial and government organizations, including those who will construct their security
policies utilizing RBAC concepts. It is important to foresee if CS will fully support RBAC
models. However, we are not aware of any work in the research community that has
explored the potential of CS for the support of RBAC reference models.
4.2 CORBA Access Control Mechanisms
First, we give a detailed, though informal, description of the CORBA AC mechanism.
Then we formulate a CORBA protection state configuration and define the authorization
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algorithm. We will use the language of the configuration later in the chapter to discuss the
support of RBAC by CORBA Security.
4.2.1 Informal Description
We introduced the main concepts of CORBA Security in Chapter 3. Before we go into
detailed discussion of CS AC mechanisms, let us briefly review CS. In short, all object
invocations are mediated by the appropriate CS functions for the enforcement of various
security policies. The functions are tightly integrated with the ORB because all messages
between CORBA objects and clients are passed through the ORB.
CS authentication architecture is very much similar to the one of SESAME. A user
uses a user sponsor to authenticate to the CS environment. A user sponsor is a logical part
of client application. It authenticates on behalf of a user with and obtains authenticated cre-
dentials from an instance of interface SecurityLevel2:: PrincipalAuthenti-
cator, as shown in Figure 4-1. Instances of user sponsor implement user interface
?
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Figure 4-1. Execution Context Creation
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specific to the authentication method supported by the concrete implementation of CS. For
example, for password-based authentication, it prompts the user for user name and pass-
word. For authentication based on smart-cards, it interacts with a smart-card reader and
(probably) prompts the user to insert the card in the reader. CS standard does not mandate
any particular authentication method. What it does specify is the interface of Principa-
lAuthenticator. An instance of PrincipalAuthenticator conducts the actual
authentication and creates Credentials object for a new subject. Based on the authen-
tication data it received from a user sponsor and on the underlying security technology
(Kerberos, SESAME, or any other capable technology) as well as on any rules it adheres
to, PrincipalAuthenticator instantiates Credentials with various informa-
tion. The information in Credentials constitute the identity of the new subject, which
initiates requests on CORBA objects on behalf of the user. Authenticated security attributes
are part of the information stored in the Credentials object.
Access control and other protection in CS is policy-based. There are several types of
policies. One of them is AC policy. Any policy is associated with a domain, which is called
policy domain in CS terminology. A policy domain is an abstraction that allows security
administrators to group objects in groups and assign policies to the groups. Objects that
have common security requirements are grouped in the same security policy domains.
Domains allow the application of AC policies to security-unaware objects without requir-
ing changes to their implementations or interfaces. Figure 4-2 illustrates the concepts of
domains and policies. It shows that a policy domain is associated with a policy. And objects
(small circles) are grouped in the domain. They are governed by the policy. Policies of
more than one type could be associated with the same policy domain and each object can
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belong to more than one policy domain. Domains could be organized in federations, hier-
archies or be completely unrelated.
The policy enforcement code uses three sources of information: the policy of the
domain(s) to which the target belongs, the information from the client's credentials, and the
message itself which specifies target object and the name of the method to be invoked. In
the remainder of this section, we discuss in detail the AC mechanisms available in CS.
For illustrating our discussion, we will use Figure 4-3. The concept of a user is absent
from the CS AC model. Instead a principal represents the user completely. The term prin-
cipal in the CS model is equivalent to subject in traditional AC terminology. We will use
these two terms interchangeably in this discussion. The notion of a session is indistinguish-
able from the notion of a principal. Thus multiple principals can act on behalf of a single
user. They all potentially have different sets of credentials and therefore exist in CS as com-
pletely independent entities. Among other data, principal credentials contain security
attributes. Hereafter, we understand attribute to mean "security attribute." From the CS AC
model point of view, a principal is nothing but an unordered collection of authenticated
attributes. An attribute is a four-tuple a = {t, a, v, ds} with certain type t, defining authority
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a, value v, and delegation state ds. Where ds e DS = {i, d} and state i indicates attribute
possessed by the immediate invoker, and d -- by the intermediate one. Attribute types are
partitioned into two families: privilege attributes and identity attributes. The family of priv-
ilege attributes enumerates attribute types that identify principal privileges. These types
include access identifier, primary and secondary groups the principal is a member of, clear-
ance, capabilities, etc. Identity attributes, if present, provide additional information about
the principal. Examples of their types are audit id, accounting id, and non-repudiation id,
reflecting the fact that a principal might have various identities used for different purposes.
Principal credentials may contain zero or more attributes of the same type. An example of
security attributes assigned to authenticated principals is provided in Table 4-1. One of the
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standard CORBA attribute types is role. Due to the extensibility of the schema for defining
security attributes, an implementation of CS can support attribute types that are not defined
by the CORBA Security standard. Although the normative part of CS does not mandate the
Principal Attributes
Pi a1
P2 a2 , a6
P3 a 2 , a 3
P4 a 4 , as
Table 4-1. Security Attributes Possessed by Authenticated Principals
way the attributes are managed, assignment of such attributes to users is meant to be per-
formed by user administrators.
All a principal does in the CORBA computational model is invoke operations on cor-
responding objects. In order to make a request one needs to know two things: object refer-
ence, which uniquely identifies an object, and operation name. CORBA interfaces can
inherit from other interfaces via interface inheritance. An operation name is unique for an
interface. Thus, any operation is uniquely identified by its name and by the name of the
interface in which it is defined. Here, we use notation ikmf, to refer to n-th operation on k-
th interface.
There is a global set of required rights for each operation. This set, together with a com-
binator (all or any rights), defines what rights a principal has to have in order to invoke the
operation. Table 4-2 provides an example of required rights for operations on three inter-
faces il, i2, and i3. It is assumed that required rights are defined and their semantics are pre-
cisely documented by application developers who know the best semantics of each
operation. Depending on the access policy (DomainAccessPolicy) enforced in a particular
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Operations Required ghts Combinator Meaning
illrlal Only a principa wnO is granted in rican invoke teiimi1  all operation.
Any principal who is granted either rl or r2 right canilm 2  r1 r2  any invoke the operation.
i2m 1  r2 r3  all Only a principal who is granted both r 2 and r 3 rightscan invoke the operation.
all Only a principal who is granted all r2, r 3, r4 rights cani2m2  r2, r3, r4  ainvoke the operation.
Any principal who is granted either of ri, r 2, r3, r4i3m 1  r1, r2, r3, r4  any rights can invoke the operation.
Table 4-2. Required Rights Matrix
AC policy domain, a principal is granted different rights (GrantedRights) according to what
privilege attributes it has. Each DomainAccessPolicy (DAP) object defines what rights are
granted for each security attribute. An example of a mapping between principal privilege
attributes and granted rights is provided in Table 4-3. Security administrators are responsi-
Granted Rights
Attributes Domain
dl d2
ai r1  r2
a2  - ri
a3  r 2,r 3  -
a4  r 3  ri, r 4
as r1, r 2 , r 3  r2, r3, r4
a6  r6  ri
Table 4-3. Granted Rights Per Attribute
ble for defining what rights are granted to what security attributes in what delegation state
on domain per domain basis. Whenever a principal attempts an operation invocation, prin-
cipal's effective rights are computed via operation AccessPol-
icy: :get_effective_rights (). CS specification purposefully does not define
how the operation combines rights granted through different privilege attribute entries
shown in Table 4-3. The specifiers let CS implementers define the operation's internal
behavior ([OMG 1996b, p. 122]). A simplest implementation of
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get_effectiverights ( ) could be such that the set of rights granted to a principal
is a union of rights granted to every security attribute the principal has. For our example,
we will assume exactly this implementation of the operation. If we use our example of secu-
rity attributes assigned to principals pi, p2, p3, and p4 (Table 4-1), and the examples of
required (Table 4-2) and granted (Table 4-3) rights, then Table 4-4 shows what rights the
Granted Rights
Principal Domains
di d 2
Pi r r2
P2 r6 rl
P3 r2 , r3  r
p4 ri, r2, r 3  r1, r2, r3, r4
Table 4-4. Granted Rights Per Principal
principals are granted in each domain. Therefore, the principals can invoke operations as
shown in Table 4-5. Note that because principal P2 is granted only right r6 in domain di, it
is not permitted to invoke any operation because right r6 is not sufficient for invoking any
operation according to the Required Rights Matrix (Table 4-2).
Permitted Operations
Principal Domains
d_ d 2
P1 11m1, i 1m2, 13m1  ilm 2, 13m1
P2 ilm, ilm 2, 13m1
P3  ilm 2, i3m1  ilm, iim 2, 13m1
P4  i1m1, ilm 2, i3m1, ilm 2, i2m1  ilm, ilm 2 , i3m1, ilm 2, i2m1, i2m2
Table 4-5. Operations Permitted to Principals
4.2.2 CORBA Protection State Configuration
Having informally discussed the CS AC model, we define the protection state config-
uration of a CORBA system in Defintion 4-1. An implementation of security service com-
pliant with CS is supposed to yield the same access control decision as the one described
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Definition 4-1. CORBA System Protection State Configuration
A configuration of a CORBA system protection state is the thirteen-tuple (A, IM, 0,
R, D, C, RRM, DS, IDM, GRM, effective rights, combine, interface operation) interpreted
as follows:
" A is the set of privilege attributes.
* IM is the set of operations uniquely identified by interfaces that they are defined on.
. O is a set of distinguishable interface instances.
* R is the set of rights.
* D is the set of access policy domains.
* C = {all, any} is a set of rights combinators.
- RRM is the required rights matrix, with a row for every interface operation from IM
and two columns. For the first column (Required Rights), we have [IM, Rights] c R.
For the second column (Combinator), we have [IM, Combinator] e C.
. DS = {i, d} is a set of delegation states.
* IDM is the matrix of domain membership for interface instances with a row for every
domain from D and a column for every interface instance from O. We denote the con-
tents of (D, O) cell of IDM by [D,O]. We have [D, O] c { T, F} ,a [d, o] = T => o e d.
* GRM is the granted rights matrix, with a row for every attribute from A and a column
for every access policy domain from D. We denote the contents of the policy domain
from D. We denote the contents of the [A, D] c R .
" effectivejrights: D x 2A -> 2R , a function mapping a set al,a 2,...a, of privilege
attributes (where Vi, s.t.1 <i <l, a. e A) in a domain d. e D to a set of rights
rl,r2.---rp (where Vi, s.t. 1 <i <p, ri e R ) that are in effdct for the given set of
attributes.
e combine: (D ->2R) - 2R a function mapping sets of rights returned from
effective-rights for every domain in D the interface instance is a member of, to a set of
effective rights.
* interface operation: M x 0 -4 IM a function mapping an operation name m and an
interface instance o e O into an interface operation uniquely identified on the inter-
face, which o implements.
a. T stands for true and F stands for false.
by Algorithm 4-1. Function effective-rights looks up GRM to obtain granted rights for each
attribute in all domains to which object o belongs. It combines those rights according to its
implementation and returns effective rights for each domain. Results returned from effec-
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Algorithm 4-1. Authorization Decision in CORBA
Decide authorization for principal p = {a 1,a 2,...an} accessing operation with name m on
interface instance o where a1 , ..., an e A, m is a string that names an operation, and
o e O.
Require: interface_operation(m, o) e IM
1: DER <- 0 {Empty an array of rights}
2: for all d s.t. IDM[d,o] == T do
3: DER[d] <- effectiverights(d, p)
4: end for
5: ER[d] - combine(DER) {Combine effective rights into one set}
6: i F- interface_operation(m, o)
7: if RRM[i, Combinator] == any then
{ Any right is required }
8: for all r in RRM[i, Rights] do
9: if r e ER then
10: return T
11: endif
12: end for
13: return F
14: else
{All Rights are required }
15: for all r in RRM[i, Rights] do
16: ifre ER then
17: return F
18: endif
19: end for
20: return T
21: end if
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tive rights serve as input parameters for the function combine. The latter combines them
according to its implementation. Rights returned by combine are checked against RRM. If
the match succeeds, then access is granted. Otherwise, access is denied.
Table 4-5 shows what operations can be invoked by the principals from our example.
For each domain, an access matrix from [Lampson 1971], such as in Table 4-6, could be
constructed.
Principal ObjectsPrncpa 1 2 i3
Pi ilm 2  - 13m1
P2 i1m1 I, ilm 2  - i3m1
P3 i1mI, ilm 2  - i3m1
N4 i1m1 , i1 m 2  12m 1 , 12m 2  13m 1
Table 4-6. Operations Permitted to Principals
Three general observations are worth noting for an access matrix constructed for any
CS system. First, subjects cannot be objects, i.e. the CORBA access control does not have
the concept of operations on principals. It only has the concept of operations on interfaces,
which are objects according to the terminology of the access matrix [Lampson 1971]. Sec-
ond, since ikmp m cl > k = l n p =q (i.e. just p =q is not enough for ikmp = im, as
in Table 4-6, the semantics of operations in a general case might be different. Thus, for each
subject s and object o, the content of cell [s,o] is specific to the object, i.e. no operations
permitted on one object could be permitted on another object because operations are
semantically different for every interface unless interfaces are related via inheritance.
Third, all implementations of the same interface in a given access policy domain are repre-
sented by the same object in the access matrix; therefore, implementations of the same
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interface are indistinguishable from the access control point of view. This is one of the rea-
sons policy domains are important in the CORBA access control model.
4.3 Support of RBAC by the CORBA
4.3.1 Access Control Model
Among the four RBAC reference models defined by Sandhu et al. [Sandhu 1996],
RBAC0 is the base model. It requires only that a system has notions of users, roles, permis-
sions and sessions. There are no constraints on the assignment of permissions to roles and
users to roles. RBAC, has hierarchies of roles in addition to everything RBAC0 has.
RBAC2 has constraints on the assignment of users to roles and permissions to roles in addi-
tion to everything RBAC0 has. RBAC3 combines RBAC, and RBAC 2. In this section, we
define RBAC0 and RBAC, using the language of Defintion 4-1 for CORBA protection
state configuration. This will help us show the correctness of our approach to configuring
a CORBA system for supporting various RBAC models. But first we introduce the original
RBAC definitions.
4.3.2 Original Definitions of RBAC models
According to the RBAC model, each session is a mapping of one user to possibly many
roles. When a user establishes a session, he or she activates a subset of roles assigned to the
user by the user administrator(s). The permissions available to the user are the union of per-
missions from all roles activated in that session. RBAC treats permissions as uninterpreted
symbols because their semantics is implementation and system dependent.
110
Definition 4-2. RBAC0
The RBAC0 model has the following components:
- U, R, P, and S (users, roles, permissions and sessions respectively),
" PA c P x R , a many-to-many permission to role assignment relation,
. UA c U xR, a many-to-many user to role assignment relation,
" user: S -÷ U, a function mapping each session si to the single user user(si) (constant
for the session's lifetime), and
. roles : S - 2R a function mapping each session si to a set of
roles(si) c { r I (user(si ),r) e UA } (which can change with time) and session si has
the permissions U {p I ((p,r) e PA) }
r e roles(si)
Definition 4-3. RBAC1
The RBAC1 model has the following components:
* U, R, P, S, PA, UA, and user are unchanged from RBAC0 ,
e RH c R x R is a partial order on R called the role hierarchy or role dominance rela-
tion, also written as , and
" roles : S -> 2R is modified from RBAC0 to require
roles(s.) c {r I (3 r' > r)[(users(s.),r) e UA]} and session si has granted rights
U { r I (3a " a) [ (r,a ") e PA] } (which can change with time) and ses-
a e roles(p )
sion sg has tie permissions U {p I (3r" r)[(p,r) e PA ] }
r e roles(si)
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We reproduce definitions of RBAC0 (Defintion 4-2) and RBAC1 (Defintion 4-3)
models from [Sandhu 1996] to help the reader in understanding the rest of the chapter.
4.3.3 RBAC 0 : Base Model
For the base model RBAC0 , the four sets of identities are represented in CS as fol-
lows: 1 users in RBAC map to users in CS; roles are represented by set A of privilege
attributes of type role; permissions are equivalent to the set of rights R in CS; sessions are
equivalent to principals which are nothing but sets of security attributes, from the CS AC
point of view. RBACO in the language of CS is formally defined in Defintion 4-4.
Definition 4-4. RBAC 0 in the Language of CORBA Security
. U, A, R, P (users, attributes of type role, rights, and principals, respectively)
" PA cR xA a many-to-many assignment of granted rights to security attributes of
type role relation.
" UA c U xA a many-to-many user to security attributes of type role assignment rela-
tion.
" user: P -> U, a function mapping each principal p to the single user user(pi), constant
for the principal lifetime, and
" roles: P -> 2A a function mapping each principal pi to a set of privilege attributes of
type role roles(pg) roles(pi) c{a I ((user(p ),a) e A)} and principal pi has the
granted rights U {r I ((r,a) e PA)} .
a e roles (pi)
1. We do not mention CS AC domains because, as it will be shown in the example below, RBAC models
can be supported in CORBA using a single domain.
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It is easy to see that the definition describes a system compliant with the RBAC0 def-
inition provided in [Sandhu 1996]. Given the definition, we will show how a CORBA pro-
tection system specified by a configuration language from Defintion 4-1 could be used to
implement a security system compliant to this definition of RBACo. PA relation is specified
by the granted rights matrix GRM. UA relation is managed by user administrators in CS that
define what values of attributes of type role are assigned to users. However such manage-
ment functionality is beyond the scope of CS specification, which means that functionality
defined by UA relation is implementation-specific. An implementation of Principal-
Authenticator initializes new principal credentials with security attributes according
to UA. An example is provided in Table 4-1, where attributes a1 through a6 have the type
role. The value of the principal privilege attribute of the type Accessld is equivalent to the
return value from the function user. An implementation of PrincipalAuthentica-
tor should initialize principal credentials according to the function roles. Since a user in
RBAC0 can activate any subset of roles to which the user is assigned, implementation of
UA ensures implementation of RBACo. Thus, we have shown that all relations, functions
and sets specified in Defintion 4-4 can be directly supported by CS-compliant implemen-
tations. In order for a CS implementation to support RBAC0 it should:
1. comply with CS standard, and
2. provide a means to administrate user-to-role assignment relation UA, and
1. As it was described in Section 3.1.5, a PrincipalAuthenticator conducts the actual authentica-
tion and creates Credentials object for a new principal.
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3. provide a means for users to select through user sponsor a set of roles with which they
would like to activate the new principal, and
4. implement Pr inc ipalAuthent icator which creates principal credentials con-
taining privilege attributes of type role according to relation UA, and
5. implement PrincipalAuthenticator which creates principal credentials con-
taining one and only one privilege attribute of type Accessid.
A straightforward implementation of RBAC0 in CS would be the one that uses privi-
lege attributes of only type role for constructing granted rights tables, such as Table 4-3.
4.3.4 RBAC1: Role Hierarchies
RBAC1 is RBACp with role hierarchies. RBAC1 in the language of CS is formally
defined in Defintion 4-5.
Definition 4-5. RBAC1 in the Language of CORBA Protection System
" U, A, R, P, PA, UA and user are unchanged from RBAC.
* RH c A x A is a partial order on R called the role hierarchy, written as . It is the
same as in [Sandhu 1996].
" roles : P - 2A is modified from RBAC0  to require
roles(pi) c {a I (3a' -a)[(users(pi ),a') e UA ] } and principal pi has granted rights
U {r I (3a" a)[(r,a') e PA]}.
a e roles(pi)
Function roles is to be implemented and enforced by a PrincipalAuthentica-
tor (Figure 4-1). A user provides to a user sponsor a set of roles with which they want the
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principal to be activated. The PrincipalAuthenticator, during the authentication
with the user sponsor, creates new credentials of the principal. The credentials have roles,
requested by user, provided that they satisfy the definition of function roles for RBAC1 .
A valid implementation of RBAC1 could be one that allows a user to specify any role
junior to those of which the user is a member. In this case, an implementation of Princi-
palAuthenticator activates all roles which are junior to the specified role.
In order for a CS implementation to support RBAC1 it should:
1. implement RBAC, and
2. provide a means to administrate the role hierarchy relation RH, and
3. implement PrincipalAuthenticator which creates principal credentials con-
taining privilege attributes of the type role according to relations UA and RH, as well as
function roles.
4.3.5 RBAC 2: Constraints
Constraints in RBAC are predicates that apply to UA and PA relations, as well as to
functions user and roles [Sandhu 1996]. Constraints on UA relation are to be enforced by
an implementation of user administrator tools. Constraints on functions user and roles are
the responsibility of PrincipalAuthenticator implementation. Constraints on PA
relation are to be enforced by an implementation of security administrator tools.
In order for a CS implementation to support RBAC 2 it should:
1. implement RBAC0 , and
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2. implement the support of constraints on UA relation by user administrator tools, and
3. implement PrincipalAuthenticator with the support of constraints on func-
tions user and roles, and
4. enable enforcement of constraints on PA relation by security administrator tools.
4.3.6 RBAC 3 : RBAC 1 + RBAC 2
RBAC3 is a combination of RBAC, and RBAC 2 along with possibly additional con-
strains on the role hierarchy. It can be implemented in CS as well. Obviously, in order for
a CS implementation to support RBAC 3 it should:
1. implement RBAC1, and
2. implement RBAC2, and
3. implement possible additional constrains on the role hierarchy.
The requirements for the support of RBAC, and RBAC 2 by CORBA Security service
implementation have already been discussed. The implementation of additional static con-
strains on the RBAC, role hierarchy is to be done by user administrator tools. For the sup-
port of dynamic constraints, additional functionality in the implementation of
Princ ipalAuthenticator is required, in addition to the administrator tools.
4.4 Examples
To illustrate the points made in the previous chapter, we describe a protection state
(defined by Defintion 4-4) of a CORBA system that implements an example role hierarchy.
We show how a CORBA-based distributed system could be configured to support RBAC1
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Project Lead 1 (PL1) Project Lead 2 (PL2)
Production Quality Production Quality
Engineer 1 Engineer 1 Engineer 2 Engineer 2
(PE1) (QE1) (PE2) (QE2)
Engineer 1 (E1) Engineer 2 (E2)
Project 1 Project 2
Engineering Department (ED)
Employee
Figure 4-4. An Example Role Hierarchy (from [Sandhu 1998b])
with an example hierarchy from [Sandhu 1998b] shown on Figure 4-4 and to protect access
to the implementations of CORBA interfaces shown in Figures 4-5 and 4-6. In RBAC role
hierarchies, the convention is to depict junior roles (with less permissions) at the bottom,
and senior roles (with permissions inherited from the junior ones in addition to the new per-
<<Interface>>
Engineering Project
m ake_c hanges ()
review_changes()
ins pect_quality (
reportproblem ()
close-problem )
create_new_release()
get_desc r iption()
close()
Figure 4-5. EngineeringProject Interface
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<<Interface>>
Employee
get name()
assignto_project()
unassign_from_project()
add_experienceo
get-ex perienceo
fire ()
Figure 4-6. Employee Interface
missions) at the top. The following access control policies describe what actions are
allowed. All other actions are denied.
Authorization Policies
1. Anyone can look up an employee's name and experience.
2. Everyone in the engineering department can get a description of and report problems
regarding any project.
3. Engineers, assigned to projects, can make changes and review changes related to their
projects.
4. Quality engineers can inspect the quality of projects they are assigned to.
5. Production engineers can create new releases.
6. Project leaders can close problems.
7. The director can manage employees (assign/un-assign them to/from projects, add new
records to their experience, and fire) and close engineering projects.
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We define that function effective rights returns a union of granted rights per attribute,
and combine returns a union of rights granted in each domain.
The intent of CORBA access policy domains is somewhat confusing. To help in under-
standing it, we provide two solutions for enforcing these policies. The first uses a single
access policy domain. The second uses multiple domains.
4.4.1 Single Access Policy Domain Solution
In order to implement the role hierarchy in CS without using access policy domains,
we introduce two new interfaces EngineeringProjectl and
EngineeringProject2, as shown in Figure 4-7. The following system protection
<<Interface>>
EngineeringProject
makechanges()
reviewchangesO
inspect_quality()
reportproblem 0
close problem (
c reate_new_release(
get _des c ript iono
close(
<<Interface>> <<Interface>>
EngineeringProjectl EngineeringProject2
Figure 4-7. EngineeringProject Interface Hierarchy
state configuration could be used:
A = {e, ed, el, e2, pel,pe2, qe1, qe2, pl1, p12, dir}. All these attributes have type role.
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* IM = {Employee::getname, Employee::assignto project,
Employee::unassign_fromproject, Employee::add_experience,
Employee::getexperience, Employee::fire, EngineeringProjectl::inspectquality,
EngineeringProjectl::make_changes, EngineeringProject 1::report-problem,
EngineeringProject 1::reviewchanges, EngineeringProjectl::close,
EngineeringProjectl::closeproblem, EngineeringProjectl::create_new_release,
EngineeringProjectl::get_description, EngineeringProject2::inspect_quality,
EngineeringProject2::make_changes, EngineeringProject2::reportproblem,
EngineeringProject2::review_changes, EngineeringProject2::close,
EngineeringProject2::closeproblem, EngineeringProject2::create_new_release,
EngineeringProject2::getdescription 1.
We do not use any implementations of interface Engineer ing Proj ect. Only
derived interfaces are used.
e O = {e, ed, e1, e2, pel,pe2, qe1, qe2, pl1, p12, dir, prjl, prj2}. prjl is an instance of
EngineeringProjectl, and prj2 is an instance of EngineeringProj ect2.
All other elements of O are instances of interface Employee.
R = {gn, atp, ufp, ae, ge, f, me1, rc1, iq l, rp1, cp1, cnrl, gd1, c, mc2, rc2, iq 2 , rp2 ,
cp2, cnr2, gd2, c2}1
- D={dl}
* C = { all } - we use only one combinator.
1. We used first letters of each operation to create a corresponding right.
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" RRM is shown in Table 4-7. We omitted column with rights combinators because
required rights for all operations have the same combinator - "all." 1
- DS= {i, d}
e In the IDM, all interface instances are the members of the only access policy domain.
e GRM is shown in Table 4-8.
Operations Rights
Employee::getname gn
Employee::assignto-project atp
Employee::unassign_fromproject ufp
Employee::addexperience ae
Employee::get-experience ge
Employee::fire f
EngineeringProject 1::get description gd 1
EngineeringProject1::inspect quality iql
EngineeringProjectl::make changes mci
EngineeringProject 1::review_changes rc 1
EngineeringProject 1::reportproblem rp 1
EngineeringProject l ::close problem cp 1
EngineeringProjectl::create_new_release cnr1
EngineeringProject 1::close c1
EngineeringProject2::getdescription gd2
EngineeringProject2::inspect_quality iq2
EngineeringProject2::make_changes mc2
EngineeringProject2::review_changes rc2
EngineeringProject2::report_problem rp2
EngineeringProject2::closeproblem cp2
EngineeringProject2::createnewrelease cnr2
EngineeringProject2::close c2
Table 4-7. Required Rights Matrix for Single Domain Solution
1. We could have used "any" as well. When an operation's required rights set consists of only one right, the
effect of either combinator is the same.
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Privilege Attribute Granted Rights
e gn, ge
ed gdl, gd2, rp1, rp2
el mcl,rcl
pel cnrl
qel iql
p11 cp1
e2 mc2, rc2
pe2 cnrl
qe2 iqi
p12 cp1
dir atp, ufp, ae, f, c1, c2
Table 4-8. Granted Rights Matrix for Single Domain Solution
effective_rights(d., a1 , a2 , ... ,al) c U {r I r e GRM[ai,d.] } -- union of
a., 1 Si <l
granted rights per attribute.
- combine(rl dr 2 dl, ... , r d, ... , rd r2 P ... , rm d c
u r I re fr1 , d rm d -- union of rights granted in each domain.
in each domai d
The CORBA protection system configuration described above allows enforcement of
the sample policies listed on page 118. For example, a lead of project 1 with role pl1 acti-
vated is able to invoke operations get name and get-experience on all implementations of
interface Employee as well as all but close operations on all implementations of interface
EngineeringProjectl.
From observing the configuration of the CORBA protection system in this solution,
significant administrative overhead could be noticed. The overhead is due to the gratuitous
use of a separate interface (EngineeringProj ect (1, 2) ) per project. This is because
we purposefully limited our solution to a single access policy domain. It is shown below
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how the unnecessary redundancy of the protection system configuration data is eliminated
by using multiple access policy domains and a hierarchy of such domains.
4.4.2 Multi-domain Solution
Once we have an access policy domain per project, we can go back to using one
EngineeringProj ect interface for all projects. We also take advantage of the CS
capability to compose domains in various hierarchies. We choose a limited and easy to
understand tree-like hierarchy shown in Figure 4-8. The following configuration of a
system protection state could be used:
S S.an
Engineering Department (ED)
Engineering Project 1 (EP1) Engineering Project 2 (EP2)
Figure 4-8. Domain Hierarchy for Multi-domain Solution
e A, 0, C, DS, effective rights, and combine are the same as in the single domain solu-
tion.
" IM= { Employee::getname, Employee::assignto-project,
Employee::unassign_fromproject, Employee::addexperience,
Employee::getexperience, Employee::fire, EngineeringProject::inspectquality,
EngineeringProject::makechanges, EngineeringProject::reportproblem,
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EngineeringProject::review_changes, EngineeringProject::close,
EngineeringProject::closeproblem, EngineeringProject::create_new_release,
EngineeringProject::get_description }.
" R = {gn, atp, ufp, ae, ge, f, mc, rc, iq, rp, cp, cnr, gd, c}.
- D = {C, ED, EP1, EP2}
" RRM is shown in Table 4-9. It is the same as in Table 4-7 except one interface Engi-
Operations Rights
Employee::getname gn
Employee::assignto-project atp
Employee::unassign_fromproject ufp
Employee::add-experience ae
Employee::getexperience ge
Employee::fire f
EngineeringProject::get-description gd
EngineeringProject::inspectquality iq
EngineeringProject::makechanges me
EngineeringProject::reviewchanges rc
EngineeringProject::reportproblem rp
EngineeringProject::closeproblem cp
EngineeringProject::createnew_release cnr
EngineeringProject::close c
Table 4-9. Required Rights Matrix for Multi-domain Solution
neeringProj ec t is used instead of two identical interfaces with different names.
" IDM is shown in Table 4-10. As illustrated in Figure 4-9, if an object belongs to a child
domain, according to the domain hierarchy shown in Figure 4-8, then it is also a mem-
ber of all the parental domains.
* GRM is shown in Table 4-11.
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Domains
Interface
Instance C ED EP1 EP2
e X
ed X X
el X X X
pel X X X
qel X X X
p11 X X X
e2 X X X
pe2 X X X
qe2 X X X
p12 X X X
dir X
prjl X X X
prj2 X X X
Table 4-10. Interface Instance Domain Membership Matrix (IDM) for Multi-domain
Solution
The CORBA protection system configuration described above allows enforcement of
the same policies as the configuration in the solution for a single domain. This time, there
is no need either in having separate EngineeringProject (1, 2) interfaces per
project or in having redundant rights. In addition, RRM and GRM are more comprehensible.
Due to the hierarchy structure of the access policy domains, the described system can
also support more flexible policies. For example, the GRM in Table 4-11, in addition to the
sample policies already described on page 118, supports a policy which allows project lead-
ers to add experience (right ae) to the records of the employees working under supervision
of the leaders. In order to enable it, whenever an employee is assigned to a project (we
assume each employee works on one project at a time) an interface implementation repre-
senting the employee is moved to access policy domain of the corresponding project. Also,
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Figure 4-9. Interface Instance Domain Membership
Granted Rights
Privilege Attribute Domains
C ED EP EP2
e gn ge - -
ed - gd,rp - -
el - - mc,rc -
pel - - cnr -
qel - - iq -
p11  - - cpae -
e2 - - - mc, rc
pe2 - - - cnr
qe2 - - - iq
p12 - - - cp, ae
dir atp, ufp, ae, f, c - - -
Table 4-11. Granted Rights Matrix for Multi-domain Solution
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the GRM enforces finer grain policy which allows only colleagues from the same depart-
ment to look up employee experience (right ge) .
4.5 Conclusions
The understanding of middleware AC mechanisms is critical for protecting resources
of enterprise applications. In this chapter we not only described in details AC mechanism
of one of the most capable middleware security technologies -- CORBA Security -- but also
defined a configuration of the CORBA protection system. Using the configuration defini-
tion, we suggested an algorithm which formally specifies the semantics of authorization
decisions in CS.
We defined RBAC0 and RBAC1 models in the language of CS and described how
RBACQ-RBAC 3 could be implemented using CS. We discussed what functionality needs
to be implemented, besides compliance with CS standard, in order to support RBAC. We
illustrated the discussion with a single access policy domain and multi-domain examples of
the CS protection system configuration, which supports a sample role hierarchy and access
policies.
Implementations compliant with the CS specification can support RBACp-RBAC 3.
However, additional functionality not specified by CS is required. Implementations of
PrincipalAuthenticator interface and user sponsor need to support roles and their
hierarchies (RBAC1). To support constraints (RBAC2), a Princ ipalAuthent icator
has to enforce them. Tools to administer user-to-role and role-to-rights relations are also
required.
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This chapter develops a framework for implementing as well as for assessing imple-
mentations of RBAC models using CS. It provides directions for CS developers to realize
RBAC in their systems and gives criteria to users for selecting such implementations that
support models from the RBACO-RBAC 3 family. This work advances the understanding of
the CORBA AC mechanism's capabilities and by this maximizes its utility which is vital
to the use of middleware in protecting application resources.
Although RBAC is shown to supersede major AC models, its capabilities are limited
and there could be authorization policies that would be challenging to model with it. Also,
the granularity of the CORBA AC mechanism is still limited to the level of interface oper-
ation. This is why we believe that the use of RBAC and CORBA does not address the needs
of all application domains. The rest of this dissertation discusses the second part of our
approach, which addresses those cases when the RBAC model and CORBA mechanism are
inadequate.
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5 Resource Access Decision Service
In the previous chapters we stated the problem of controlling access to the resources
of enterprise distributed applications and reviewed available technologies along with
related work. For those application domains where authorization policies can be supported
by RBAC and the granularity of the CORBA AC mechanism is sufficient, the framework
for implementing RBAC models using CORBA Security developed in last chapter could
be an adequate solution. But what to do with the applications whose AC needs cannot com-
pletely be addressed by either the RBAC model or CORBA Security? In this chapter, we
introduce an approach which meets the requirements of other applications -- an architecture
for resource access decision (RAD) service. Furthermore, we demonstrate its utility on
examples with complex access control policies. Some sections of the chapter are based on
the material from [Beznosov 1999b].
RAD defines a conceptual architecture that encapsulates authorization logic in an
authorization service which is external to the application and is also independent of the spe-
cific security models and policies. Such an architecture not only significantly simplifies
both application and security system development but also allows organizations to uni-
formly manage and enforce their security policies.
The RAD approach addresses most other issues important for protecting application
resources in enterprise distributed applications. It is possible to use as many types of subject
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security attributes for authorization decisions as the underlying authentication technology
provides. The service architecture allows the use of information obtained from work-flow
systems and other sources, thus supporting policies specific to the application domain. It
also enables the use of application-specific information in AC decisions. Due to the encap-
sulation of authorization logic into a separate service, which can be implemented as a net-
work server, consistency of AC policies enforcement across applications can be easily
achieved. In addition, the architecture supports the multi-policy authorization model, and
it enables security administrators and application developers to maintain a clear separation
of responsibilities. To achieve these benefits, our design requires application-level enforce-
ment of authorization decisions and assumes agreement on the semantics of resource names
between the application developer and the owner.
RAD architecture is mostly independent of the underlying security technology,
although the current design takes advantage of the CORBA-compliant security infrastruc-
ture and compliments it with the capability of more sophisticated authorization. Note that
it is by no means a replacement or substitution of standard CORBA Security service [OMG
1996b]. Still, the RAD approach can be applied to most distributed computing environ-
ments.
Moreover, we show that the decoupling of authorization logic from application can be
done without complicated interactions between an application and the authorization service
and without significant communication overhead. Factors specific to the application
domain can be supported by authorization systems using the traditional access matrix
[Lampson 1971] as an underlying implementation.
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5.1 RAD Architecture
The main objective of RAD is to decouple application-level authorization logic from
application logic. As discussed above, the finest granularity level of AC provided by the
main middleware technologies is at the level of operations on middleware objects. The
authorization service is to make decisions for access to those information and computa-
tional resources that are not first class objects or their operations. Thus, the service comple-
ments middleware AC mechanisms. It relies on and uses the middleware security
environment for secure authenticated communications (i.e. message authenticity, confiden-
tiality and integrity protection) between the service and the applications as well as among
the service components. It also assumes that the underlying security provides a means for
an application to obtain security attributes of the accessing subject. As we showed in
Chapter 3, these assumptions are valid for most middleware security technologies.
5.1.1 Interface Between Application Systems and RAD Service
The RAD approach is a representative example of authorization services direction
described in Section 3.2.3. Like most of these services, RAD provides authorization deci-
sions to an application system (AS). Authorization logic is encapsulated into RAD service
external to the application, which is traditionally part of an application program. Since the
service can be logically centralized, the approach allows applications to enforce AC
according to the same enterprise-wide set of authorization policies thus naturally enabling
policy consistency. In our approach, the authorization decision is obtained after the method
on the object is invoked. Hence, an application can exercise access control of any granular-
ity level by associating a resource name with protected elements of any size and semantics.
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The flow of interactions between application client, application system and an instance
of authorization service is depicted in Figure 5-1. The sequence of the interaction is as fol-
lows:
Client TargetObject Access Decision
Object
(ADO client .
. Application Request - { Authorization request I
4. Reply to application request 3. Reply to authorization request
Middleware
Application Client Application Authorization
System Service
Figure 5-1. Interactions among Client, Application System, and RAD Service
1. A client of the application system invokes an operation on the application.
2. While processing the invocation, the application requires an authorization decision
from the authorization service.
3. The service makes a decision, which is returned to the application.
4. The application enforces the decision. If access was granted by the authorization ser-
vice, the application returns the expected results of the invocation. Otherwise, it either
returns partial results or raises an exception.
Simple interfaces between the application and the authorization service are used. An
application developer only needs to program a single invocation on the authorization ser-
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vice in order to obtain a decision. Each authorization request consists of client subject secu-
rity attributes, the name of the resource to be accessed, and the name of the operation to be
performed on the resource. The security attributes of the invoking subject are supposed to
be obtained by the application from the middleware security infrastructure. The application
is expected to compute the resource and operation names as part of its application logic. For
each authorization request, it receives back a binary (yes/no) decision. An application
obtains an authorization decision only from one instance of RAD. It is the contract between
the application and its enterprise environment to request an authorization decision and to
enforce it.
A nominal amount of data is passed between the application and the authorization ser-
vice in order to make authorization decisions. When making an authorization request, an
application passes the following three parameters: a sequence of name-value pairs repre-
senting a name of the resource to be accessed; name of the access operation (e.g. "create,"
"read," "write," "use," "delete"); and authenticated security attributes of the subject on
behalf of which the client is requesting access to the named resource.
Security attributes here are regular attributes of the current user session. Of the the
parameters passed by the client, the first two (resource name and access type) are most
worthy of discussion. We introduce an abstraction called "protected resource name" or just
"resource name," used to abstract application-dependent semantics of entities, the access to
which is controlled by the application. A resource name can be associated with any valu-
able asset of the application owner, the access to which is controlled according to the
owner's interests. For example, electronic patient medical and billing records in a hospital
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are usually its valuable assets. The hospital administration is interested in controlling
access to the records due to various legal, financial and other reasons. Therefore, the hos-
pital administration considers such records as protected resources. Moreover, different
information in those records counts as different resources, examples of which can be
records from different visits or episodes for one patient. At the same time, a resource name
can be associated with less tangible assets, such as computer system resources, including
CPU time, file descriptors, sockets, etc. The RAD service does not attempt to interpret the
semantics of the resource name. We will show in the discussion of the RAD design that it
uses the resource name only to obtain additional security attributes and to look up a set of
policies governing access to the resource associated by an application system with the
resource name.
Access operation abstracts the semantics of access to resource(s) associated with
resource name. An application may manipulate patient records on behalf of different care
givers, or may provide different hierarchies of menus to different lab technicians. In either
case, it is up to the application system developers and the enterprise security administrators
to agree on the semantics of the operation name used for each access. RAD does not inter-
pret the semantics of access operation as shown in the description of the RAD design.
A system can communicate application-specific information to RAD service by encod-
ing it in resource and/or operation names. For example, withdrawal of $500 from a bank
account can be represented as an operation with the name "withdrawal:$500," and the
resource name carrying the account number. Simple and yet very generic data structures for
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operation (arbitrary string) and resource name (a list of string name-value pairs) have good
expressive capabilities for this task.
Before an application requests a RAD server for an authorization decision, it is sup-
posed to identify what the resource name and the access operation name are associated with
servicing the client request. There is no particular algorithm defined for performing such
an association because for every application, or at least for every application domain, the
method of associating protected entities with abstract resource names can be different.
Our approach is very similar to most solutions based on authorization services in the
way the client, AS and the RAD server interact, but it is different in the internal composi-
tion of its elements.
5.1.2 Logical Composition of RAD
RAD architecture aims to enable implementation of its components by various vendors
due to the diversity in the requirements to AC policies, performance, scalability and other
system properties from different government and commercial markets. Components of the
following types comprise a RAD service (Figure 5-2): The AccessDecisionObj ec t
(ADO) serves as the interface to RAD clients and coordinates the interactions between the
RAD components. Zero or more PolicyEvaluators (PEs) perform evaluation deci-
sions based on the AC policies governing the access to protected resources. The
DecisionCombinator (DC) combines the results of the evaluations made by poten-
tially multiple PEs into a final authorization decision by applying certain combination pol-
icy. The PolicyEvaluatorLocator (PEL), for a given access request to a protected
resource, keeps track of and provides references to a DC and potentially several PEs, which
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1: accessallowed
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2: get-policydecisionevaluators
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Figure 5-2. Interactions among RAD Components
are collectively responsible for making the authorization decision. The
DynamicAttributeService (DAS) collects and provides dynamic attributes about
the client in the context of the intended access operation and resource name.
The components are only logically disjointed while in practice they can be co-located
in the same process or host. This feature is provided to further the support for dynamic com-
position and re-configuration, as well as for high availability and fault tolerance of the ser-
vices based on RAD architecture.
Figure 5-2 shows interactions among components of authorization service. They are
the following:
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1. The authorization service receives a request via the ADO interface.
2. The ADO obtains object references to those PEs and DC which are associated with the
resource name in question.
3. The ADO obtains dynamic attributes of the subject (client) in the context of the
resource name and the intended access operation to be performed.
4. The ADO delegates an instance of DC for polling the PEs (selected in Step 1) and com-
bining multiple results of evaluations made by PEs into a final decision. This is because
there can be several PEs responsible for making authorization decision.
5. The DC obtains decisions from PEs and combines them according to the combination
policy. The decision is forwarded to the ADO, which in turn returns the decision to the
application.
To clarify the work of RAD components, we provide a short example of processing an
authorization request in Figure 5-3. It shows the sequence of invocations among RAD com-
AS AD PE DA DC RBAC PE
ole caregiver
access allowe {ptient_i 984329,record pert=PN}, re {user_id=g,roe=caregi r, role=nurse}) read
get-policy decisioneval ors({patient id=299842,record_pert=PN}) aIent name
get_dy i _attributes({patient_icd2 29 ,record-part=PN}, Tad,{user _id=g,re=careg er,role=nurse})
combine dacisions((patient_id=29984329,record par=PN}, read, {wserid=g,rde=caregiver ole=nurse }, {RBAC PE}
evaluate({patient id=29984329,record part=PN), fead, {user id=g,role=caregiver,rde=nurse })
RAD
Figure 5-3. Interaction Diagram for Hypothetical Case
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ponents in a hypothetical case. For the sake of illustration, let us assume that there is an
authorization policy containing a statement that a user can read the patient's name (PN) if
the user is performing role caregiver. In this example, AS is requesting authorization to per-
form access operation read on resource patient name. The resource is part of the medical
record on the patient with ID 29984329. Access is to be performed for a user with user id
d, who activated role nurse which is senior to caregiver. The ADO obtains a list of refer-
ences to PEs and DC, which should be used for making an authorization decision on a
resource with name {patientid=29984329, recordpart=PN}. The PEL returns a reference
to the DC and a reference to one PE - RBAC PE. The DAS does not change the list of secu-
rity attributes, which specifies that the user ID is d and the roles the user activated are car-
egiver and nurse. RBAC PE implements authorization based on roles. According to the
authorization rules, users acting as caregiver have access to the names of all patients. Thus
the PE returns "yes" and the DC returns the same answer to the ADO, which authorizes the
AS to access the name of the patient with ID 29984329 on behalf of user d.
RAD architecture is such that all its components could be replaced dynamically by dif-
ferent implementations as long as they comply with the interface specifications. This
enables the support for insertion and deletion of applications, changes in policies and the
computing environment. For instance, if application insertion introduces new resources to
be protected, a new PE (or even a set of PEs) can be dynamically added and PEL is recon-
figured to use them. We will illustrate the support for changes in authorization policies in
Section 5.2, where we discuss sample authorization policies and show how RAD can sup-
port them and their changes.
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Unlike most authorization services [Simon 1997, Varadharajan 1998, Woo 1993c]
RAD architecture does not restrict its implementations in the type of supported authoriza-
tion policies. This is why the scope of authorization policy representation is beyond the
scope of RAD architecture, as shown in Figure 5-4. Each PE can be administered using a
ADO client
consults 1 DynamicAttribute
Service
consults
PolicyName
1 n PolicyEvaluator w 1
AccessDecision Locator
represented by
I1..* 1 1
locates - PolicyEvaluator
consults locates 0..1 evaluatesconslts 1 .jPolicy
1.. o ..1
I 1 
1.. 0..1
Decision consults
Combinator defines
access policy
1 ;0..1
ResourceName s- 1represented by -_
SecuredResource
Operationhs
Scope of the RAD Service I
Figure 5-4. Main Run-time Elements and Their Appurtenance to the Architecture Scope
(from [OMG 1999c])
different interface and AC rules written in a different language. Such a design enables the
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use of the existing policy engines, which were not originally developed to be PEs (e.g.
RACF [Benantar 1996]), and the support for future ones.
One authorization engine (supporting a particular policy) per request is used in Argos
[Jonscher 1995] to evaluate requested access. The introduction of multiple evaluators and
a combinator in RAD provides ways for more than one policy (even of different types) to
govern authorization decisions for the same request. This is similar to [Bertino 1996b],
where Bertino et al. define an explicit authorization model with conflict resolution and
overriding rules. In RAD architecture, such rules are implemented by a particular DC.
One of RAD's distinguishing architectural elements is the use of DAS. It enables the
support of policies based on the factors whose value can change from request to request or
is determined by the state of organizational work-flow. These factors are furnished by DAS
in the form of dynamic attributes, syntactically equivalent to subject security attributes.
ADO obtains them from DAS before it passes the request to the corresponding DC and PEs.
Dynamic attributes are attributes whose value can be determined only at the time when a
request for an authorization decision takes place. Thus they are specific to the request in
question. Examples of such attributes are relationships between physicians and patients in
a hospital [Barkley 1999]. The introduction of DAS in RAD architecture increases the vari-
ety of information available for making authorization decisions, and enables the use of the
traditional access matrix [Lampson 1971] to support complex and dynamic AC policies.
We will illustrate the benefit of DAS in Section 5.4.
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All RAD components, in addition to the run-time interfaces described above, have
interfaces to administer them. Those interfaces constitute the RAD administrative model,
the scope and main elements of which are shown in Figure 5-5.
Administrator
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I I
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Iappli ResourceName 1 --0..1 1
I p y 11', I(
Operation assigns representedI byaccess policy r s
L --- -represented by
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SecuredResource
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PolicyName f-
RAD Scope
Figure 5-5. Administrative Elements and Their Appurtenance to the Architecture Scope
(from [OMG 1999c])
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Even though RAD architecture purposefully does not provide a means of specifying
authorization policies and their representation, it allows RAD administrators to apply pol-
icies defined via implementation-specific PE interfaces to protected resources. This is car-
ried through with the notion of policy name and with administrative interfaces for PE and
PEL. A policy name is employed to associate the policy with a resource name for those PEs
that can evaluate more than one policy. By naming a policy and avoiding a definition of
policy representation, we keep RAD architecture open to the multitude of existing and
future authorization languages.
Run-time and administrative interfaces and the supporting data structures, all defined
in OMG IDL, along with prose description of their semantics, constitute RAD architecture.
Its computational view is showed in Figure 5-6. The administrative part of RAD architec-
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Figure 5-6. Computational Part of RAD Architecture
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ture is designed to allow replaceable RAD objects within an implementation. For instance,
AccessDec is ionAdmin interface contains operations for inspecting and specifying the
reference to PEL. Operation set-policy evaluatorlocator () allows a RAD
administrator to "point" the ADO to a different instance of PEL. After the change, the ADO
will use the new PEL. This is an example of how we address the goal of supporting changes
in policies and the computing environment.
5.2 Example
RAD conceptual architecture is very generic, and the role of RAD components as well
as the interactions among them could be hard to understand. This section provides a
detailed example for illustrating RAD architecture and its capabilities. The example further
clarifies RAD concepts. It also shows how policies based on roles and relationships can be
supported by a RAD service.
We consider a set of simplified but typical access control policies in the health care
domain which has arguably one of the most complex AC requirements. Consider a hospital
computing enterprise consisting of many distributed systems, which are used for registra-
tion and billing, collecting results of laboratory tests and transcribed X-ray images, as well
as for storing all other clinical information about patients including records of their visits
to the hospital (for out-patients) and their stay over night, when they have complicated
cases (for in-patients).
Hospital employees involved in the care process are called caregivers for short. A car-
egiver accesses many of those clinical, laboratory, transcription and financial systems
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either directly with specialized client software or via general-purpose application pro-
grams. Such programs interact with several application servers in order to provide caregiv-
ers with information needed for patient diagnosis and treatment. Access to patient
information (patient records) is controlled by AC mechanisms employed by the computing
enterprise.
5.2.1 Initial Policies
Let us assume that the hospital adopts the policy listed in Table 5-1 to control
employee access to the patients' medical records. Let us also assume that all patient records
consist of the parts shown in Table 5-2.
Rule Rule Definition
No.
PT.F Any caregiver can react patient's name.
P1.2 Registration clerk can modify patient name and demographic information.
Nurse can read patient's name and demographic information, modify cur-
P1.3 rent episode demographic information, read current episode regular records
and test results.
P1.4 Technician can modify current episode regular and sensitive test results.
P1.5 Physician Assistant, in addition to what a nurse can do, can also read all
regular records of patients.
Physician, in addition to what a physician assistant can do, can also modify
P1.6 current episode regular and sensitive records, as well as read regular, sensi-
tive records and test results from previous episodes.
P1.7 Psychiatrist, in addition to what a physician can do, can also modify mentalinformation.
Table 5-1. Access Control Policy (Policy 1)
This policy is coarse-grain in regards to the classes of users. The policy allows any
nurse to read regular records of any patient in the hospital; technicians have full access to
test results of all patients in the hospital; physicians have full access, except mental infor-
mation, of the patients who have ever received care at the hospital. In addition, the policy
does not reflect the fact that patients have relatives, guardians and other representatives,
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Part name Abbreviation
Patient name PN
Demographic data DD
Current episode demographic data CDD
Current episode regular records CRR
Current episode sensitive records CSR
Current episode regular test results CRT
Current episode sensitive test results CST
Regular records from previous episodes PRR
Sensitive records from previous episodes PSR
Regular test results from previous episodes PRT
Sensitive test results from previous episodes PST
Mental information from all episodes AMD
Table 5-2. Parts of Patient Medical Records
that are eligible to know some information about the status of their patient. Nonetheless, let
us assume that the healthcare organization in our example has such privacy requirements
that Policies 1 suffices. We will consider a new policy to deal with more complex AC deci-
sions later in Section 5.4.
5.3 Modeling Policies
Policy 1 can be implemented using the RBAC model with role hierarchy -- RBACI
[Sandhu 1996]. In order to define the configuration of an RBACI system, one needs to
specify role hierarchy, user-to-role and permission-to-role relations, as well as functions
user and roles. We define the role hierarchy (RH) in Figure 5-7. According to this hierar-
chy, for example, role physician assistant has as many permissions as role nurse plus its
own permissions, because physician assistant is senior to nurse. User-to-role assignment
relation (UA) is shown in Table 5-3, where we can see that user g is assigned to role care-
giver, and user d is assigned to roles nurse and technician. This means that, when user d
logs into the system, the user can activate either role caregiver, nurse or technician,
whereas user g can only activate role caregiver. This because, according to the role hierar-
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Physician
Physician Assistant
Registration Clerk Nurse Technician
Caregiver
Figure 5-7. Role Hierarchy (RH relation)
Users
Roles a b c d e f g
Psychiatrist +
Physician +
Physician Assistant +
Nurse +
Registration Clerk +
Technician + +
Caregiver +
Table 5-3. User to Role Assignment Relation (UA)
chy, a user can act in any role junior to the one he or she is assigned. If user d activates role
nurse, then the subject will be granted all permissions assigned to roles caregiver and
nurse. The permission-to-role assignment relation (PA) is presented in Table 5-4, accord-
ing to which a nurse is assigned permissions to read demographic data (DD), current epi-
sode regular records (CRR), and current episode regular test results (CRT), as well as read
and write current episode demographic data (CDD).
The configuration of a RAD server that performs authorization according to the
RBAC1 system defined by the above PA, UA and RH relations, is depicted in Figure 5-8.
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Resource
RoleZ A W A
Psychiatrist RW
Physician W RW R R R
Physician R R
Assistant
Nurse R RW R R
Registration W RW
Clerk
Technician RW RW
Caregiver R
Table 5-4. Permission-to-role Assignment Relation (PA)
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Figure 5-8. RAD Configuration for Role-based Policies
ADO obtains a reference for the DC and the only PE (RBAC PE) from the PEL, which
always returns the same references. The DAS returns the same list of security attributes that
it received from the ADO. RBAC PE evaluates authorization requests using PA relation.
The DC denies access if the PE returns "unknown" as the result of evaluation (for example
if the resource name is not found in the PA table), otherwise it returns whatever the PE
returns.
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We assume the availability of a distributed security environment which supports acti-
vation of roles by users during the authentication process with enforcement of UA and RH
relations, and implementation of functions user and roles. This means that roles are imple-
mented by the underlying security environment. There are security technologies capable of
fulfilling this assumption. For example, we showed in Chapter 4 that CORBA security ser-
vice [OMG 1996b] can support RBAC- 3 models. This is why in our example, an applica-
tion making authorization request to a RAD service supplies a list of principal security
attributes which contains all roles activated by the user. The list, as described earlier, is
obtained by the AS from the distributed security environment.
Another way of modeling the policy with RAD using RBAC1 would be to assign the
task of determining the user roles to the DAS or to RBAC PE itself. We preferred the first
choice to the latter two because activated roles are security attributes managed by user
administrators. They persist throughout the user session and should be activated during the
authentication phase when the user logs into the system. This choice also supports dynamic
separation of duties,I a commonly required RBAC feature.
One of our claims is that RAD architecture supports policy changes in a scalable way.
Let us inspect how policy changes affect a RAD service. Changes to Policy 1 can either
result in the replacement of the authorization model supporting the policy, or in changes to
the system configuration which is defined via UA, RH, PA relations and functions user and
roles. We will discuss in Section 5.4 how a RAD service can be reconfigured when an
1. Separation of duties is achieved by ensuring that mutually exclusive roles must be invoked to complete a
sensitive task [Sandhu 1996]. Dynamic separation of duties is enforced in RBAC via constraints on role acti-
vation so that a user will not be able to activate mutually exclusive roles simultaneously even though each of
them can be activated by the user.
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authorization model is replaced. Now, we show what has to be done when only the system
configuration is to be updated.
Only minimal alterations are required to accommodate RBAC re-configuration.
Changes in UA, RH, user and roles do not affect RAD components because in our config-
uration they are entirely implemented by the underlying middleware security service.
Changes to PA will result in different evaluations made by RBAC PE. For example, if rule
P.1.5 in Table 5-1 was modified to allow physician assistants to read current episode sen-
sitive records (CSR) of patients, then PA would be modified to have PA[Physiscian Assis-
tant, CSR] = { R}. This would result in RBAC PE granting access for reading CSR to
anyone whose list of activated roles contains "Physician Assistant."
5.4 Advanced Policies
RAD architecture provides good support for changes not only in the policy content but
also in its type. In this section, we show how a RAD service can be re-configured to support
a more complex policy.
The policy listed in Table 5-1 (from now on called role-based policy) allow an
employee to access records of all patients, regardless of whether the employee is involved
in the provision of care to the patient or not. The principle of least privilege' is not fully
supported. Let us assume that a new legislation requires the hospital to ensure that patient
records are accessed not only according to the employee functions but also depending on
whether the employee is actually involved in the patient care process. For example, only
1. The principle of least privilege requires that users should only be granted privilege for some activity if
they have a justifiable need for its associated authorizations [Amoroso 1994].
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the attending physician is now allowed to modify current episode records of the patient.
Also, let us assume that now the patient's relatives, guardians and designated representa-
tives have the right to limited access of the patient's records. To become compliant with the
new regulations, the hospital replaces the old policy with the new one listed in Table 5-5.
Rule Rule Definition
No.
P2.1 Any caregiver can read patient's name.
P2.2 Registration Clerk can modify patient name and demographic information.
P2.3 Nurse can read patient's name and demographic information.
Attending Nurse, in addition to the rights of any other nurse, can modify cur-
P2.4 rent episode demographic information, can read current episode regular records
and test results.
P2.5 Technician can read patient's name and modify current episode regular test
results.
P2.6 Related Technician, in addition to the rights of any other technician, can mod-ify current episode sensitive test results.
Attending Physician Assistant, in addition to what an attending nurse can do,
P2.7 can also read all (i.e. from the current and previous episodes) regular records
and all regular test results, as well as modify current episode regular records.
Attending Physician, in addition to the rights of an attending physician assis-
P2.8 tant, can modify current episode sensitive regular records and can read all regu-
lar and sensitive records from previous episodes.
P2.9 Attending Psychiatrist, in addition to what an attending physician can do, can
also modify mental information.
P2.10 Patient Relative can read patient's current episode demographic and patient's
name.
P2.11 Patient Guardian can read previous episode regular data.
P2.12 Patient Spouse can read previous episode sensitive data.
P2.13 Patient Representative can read previous episode regular data provided that
patient gives a consent.
Table 5-5. New Policy (Policy 2)
The policy requires that only caregivers who are related to the treatment process for a
given patient can have access to the corresponding parts of the patient record according to
their job description. The new policy follows the least privileged security principle more
closely then the old one. However, authorization decisions for such a policy can be made
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only if the relationship between the patient and the user is taken into account. It is very chal-
lenging to make authorization decisions if only the RBAC model is employed. This means
that, without more expressive authorization mechanisms, additional control must be exer-
cised via manual procedures in the medical records department, which would severely
inhibit the automation of the hospital health care process. To avoid this situation, the rela-
tionship between the user and the patient should be computed each time an authorization
decision is to be made.
When AC logic is tightly coupled with application logic, the main challenge is to
modify authorization logic in all clinical applications of the hospital so that they reflect the
changes in hospital policy. This is a tremendously difficult, time consuming, expensive and
error-prone process! For example, in order to accommodate the new policy, our hypothet-
ical hospital would have to make changes in all its application systems that access patient
records. With RAD, however, such changes can be made by dynamically reconfiguring the
authorization service without any changes to the applications.
In order to enforce the new policy, we configure RAD service with new DAS and DC,
as well as two different PEs. One PE is RBAC PE (the same as before). The other PE uses
relationships instead of roles while making authorization decisions. For the sake of brevity,
we employ name RelBAC to signify the use of relationships in authorization decisions.
Therefore, the other is RelBAC PE. The new configuration is shown in Figure 5-9. The
state of the authorization system for the new policy is described by 1) a role hierarchy,
which is the same as the one shown in Figure 5-7, 2) a new PA relation (Table 5-6), 3) a
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Figure 5-9. RAD Configuration for Relationship-based Policies
Resources
Roles Q I M Q
Psychiatrist
Physician _____
Physician
Assistant
Nurse R
Registration W RW
Clerk
Technician RW
Caregiver R
Table 5-6. Permission Assignment (PA) Relation for Role Hierarchy (New Policies)
relationship hierarchy (RSH) (Figure 5-10), and 4) a relationship to permission assignment
(RSPA) (Table 5-7).
We outlined the support for such dynamic factors as relationships with RBAC mecha-
nisms in [Barkley 1999]. Here we give a more concrete example of how the support of rela-
tionships can be implemented using the RBAC model and RAD service. Putting it simply,
RelBAC is the same as RBAC, except that in RelBAC, role hierarchies should be viewed
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Patient Attending Physician
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Physician
Ckmrdian Attending Nuse Related Technician
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Figure 5-10. Relationship Hierarchy Relation (RSH)
Resource
Relationship z A A 9 M
Attending RW
Psychiatrist RW
Attending RW R R RPhysician
Attending
Physician W R R R
Assistant
Attending RW R RNurse
Related RWTechnician
Related RCaregiver
Patient
Spouse R R
Guardian R R
Relative R R
Table 5-7. Relationship to Permission Assignment Relation (RSPA)
in the context of a particular resource owner. In our example, relationship hierarchies are
patient-centric, and they represent "roles" towards the patient. For instance, attending phy-
sician is a relationship that could be between a hospital physician and a patient. Role phy-
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sician is an attribute of a user session, which persists through all actions undertaken during
the session, whereas the value of the relationship between the user and the patient is always
determined when a request to access patient data is authorized. A distinguishing feature of
supporting RelBAC by RAD is that every time a request is to be authorized, the dynamic
attribute service determines the relationship between the user and the patient whose records
the user requested to access. The relationship information is added to the list of security
attributes as new attributes of type relationship and values listing all the relationships junior
to the one in question.
The two PEs work in concert coordinated by the DC. RBAC PE grants access only to
those users who perform roles authorized to access patient data according to the PA relation
showed in Table 5-6. For example, a user acting in role physician assistant is granted access
to read demographic data (DD) for all patients in the hospital. On the other hand a user
acting in role physician is denied access for reading patient current episode sensitive
records (CSR) unless the user is determined to have attending physician relationship with
the patient whose CSR records are to be accessed. The RelBAC PE grants such an access
by basing its evaluation decision on RSPA (Table 5-7) and the value of relationship
attributes inserted by DAS. The DC invokes RBAC and RelBAC PEs, and grants access if
any of the two do so. Otherwise, it denies access, i.e. DC implements logical OR.
Let us walk through with a sample authorization request for the new policy. For illus-
tration purposes, assume that a nurse with userid d attends a patient with patientid
29984329. Consider an authorization request for operation read on current episode regular
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records (CRR) associated with patientid 29984329 on behalf a user with user id d, who
activated role nurse. The event sequence, illustrated in Figure 5-9, is the following:
1. The ADO receives the authorization request from the application.
2. The ADO obtains a list of references to PEs and DC, which should be used for making
authorization decisions on resource with name {patient_id=29984329,
recordpart=CRR }. The PEL returns a reference to the DC and two PEs - RBAC PE
and ReIBAC PE.
3. The DAS adds two new attributes of type relationship with values attending nurse and
related caregiver to the list of existing attributes which already has user id d and roles
caregiver and nurse.
4. The ADO delegates the DC to make the decision.
5. RBAC PE denies access because, according to its PA relation (Table 5-6), neither role
nurse nor caregiver has permission to read CRR data. The decision reflects the new
authorization rules (P2.1 and P2.3 in Table 5-5) that do not allow reading CRR by any-
one unless that person acts as physician assistant and attends the patient.
6. The DC requests RelBAC PE to evaluate the request. The PE uses its RSPA relation
(Table 5-7) to determine that the access should be granted because RSPA[attending
nurse, CRR] contains permission R. Thus the PE grants access.
Finally, the DC (implementing logical union) returns to ADO the same answer, and the
ADO authorizes the application to access current episode regular records of patient with ID
29984329 on behalf of user d.
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Now the RBAC and the ReLBAC PEs work together to enforce the new authorization
policy. However, it is possible to assign each rule from the policy to a specific PE based on
its distinguishing function. By checking the Policy 2 (Table 5-5), we can find that rules
P2.1, P2.2, P2.3 and P2.5 are suitable to be evaluated by the RBAC PE, while the RelBAC
PE evaluates all other rules.
5.5 Discussion and Conclusions
In this chapter we presented an approach to separating authorization and application
logic for those distributed applications which resort to application-level access control. The
decoupling is a means to achieve the established earlier objectives of controlling access to
the resources of enterprise distributed applications.
Our approach is formulated as an authorization service architecture -- RAD. The archi-
tecture is simple, generic and yet capable of supporting authorization decisions for wide
variety of application domains. The main property, separation of authorization and appli-
cation logic, is maintained when RAD approach is used because application delegates
authorization decisions RAD-based authorization service. The architecture can support any
level of protected resource granularity because of the generic data structure representing a
resource name, which is used by applications for referring to the resources in question. The
architecture is policy-neutral as opposed to other authorization service architectures
[Varadharajan 1998, Zurko 1998], which allows implementation of various types of poli-
cies. For example, we demonstrated how role-based policies can be supported by RAD.
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The architecture is also neutral to the nature of information used for making authori-
zation decisions, as long as the information can be syntactically represented in the form of
principal security attributes. This feature allows RAD-based services to support wide vari-
ety of authorization information. Moreover, the introduction of dynamic attribute service
(DAS) defines a standard way to utilize request-specific information. We showed how
RBAC policy engine can be combined with DAS that supplies user-patient relationships,
in order to support policies based on caregiver-patient relationships in health care organi-
zations. Because authorization requests to RAD-based services are invoked from within
applications, the applications can provide the service with information available only while
the application processes the client request, which is not supported, for example, by [Woo
1998]. Because the architecture enables encapsulation of authorization logic into a server,
which can serve more than one application, the consistency of policies enforced across mul-
tiple applications is inherently supported.
New applications can be added and removed from the enterprise computing environ-
ment without affecting such a server. Changes to authorization policies, as we showed,
cause re-configuration of RAD components or their composition and possibly replacement
of some of them, which theoretically can be done dynamically without shutting down the
server. The architecture enables administration scalability because changes to authorization
policies can be done in one location. We will show in Chapter 5 using a CORBA-based pro-
totype that RAD architecture enables component replacement with minimum affect on the
work of the server. The above substantiates our earlier claim that RAD approach is adapt-
able to frequent changes in policies, applications, computing environment, and users.
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The design of Adage [Zurko 1998] follows a pattern similar to that of our work. Their
Authorization Decision Server (ADS) is encapsulated into a separate entity in the distrib-
uted environment with administrative and authorization interfaces. They are exposed to the
management clients and the application servers via CORBA interfaces. In each authoriza-
tion request to ADS, an application specifies the name of the accessing subject, the name
of the resource (target in Adage terminology), and the action to be performed on the
resource.
There are also many differences in the design. The foremost difference is in the parti-
tioning of the authorization service into internal components. In Adage, an RBAC authori-
zation engine, two rule databases and a translator are predefined and built into the ADS.
Also Adage's authorization language syntax and semantics are fixed and predefined in the
language interpreter. RAD architecture, on the other hand, allows different evaluation
engines with their own rule languages and administrative interfaces to co-exist as long as
few simple obligations for integrating those engines are fulfilled. This is achieved by defin-
ing not only interfaces for RAD clients and administrators but also interfaces for policy
evaluators, decision combinators and other RAD internal components. The definition of
RAD internal interfaces allows dynamic installation of third party RAD-compliant compo-
nents in a RAD server. Furthermore, Adage authorization server can be used as one of RAD
policy evaluators.
RAD re-uses CORBA Security service infrastructure. It relies on the service to provide
all other security functionalities such as user security administration (group membership,
role assignment, etc.), authentication, communication integrity and confidentiality, audit
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and non-repudiation. The authorization engine and ADS administrative tools in Adage,
however, are meant to be tightly integrated with user administration and authentication
parts of the security infrastructure in order to evaluate activation rules used when a user is
entering or leaving a role. This is needed to maintain static and current cardinalities of each
role and the current labels of each subject if the enforced policies require static and dynamic
separation of duties [Gligor 1986]. Moreover, the engine is designed to perform partly the
user administration work (to enforce static separation of duty) and authentication work
(dynamic separation of duty). Another difference is the existence of two logically distinct
databases in Adage ADS. One is used to store Adage policy objects defined through the AL
interpreter. Another stores a compiled form of the AL definitions that is optimized for eval-
uation by the authorization engine.
The body of work described in this chapter has been served as a foundation for
Resource Access Decision Facility specification [OMG 1999c] from the Object Manage-
ment Group which shows its practical usability. However, no matter how promising this
approach is, it is important to establish its functional and performance feasibility. This is
why we have developed a prototypical authorization service according to RAD architec-
ture. We describe the service and the results of our studies in the next chapters.
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6 CAAS -- Prototypical
Implementation of RAD
In the previous chapter, we proposed a solution to the problem of controlling access to
the resources of distributed enterprise applications -- an architecture for an application
authorization service, RAD. We also showed that the architecture features key benefits: it
enables the separation of application and authorization logic; it supports AC on fine-grain
resources; it can be configured to implement different AC models, particularly RBAC; it
supports the use of factors specific to the application domain or to the organizational work-
flow, such as relationships between the user and the resource owner; it enables the use of
authorization engines created by different developers and administered by disparate author-
ities; and its distributed nature enables the consistency of authorization decisions across
enterprise applications.
However, it is an open issue as to how one can design and implement a flexible (i.e.
responsive to the changes in policies and conditions), extendable (i.e. capable of accommo-
dating new functionality), and portable authorization server based on the conceptual archi-
tecture of RAD and what performance implications arise from employing such an
approach. Answering these questions is critical in order to understand the validity of our
and any other approach in this problem area. To the best of our knowledge, no research on
authorization mechanisms for application systems reported in the literature, which we sur-
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veyed in Chapter 3, examined the aspects of designing, constructing, and addressing per-
formance in such mechanisms.
In order to study these issues, we designed and implemented an experimental test-bed
-- CORBA-based Application Authorization Service (CAAS). It adheres to RAD architec-
ture, and serves as a framework for our research on the RAD approach. Besides developing
CAAS to serve as a test-bed, we also wanted to gain an understanding of the principles for
constructing application authorization services.
This chapter is devoted to the design and implementation of CAAS. The main design
requirements were flexibility, extensibility, portability and configurability. We actively uti-
lized design patterns which provided us with simple and elegant solutions to general prob-
lems of constructing object-oriented component-based distributed security services. The
service is based on CORBA and Java technologies, and utilizes CORBA Naming service.
We showed by the means of implementation that RAD architecture is feasible and its
computational model, defined in IDL, is correct. Besides the feasibility proof, we gained
more understanding of the design and implementation of an authorization service for dis-
tributed applications.
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section gives an extensive overview of
CAAS design and explains the main elements of its components. We illustrate the points
of the section by describing in detail designs of DC and PE in Sections 6.2 and 6.3. We dis-
cuss the results of designing and developing CAAS and conclude the chapter in Section 6.4.
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6.1 Overview of CAAS Design
As mentioned earlier, the main goals for CAAS construction were proving RAD
approach feasibility, and developing an experimental framework for further research on the
support of application-specific fine-grain, complex and dynamic access control policies,
while providing a necessary degree of usability, fault tolerance, scalability and availability.
This is why, besides making CAAS design confirm to RAD architecture, we strived to
achieve its configurability, implementation affordability, portability, as well as flexibility
and extensibility sufficient for the current and future research. In this section we give an
overview of CAAS main design elements that allowed us to achieve the objectives.
6.1.1 Middleware Technology
To make CAAS implementation portable and extendable, we used standard technolo-
gies as much as possible. CORBA became the middleware technology of choice. Its secu-
rity service provided the functionality necessary to model different authorization policies.
CORBA Naming service allowed CAAS distributed components to discover each other in
a platform-independent way. We were free to choose any implementation language for
each CAAS component. The choice of CORBA influenced the overall composition of the
service's main elements, shown in Figure 6-1. All of them interact via Interoperable Inter-
-AS Obec
Figure 6-1. CAAS Main Elements
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RAD IDL Interface Defined by RAD Extended IDL Interface Defined by
Component Architecture CAAS Design
ADO AccessDecision AccessDecisionExt
AccessDecisionAdmin AccessDecisionAdminExt
PEL PolicyEvaluatorLocator
PolicyEvaluatorLocatorAdmin
PolicyEvaluatorLocatorBasicAdmin PolicyEvaluatorLocatorAdminExt
PolicyEvaluatorLocatorNameAdmina
PolicyEvaluatorLocatorPatternAdmina
DAS DynamicAttributeService DynamicAttributeServiceExt
DynamicAttributeServiceAdminExt
DC DecisionCombinator
PE PolicyEvaluator PolicyEvaluatorExt
PolicyEvaluatorAdmin PolicyEvaluatorAdminExt
Table 6-1. Correspondence Between IDL Interfaces Extended by CAAS Design and RAD
a. Not implemented in the current version of CAAS
ORB Protocol (IIOP) [OMG 1999a], which is a standard communication protocol for
CORBA-based systems communicating over TCP/IP. The next major design decision was
about the interfaces CAAS components should provide.
6.1.2 Component Interfaces
IDL interfaces defined in RAD architecture expose functionality common to all ser-
vices based on the architecture. CAAS design is required to provide additional functionality
exposed via interfaces. The functionality should allow run-time interfaces to obtain refer-
ences to administrative interfaces and enable graceful shutdown of the components. There-
fore, we introduced extensions to RAD run-time and administrative interfaces listed in
Table 6-1. These extensions allow the implementation of additional functions without alter-
ing the RAD interfaces. Due to CORBA IDL interface inheritance capability, newly
defined interfaces were seen by CAAS clients as base RAD interfaces unless additionally
defined operations and attributes were used.
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6.1.3 Implementation Language
The next design decision was about the implementation language. It was influenced by
two requirements -- the implementation portability and the ease of programming for grad-
uate students, mostly unprofessional developers. To address them, we used Java as the
implementation language. Implementations of Java Virtual Machine (JVM) are available
for most operating systems, and the language provides several advantages for rapid devel-
opment such as object-orientation, thread and garbage collection support. Java also pro-
vides dynamic loading of classes, and this allows great flexibility in configuring and
changing CAAS behavior at boot- and run-time, and loading of Java classes compatible
with underlying ORB middleware. 1
However, Java imposed several constraints. Most CAAS components provide multiple
IDL interfaces -- run-time and administrative. Run-time interfaces are used during the com-
putation of authorization decisions. Administrative interfaces define operations through
which the behavior of CAAS components can be configured. Given that, we decided for
each CAAS component to implement both types of IDL interfaces using a single Java class,
as shown in CAAS architecture in Figure 6-2. For example, Java class DynamicAt-
tributeService implements both IDL interfaces DynamicAttributeService-
Ext and DynamicAttributeServiceAdminExt. In Java, an IDL interface is
implemented using a class which defines public methods corresponding to the operations
and attributes of the IDL interface [OMG 1999b]. However, we could not use inheritance
1. For the time of developing CAAS only few ORB vendors had Portable Object Adapter (POA), which
precluded us from using POA in order to achieve complete code portability on the server side.
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Figure 6-2. CAAS Architecture
for implementing run-time and administrative IDL interfaces because Java does not support
multiple class inheritance.
To work around the single-inheritance restriction of Java, we implemented compo-
nents using a delegation mechanism known as the Tie approach [Pedrick 1998]. In this
approach, a single tie class implements a number of CORBA interfaces. However, the tie
only implements the minimum mechanisms needed to interact with the ORB environment.
The actual implementation of the component's operations is done in a delegate class imple-
menting the ComponentOperation interface, as shown in Figure 6-3. With this
approach, we obtained greater flexibility in composing objects since the delegate class is
not restricted to inherit from any particular class. The only requirement is that the delegate
class implements the Component0peration interface. 1
1. One drawback of delegation is that systems relying on object composition may be more difficult to com-
prehend [Gamma 1995].
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Figure 6-3. Implementing a CORBA Object Using the Tie Approach
Current versions of Java ORBs support concurrent invocations by executing the
instances of a CORBA object in more than one thread. Although a performance benefit, this
feature requires carefulness in changing an object state. To address this issue, we decided
in the current version to use fully synchronized methods for the implementation of CAAS.
Although this property does not guarantee that the system will be free of liveliness failures
such as deadlocks and resource starvation, it does guarantee consistency of values at the
object level. This design solution allows synchronized method implementations to be used
in concurrent settings [Lea 1996]. However, this introduced unnecessary synchronization
which can affect overall run time performance because calls to synchronized methods are
more expensive, than to un-synchronized ones. Also, synchronized operations on CAAS
components are of a coarse granularity which can cause threads to block and unblock
unnecessarily.
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6.1.4 Design Extensibility
During the design process, it became evident that different instances of the same
CAAS component, such as DC and PE, must implement different logic. For instance, a DC
can combine results from multiple PEs in more than one way. One solution would be to
implement one class per component behavior. However, this would create many related
classes that differ only slightly in their functionality. The solution we chose was based on
the design pattern Strategy [Gamma 1995].
In Strategy pattern, a Context class implements the logic common to all other imple-
mentations, and a Strategy class provides behavior specific to the concrete implementation,
as illustrated in Figure 6-4. The pattern allowed us to implement families of algorithms
related to each CAAS component (strategy classes) and common functionality (context
classes).
Since Java was our implementation language, we defined strategies as Java interfaces.
In this case, component contexts are Java classes implementing the services published by
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Figure 6-5. Applying Template Method Pattern
the strategy interfaces. With the implementation of the strategies for the DC and PE com-
ponents, we took a step further: their implementation is based on a design pattern known as
the Template Method [Gamma 1995]. The idea (illustrated in Figure 6-5) behind the pattern
is to define an outline or skeleton of an algorithm in a base class while leaving some steps
to be defined in subclasses.
Template Method pattern was used in the design of DC and PE because implementa-
tions of each of these components tend to share a common functionality. For example,
implementations of DC need to resolve references to PE objects received from the ADO
regardless of the decision combination policy being implemented. Similarly, PE implemen-
tations need to maintain associations of policies to resource names independently of how
the policies are stored and evaluated. Such a common functionality can be implemented in
an abstract strategy class (Figure 6-5). This class is later refined to obtain specific imple-
mentations (strategies A, B, C in the example in Figure 6-5).
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Figure 6-6. Structure Common to Most CAAS Components
6.1.5 General Component Structure
We structured all components in the same fashion, as shown in Figure 6-6. This made
the design and coding faster, because the former could be re-used and the developers had
to learn only one structure in order to understand the principles of work for each compo-
nent. It was also easier to see the differences. For example, PEL does not have an extension
to its administrative interface, whereas DC lacks an administrative interface due to its sim-
plicity.
6.1.6 Component Initialization and Discovery
We wanted to study CAAS performance under different configurations and loads. Do
so would require CAAS to provide a number of capabilities: to use different policy evalu-
ators and/or decision combinators; to allow the deployment of different components in dif-
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Client Host Server Host
Figure 6-7. Reference Configuration
ferent locations on the network and in the system by co-locating components in the same
process or host; and to change its configuration with relative ease and repeat the same
experiments over time. For example, it should be possible to combine application and
authorization logic in one process, as shown in Figure 6-7, or to load each CAAS compo-
nent in a separate process (Figure 6-8). Moreover, we wanted to have the capability of load-
ing the service in different configurations without recompiling the source code.
In order to ease the process of booting CAAS components in different configurations,
we introduced two techniques. First is the use of a component loader, shown in Figure 6-2,
which enables any number of instances of the same component to be loaded in one process.
All the information needed by the loader was provided via either configuration file or the
command line parameters. However, once the components are loaded, it is necessary for
them to discover each other, i.e. obtain corresponding object references, no matter if they
are located in one process, on one machine or on different network nodes. It was also
desired to avoid the use of the middleware when process co-located components commu-
nicate with each other, in order to avoid unnecessary overhead. This is why the second tech-
nique -- uniform URL-like representation of component references -- was introduced. The
technique allowed us to choose the ways of posting and obtaining object references of the
components by simply changing the content of the symbolic readable reference represen-
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Figure 6-8. CAAS Configuration with Each Component in a Separate Process
tations, specified in the configuration file or command line, and to avoid superfluous use of
middleware when both the client and the target are located in the same process.
For discovering components located in different processes, either interoperable object
reference (IOR) stored in the stringified form in a text file, or CORBA Naming service can
be used. The latter is most convenient when the components are located on different
machines. Since CORBA Interoperable Naming Service [OMG 1998a] implementations
were not available at the time of the development, we utilized object locator approach
(shown in Figures 6-1 and 6-2) similar to the one in TAO [Schmidt 1998] and discussed in
[Schmidt 1999]. The main benefit of the locator is the complete portability in locating
naming service. It is done by sending a UDP broadcast to a predefined port. If the locator
instance is available on the network, it will respond with a stringified IOR for the naming
service root context, which is sufficient for finding a component IOR by its name in the
naming hierarchy. The design is sufficiently generic to discover IORs of other CORBA
objects.
To illustrate CAAS design elements discussed above, we discuss DC and PE in the
next two sections. Although other components are equally important, their design is similar
to DC and PE. A more detailed description of ADO, PEL and DAS can be found in [Espinal
2000].
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Figure 6-9. DecisionCombinator Design
6.2 Decision Combinator
DC encapsulates the "decision combination" logic which is delegated to an object
implementing DecisionCombinatorStrategy interface (Figure 6-9). DC only has
a run-time interface in the current version of CAAS, the Dec isionCombinator with
DecisionCombinatorContext as the class implementing the IDL interface. None-
theless, the design of DecisionCombinatorContext uses the Tie approach to
accommodate the introduction of future administrative interfaces.
DC features the simplest design of all CAAS components. However, DC objects can
exhibit different behavior. For instance, a DC can combine results from multiple PEs in
more than one way, e.g. one type of DC can combine multiple results using a logical AND
combination policy, whereas another type can combine multiple results using a majority
vote policy. These two forms of policy, however, do not necessarily change the way a DC
consults the PEs; that is, in both cases a DC may not need to consult all of them. Taking
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these issues into account, we designed DC using the Strategy pattern. With this pattern, a
DecisionCombinatorContext class implements functionality required to consult
PEs handed by ADO. Different decision combination policies are then delegated to an
object implementing the Dec is ionCombinatorStrategy Java interface. One of the
interface implementations is class Abs trac tAndOrCombinator. The class is further
refined (using the Template pattern) into two classes, OpenWorldAndOrCombina-
tionPolicy and CloseWorldAndOrCombinationPolicy. With the former pol-
icy, a DC grants access if no PE object denies access, and with the latter it implements a
stricter combination policy -- it grants access only if all PE objects do so.
Having described the simplest component -- DC -- we will discuss the design of PE,
which is the most complex.
6.3 Policy Evaluator
The function of a PE is to evaluate one or more of the authorization policies in regards
to a resource given a list of principal security attributes, the resource and operation names.
The PE has run-time and administrative IDL interfaces -- PolicyEvaluator and Pol-
icyEvaluatorAdmin. The two are extended with PolicyEvaluatorExt and
PolicyEvaluatorAdminExt IDL interfaces (see Figure 6-10). For their implementa-
tion, we use a single Java class, PolicyEvaluatorContext.
As mentioned in Section 6.1, an IDL interface is implemented in Java with an imple-
mentation class [OMG 1999b], and thus inheritance cannot be used for implementing mul-
tiple IDL interfaces. Because of this constraint, we used the Tie approach for implementing
173
PolcyEvalc alor -DL Inter Iera>
evaPate() Pofcy valuatorE xt PollcyE valu IrExt0 perallons
PolmcyEvaluatorContext
+In POll yEv aluatorAdminExt b ---- 
-
011000>> mcacn m, $01 policie0PolIcyE valualo rAdmin V m_0000 cles()
1_p011cI < I ace>>. 
-rlacea - l s "Oeau l
--a1po O Pol yEvaluatorAdmInExl Pollcy-alua r n xlOperations -1 Cy()
1el lesp 0,el $ooclsi e~ou s() uloo n
- -- - Null Oblect <Im0l ac 0
Pal rn PolIcIesByResourceNameMap l
clear() Sibale gyNulPolic-B yResourceNam eM ap _ _ sRes0oorceName() Pallern
sEmply() 1
tem 00 oPollo les) ea)
P o cyE valualorS Irate gy
RBACEvaluaor-- ---- --------- - eva Us" Polyey(
1.00 005()
glD a0 ul0TPolcy()
FleSystem PermIsson 9s valual0
A/waysGrantDen yAbstraciEvalueao,
-_ - - _ Template !.
Pallem ---- - - --
UnixFile Sy em PermlsonE va luaor NttsFlleSyslemPerm ISSO sEvaluator AlwaysDenyEvaluator AlwaysGrantEvalualor
Figure 6-10. PolicyEvaluator Design
PolicyEvaluatorExt and PolicyEvaluatorAdminExt IDL interfaces. In the
case of PE, PolicyEvaluatorContext delegates the functionality of its operations to
objects that implement the PolicyEvaluatorExtOperations and PolicyEval-
uatorAdminExt Java interfaces (see Figure 6-10).
Different instances of PE can exhibit different behavior. For instance, a CAAS service
may utilize PE components implementing policy evaluation mechanisms based on filesys-
tern permissions, RBAC, or even default evaluation policies which always grant or deny
access. However, most of these instances of PE may use the same mechanisms to associate
resource names to access control policies.
To avoid the introduction of many related PE classes that differ only in their evaluation
policy, we use a solution based on the Strategy pattern. With this pattern, PolicyEval-
ua torContext implements functionality common to most other implementations of PE.
For example, addition and removal of authorization policies is not likely to change between
174
PE instances. Different evaluation policies are then delegated to an object implementing the
PolicyEvaluatorStrategy Java interface (see Figure 6-10). Similarly, the manage-
ment of resource name associations for accessing policies may vary between PE instances.
Consequently, PolicyEvaluatorContext delegates the implementation of such
functionality to objects implementing the Pol ic iesByResoureNameMap. By using
this interface, the association can be implemented by employing any form of storage suit-
able to the current needs independently of PolicyEvaluatorStrategy implementa-
tion.
Implementations of PolicyEvaluatorStrategy interface are further refined
using the Template Method pattern, as shown in Figure 6-10, which allows extensions and
modifications to policy evaluation mechanisms with relative ease as the needs for different
evaluation logic change during the system life cycle.
Another pattern we used in the design of CAAS components is the Null Object pattern
[Grand 1998]. With this pattern, developers can provide "do-nothing" versions of classes
for which no particular implementations exist during execution. In the case of PE design,
it was used to define the NullPoliciesByResourceNameMap class as the default
implementation of PoliciesByResourceNameMap interface (see Figure 6-10). The
class relieves PolicyEvaluatorContext from testing for null values before access-
ing the interface methods.
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6.4 Discussion and Conclusions
We claimed in the previous chapter that RAD architecture has the following proper-
ties: simplicity, flexibility and generality. Simplicity is achieved by using simple interfaces,
by requiring AS to make simple operation invocations on RAD service, and by using
simple structures for exchanging information between applications and a RAD service.
Simplicity is also achieved by using encapsulation principles in RAD architecture and
CAAS design. The programming complexity of making authorization decisions for an indi-
vidual policy is encapsulated in PEL, DAS, and PE objects. While constructing CAAS, we
found that DC greatly contributes to the simplification of CAAS design. This is because
DC encapsulates decision combination policies which can completely change the overall
authorization logic of CAAS. Total complexity increases only when complex access poli-
cies are added to CAAS, yet such complexity is still contained within the appropriate com-
ponents. Increased complexity within PE implementation does not increase the complexity
encapsulated by DAS or PEL and vice versa. However, it might be possible that in some
cases, the introduction of more complex policy evaluators could increase the complexity of
decision combinators.
Flexibility is another property present in CAAS. Changes in CAAS would manifest as
changes in access control policies, policy evaluations and dynamic attributes; new access
control polices, for example, can be implemented by changing or replacing existing PE and
DC objects, as we showed it in the example of the previous chapter. In order to demonstrate
the extensibility and flexibility of RAD, we designed CAAS to support run-time shut down,
re-initialization, or replacement of its components. For example, we implemented different
versions of DC, and showed that those versions can be replaced "on the fly."
176
CAAS and Application Server CAAS co-located with CAAS and AS co-located
in different hosts Application Server CAAS using an external PE
CLIENT AS CAAS
CLIEN AS CAAS CUENT AS CAAS PE
CORBA ORB CORBA ORB
ORB
NETWORK INFRASTRUCTURE NETWORKINFRASTRUCTURE NETWORK INFRASTRUCTURE
Figure 6-11. CAAS under different configurations
More evidence of RAD architecture flexibility is the support for different configura-
tions of CAAS components. For conducting performance experiments using CAAS differ-
ent configurations, we designed it to support the deployment of the components, without
changing source code, co-located in a process, computer or distributed over a network (see
Figure 6-11 for examples). This configurability allows such CAAS deployments that max-
imum performance (by avoiding ORB middleware and network overhead), availability, or
flexibility (by having any component in any system in the network) are achieved.
After designing and implementing CAAS, we find RAD architecture sufficiently gen-
eral in the sense that it can be implemented for different environments, with different
requirement and design priorities. A straight-forward implementation, intended for envi-
ronments with tolerant requirements, could be done with few lines of code without usage
of design patterns. On the other hand, a RAD service can be implemented using a complex
design to achieve fault-tolerance, high-performance and scalability. Our current implemen-
tation of CAAS tries to obtain a balance with a simple design which allows it to be flexible,
extendable and configurable.
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By utilizing standard technologies, namely CORBA and Java, we have developed a
concrete implementation of RAD architecture -- CAAS. The implementation is flexible,
configurable, extendable and portable. The design and implementation of components
available in CAAS is covered with more detail in our technical report [Espinal 2000].
The main contribution of the work presented in this chapter is a concrete design of a
prototype (CAAS) of RAD architecture. The design is sufficiently flexible to deploy CAAS
under different configurations, and to experiment with different authorization policies of
different granularity and complexity. We showed that RAD architecture is feasible and its
computational model, defined in IDL, is correct. Besides the feasibility proof, we gained
important insights into the design and implementation of an authorization service for dis-
tributed applications.
During our work on CAAS we actively utilized design patterns, which provided us
with simple and elegant solutions to general problems of constructing object-oriented com-
ponent-based distributed information systems. CAAS design and implementation is a
required step towards a comprehensive study on support of application-specific fine-grain,
complex and dynamic access control policies in heterogeneous distributed enterprise appli-
cations that are to constitute current and future information enterprises. The initial goal of
using CAAS was to study the implications of RAD architecture on the system end-to-end
performance. We report on the study and its results in the next chapter.
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7 CAAS Performance Measurements
One of the main concerns about RAD-based authorization services is the overall
system performance. Regardless of how attractive the approach is, if the resulting imple-
mentation impedes the application capability to comply with its performance constraints,
the approach would not be of much help to the developers. In this chapter we report on our
studies about CAAS performance.
The main question with the performance of authorization services based on RAD
architecture is not whether a performance fee has to be paid but how much it is. One would
expect middleware and communication overhead to affect the application response time the
most. However, we need to qualify and quantify the overhead. Because RAD architecture
defines multiple components that can be located in the same process, in the same host or in
different hosts in a network environment their different compositions will affect overall
run-time performance to various extent.
Another question is what features of RAD architecture or the design based on it inher-
ently affect the performance of application systems. The third, equally important, question
is what application domains can absorb the performance penalty, since not all the applica-
tions have the same strict constraints on their response time or the time is determined by
other factors more then by the authorization delay. Knowing the performance penalty, can
we identify the application groups where such a penalty is acceptable? So far, we have not
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seen any reports in the literature about studies on either the performance trade-offs for
authorization services or other questions stated above. In this chapter, we discuss how we
addressed these questions.
We used CAAS as a test-bed. The focus of the experiments was the run-time perfor-
mance of application systems that obtain authorization decisions from CAAS. We mea-
sured the performance under various configurations, loads and server-side application logic
delays using a simple performance model.
The main contributions of the work are our performance measurements and the con-
clusions we have drawn from them. We identified factors affecting run-time performance
of systems using CAAS and possible solutions for improving the performance of authori-
zation services based on RAD approach. Moreover, we believe the performance results can
be used to measure and reason about the performance of authorization servers in general.
We also gained the understanding of how the amount of time spent on executing application
logic affects the performance penalty experienced by an application. This helped us to qual-
ify the applicability of CAAS and similar implementations to the different application
domains.
The organization of this chapter is as follows. The next section discusses the perfor-
mance model. We describe CAAS configurations used for the experiments in Section 7.2.
The test environment and the experimental procedures are explained in sections 7.3 and 7.4
respectively. We report on the data and interpret it in Section 7.5. Based on the experimen-
tal data interpretation, we suggest the ways for achieving adequate performance for RAD-
based services in Section 7.6. Conclusions are drawn Section 7.7.
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7.1 Measurement Model
It was crucial to define the model for our experiments, which would enable answers to
the stated questions. A measurement model determines the scope of an experiment, what
results could be obtained, and how they should be interpreted. It also determines the com-
plexity and affordability of experiments. Since performance studies are not the central con-
tribution of our research, we decided to follow a minimalistic approach, i.e. to use such a
model that would allow us to obtain required performance measurements with the simplest
and most affordable experimental framework.
While defining the framework, the first question for us to answer was if we should use
absolute or relative performance measurements. Absolute measurements could be inter-
preted correctly only in the context of a standard benchmark with strictly defined imple-
mentation platform, language, middleware technology, and many other factors. Since we
were not aware of any standard benchmark that would fit our goals, we saw little value in
reporting absolute times to anybody who uses different implementation languages, ORBs,
etc. or even their versions. Therefore, we decided to collect measurements relative to a ref-
erence model implemented with exactly the same programming and communication tech-
nologies as well as execution platforms.
The reference model we choose was an application system (AS) that has coupled appli-
cation and authorization functionalities in one process with the former having exactly the
same computational complexity as in the experimental configurations. Thus, by comparing
performance of this and an experimental system, where authorization mechanism is encap-
sulated in CAAS, we could measure the difference in their performance.
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The second question was about the meaning of performance in the context of this
study. System performance has many meanings and multiple aspects. The way system per-
formance is measured depends on how it is defined. If we defined the performance as a
number of authorization requests served per a unit of time, or the latency time for each
request, then we could have used time Tcaas (Figure 7-1-b), when CAAS completes the pro-
Client AS Client AS CAAS
User User
T T T
e
(a) Reference Model (b) Response Times for Configurations with
CAAS
Figure 7-1. Times for Measuring Performance
cessing of an authorization request, as the measure of CAAS performance. However, it,
besides other reasons, would not allow us to have a reference model because there would
be nothing to refer to. Nor did we decide to use time Tas, when an AS finishes processing
an application request, which in turn contains time Tcaas. Instead, we chose to measure
response time Tc perceived by clients since it included response times at the other two
points, and it was the main concern from the performance point of view, when authorization
decisions were computed by CAAS. This is why our performance metric for CAAS is end-
to-end response time that a client observes while interacting with an AS.
The definition of performance and the time representing it determined the reference
model and the reference time shown in Figure 7-1-a. Using measured times Tc, and Te, we
calculated the percentage of response time increase I in the case of external authorization
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for each configuration of CAAS with respect to embedded access control using the follow-
ing formula:
I = - 1 x 100 (1)
Te
Since CAAS first design was not optimized for concurrent access, we decided to leave
performance scalability experiments outside of these experiments' scope. This is why for
this study we measured run-time performance of CAAS in the presence of only one client,
which sent requests to a single application system in a sequential manner as shown in
Figure 7-1-b. That is, the client waited until it received the reply from its previous request
before it made a new one.
We expected that, given the same complexity of authorization logic, the number of
remote invocations made per each authorization request would effect the overall system
performance the most. In its turn, the number depended on the composition of CAAS com-
ponents and their location relatively to each other. For that reason we used different CAAS
configurations to see how the composition of CAAS components affected the response
time observed by the client.
7.2 CAAS Configurations
Given the multitude of different configurations that can be composed out of CAAS
components, we needed to determine which of them should be used in the experiments.
CAAS configurations determine the boundaries crossed by the messages sent during the
computation of an authorization request. There are three types of these boundaries: object,
process, and host. Note that whenever a message crosses process boundaries, it inevitably
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goes through the ORB layer too. Thus ORB and process boundaries are considered as a one
atomic layer. Whenever host boundaries are crossed, the messages travel over network as
well. Thus by "crossing host boundaries" we imply traveling over network.
Another general observation important for understanding our choice of CAAS config-
urations is illustrated in Figure 7-2. Messages between CAAS components can travel in
H ost Hs
2 1
Figure 7-2. Boundaries Crossed by Messages
three ways: 1) from object to object in the same process, 2) from object in one process to
an object in another process, and 3) between objects located in different processes, which,
in their turn, are running on different hosts. There is a hierarchy of the boundaries: object,
process, host. When a boundary is crossed, then all boundaries lower in the hierarchy are
also crossed.
184
Messages cross object boundaries when components are co-located in the same
address space and use direct method calls through JVM to communicate. Messages cross
process boundaries when communicating components are co-located in the same host but
run in their own processes. In this case, communication takes place through the ORB mid-
dleware, which is why we also call these boundaries as middleware boundaries. This form
of communication, however, can take place using other mechanisms such as IPC [Nutt
1997, Stevens 1993]. Finally, messages cross host boundaries when components reside on
separate hosts; this involves middleware and communication subsystem overhead.
CAAS can be deployed in many different configurations. When composing CAAS
configurations, the main choice is the boundaries crossed between different components.
We wanted to measure a wide range of boundary crossing configurations. On the one end
of the range is a configuration when all CAAS components are collocated in one process
and messages among them cross only object boundaries, which, we expected, would be the
most efficient but the quantitative answer was not known. To highlight this, the correspond-
ing CAAS configurations (shown in A, B, and D in Figure 7-3) end with word "Object."
On the other end is the composition, in which all CAAS components are running on differ-
ent hosts, which should yield the best flexibility and the worst overall performance. Again,
we wanted to give a quantitative answer about the performance. We decided not to measure
such a configuration because it seemed unlikely that anybody would use the service in this
way. Instead, we tested cases when all the components are in separate processes, as shown
in C, E and G. We also anticipated the use of a PE located on a separate host in case a legacy
policy engine is utilized as a PE (configurations F and G).
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Figure 7-3. Reference Model and Experimental CAAS Configurations
We expected that application performance is affected not only by the type of bound-
aries the messages among CAAS components cross but also by the communication over-
head associated with the messages between the AS and CAAS. This is why we measured
the performance for configurations where CAAS is located on the same (B and C) and dif-
ferent (D--G) hosts as the application. To stress this difference, the names of the corre-
sponding configurations begin with either "Process" or "Host."
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In order to produce relative performance measurements we needed a reference config-
uration that would have the authorization logic, with the same computational complexity
as in all other configurations, coupled with the application logic. For this, we simulated our
Reference Model by co-locating all CAAS components within the application process as
shown in Figure 7-3-A. Our reasoning was based on the assumption that even though the
code responsible for application and authorization logic could be highly coupled, it can be
re-arranged into the equivalent code in such a way that it will allow for every computer
operation to identify whether it contributes to application or authorization performance
overhead. Once identified, it should be possible to encapsulate the authorization instruc-
tions into a separate application module.
Having the rationale behind CAAS configurations outlined, let us walk through and
explain each of them. With Process/Object configuration, AS and CAAS are co-located as
independent processes in the same server host, and CAAS components are co-located
within the same process as illustrated in Figure 7-3-B. Messages between AS and CAAS
are transmitted via ORB middleware (process boundaries) whereas CAAS components
communicate using native method calls using the JVM (object boundaries). Figure 7-3-C
shows Process/Process configuration where CAAS components are deployed in their own
processes (process boundaries). In Host/Object configuration shown in Figure 7-3-D,
CAAS components are co-located in the same process; however, AS and CAAS are on dif-
ferent hosts. That is, messages between AS and CAAS are delivered through the ORB mid-
dleware and communication subsystem (host boundaries) while messages among CAAS
components cross only object boundaries.
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In Host/Process (Figure 7-3-E), AS and CAAS are on different hosts, and CAAS com-
ponents are in their own processes in the same host. Figure 7-3-F illustrates Host/Object/
PE-Host configuration. This configuration is similar to Host/Object except that PE compo-
nent runs in a different host. Communication among CAAS components incur object and
host boundaries. Finally, in Host/Process/PE-Host configuration (Figure 7-3-G), PE is
located in a host other than the authorization host while the other CAAS components run
in different processes co-located in the authorization host. It is important to note that when
two components exchange messages through process boundaries, message passing
involves middleware overhead and possibly context switch overhead at the host where the
two reside. Host boundaries, on the other hand, do not involve such context switch over-
head since the communicating components do not compete with each other for execution
time.
This configurability allows developers and administrators to deploy CAAS in a way to
obtain maximum performance (by avoiding ORB middleware and network overhead), or
flexibility (by having any component in any system in the network). For example, admin-
istrators may deploy CAAS using Host/Object configuration to avoid middleware and net-
work overhead. However, in an organization where one or more PE components are
remotely located (perhaps in a different subnet), CAAS can be deployed using Host/Object/
PE-Host or Host/Process/PE-Host configurations. Host/Process or Process/Process con-
figurations can be used to deploy CAAS components developed by third parties, which are
not enabled to run in the same address space with other components. In a real scenario, we
expect to see most components be co-located in the same process or host while one or more
components, possibly PE, be deployed in remote locations.
188
After defining the measurement model, the reference and experimental configurations,
the next question was what environment for conducting experiments should be used. This
is discussed in the next section.
7.3 Test Environment
Our test environment was composed of 4 Gateway E-4200 400MHz Pentium III PC's
running Windows NT Workstation 4.0 service pack 4. Each workstation had 128MB of
physical memory, 139MB of swap space and its performance properties were set to maxi-
mum boost for foreground applications. Also, each workstation was equipped with an Intel
PRO/100+ Management network adapter. These workstations interoperated on an 100Mb
Ethernet with one hub, and connected to the rest of the campus network through a 100Mb
switch. Furthermore, during testing we used JDK 1.1.7 and Visibroker 3.3 ORB, and all
java classes and jar files were located on the local hard-drives. We used CORBA Naming
service located on a separate host to discover the CAAS components and application. We
carried out the performance measurements only when network utilization was less than 1%
to minimize the effects of unrelated network load.
7.4 Experiment Procedure
Our experiment setting consisted of a client, an AS, and an instance of CAAS com-
posed of one Access Decision Object (ADO), a Policy Evaluator Locator (PEL), a Dynamic
Attribute Service (DAS), a Decision Combinator (DC), and a Policy Evaluator (PE). The
goal of the performance measurements was to estimate a worst case performance penalty
experienced by clients when CAAS serves authorization requests. We measured the
response time Tr experienced by the client when external access control is implemented
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using CAAS. Then, the response time Te was measured. Using these two numbers, we cal-
culated the response time increase I percentagewise using Equation 1. The DC object
implemented logical AND combination policy while the PE object always granted access.
This procedure was repeated using all six configurations described in Section 7.2.
Other parameters for our performance measurements were application processing (or busi-
ness) logic time B and the number of authorization requests N generated for each client
request. Application processing time represents delays experienced by an AS while serving
client requests and enforcing authorization decisions returned by ADO. It does not include
processing time incurred by CAAS. Although we used one client during the experiment, in
an actual system, a client request can trigger any number of authorization requests by AS.
This was simulated using a variable number of authorization requests per each client
request.
It was an open question what authorization policies should be used for performance
experiments. Since our goal was to measure a worst case performance penalty relative to
the Reference Model, we used computationally least expensive combination and evaluation
policies. This is because more complex authorization policies would increase computation
overhead without increasing middleware and communication overhead, provided that no
new inter-component messages are introduced. The increase in the computational overhead
would occur within embedded authorization logic for the Reference Model as well as
within CAAS while communication overhead would remain unaltered. The change can be
illustrated by Equation 2, where A is the increase associated with the additional computa-
tional complexity of authorization logic. This means that I' < I, because Te > Te and A > 0.
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=- 1 x 100 (2)
Te + A
For our performance experiments we did not use caching techniques. Caching was not
considered since it reduces communication overhead and therefore reduces relative
response time increase I. We did not utilize secure communications for remote invocations
because the overhead due to the communication security is something we cannot control.
Moreover, communication protection is application and implementation dependent. Differ-
ent applications require different levels of protection, and different security products have
different performance. As a result, we decided not to employ communication protection
and estimate a worst case response time increase strictly in terms of middleware and com-
munication due to RAD architecture.
7.5 Measurement Results
The measurements were carried out using CAAS configurations shown in Figure 7-3,
and the results are illustrated in Figure 7-4. We calculated the increase of the response time
as a function of application processing time per authorization request. For example, in the
case of configuration Host/Object (Figure 7-3-D), the response time increased compara-
tively to the Reference Model by 31%, when the application was executing application
logic for 10 ms each time before it would make an authorization request.
Two groups of CAAS configurations can be observed. The group with the best perfor-
mance results consists of those configurations, in which all or most CAAS components
were process co-located. Even when configured with the PE located on a host, separate
from the one with all other CAAS components, CAAS performed better than in any other
configuration from the second group. This group consists of CAAS configurations, when
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Figure 7-4. Response Time Increase for Various CAAS Configurations (Error size: 0.5)
all the components interacted with each other via messages crossing process boundaries. It
is worth noting that we used no ORB optimization for interprocess communications on the
same host, although some ORBs have them.
The results imply that the amount of time spent executing application logic per each
authorization request drastically affects the relative performance experienced by the appli-
cation client. Its increase in the order of magnitude causes relative performance increase
anywhere between 2 and 10 times in both groups. The results also revealed that those appli-
cations, which do not actively use the authorization service and spend one second or more
executing application logic for each authorization request, are almost insensitive to CAAS
configurations. This makes them the primary candidates for employing CAAS. But even
more authorization-intensive applications can utilize such an authorization service as
CAAS, if all the components are process co-located and the application owners can afford
10% decrease in the performance in return for all the benefits of RAD approach.
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7.6 Performance Considerations
Our performance experiments suggest that in order to develop and utilize successfully
RAD-based authorization services using current middleware technologies, several critical
implications on the overall system performance should be considered. We summarize our
findings in Table 7-1.
First, the pattern of using the authorization service by the application must be studied.
As Table 7-1 shows, if the usage is mild (i.e. no more than one authorization request in
Limitations on Authorization Service Usage (app. logic time per request)
Response Latency Intensive Medium MildIncrease (10ms or less) (between 100ms and is) (10s or more)
Authorization and appli-
Strict (5% or less) cation functions located CAAS components in Any configuration or
one process locationin one process
1.CAAS components in
Medium (between 10% one process Any configuration or Any configuration or
and 30%) 2.CAAS and applica- location location
tion on the same host
Any configuration or Any configuration or Any configuration or
Lax (over 30%) location location location
Table 7-1. Recommended CAAS Configurations Depending on Application
Requirements
every 10 seconds or so), then such applications (last column) can use RAD-based services
configured in any reasonable way. Second, the performance constraints imposed on the
application should be used to understand where the application and the service should be
located relatively to each other and how the service should be composed. For example,
applications that can afford an increase of the response time due to the use of authorization
service by more than 30% do not have to be host-collocated with the service, and the ser-
vice can be configured in any way. On the other hand, applications intensively using the
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service by making 100 or more authorization requests per second of application logic exe-
cution, and having strict performance constraints affording no more than 5% performance
degradation, should have authorization and application logic process co-located.
The configuration and location requirements can be relaxed if some techniques for
increasing performance in distributed systems are applied. For example, communication
overhead can be minimized by using ORBs with communication layer optimized for
objects located on the same host. Another technique is the caching of results previously
obtained from the service components. The technique can be very helpful when authoriza-
tion requests repeat over time.
The deployment and implementation of RAD-based authorization services should take
into consideration the interactions among components. That is, described optimization
techniques should be applied to components that have a high rate of interaction. For exam-
ple, evaluations of policies that require more than one PE can be optimized by co-locating
corresponding PEs with the appropriate DC in the same process.
Performance in the presence of concurrent requests is another aspect that should be
taken into account. Although processing of concurrent requests were not part of our perfor-
mance measurements, it is an aspect that warrants further research. Concurrency is not a
trivial issue to handle in component-based systems. Safety preservation, the insurance that
all objects in a system maintain valid states in the presence of concurrent access, requires
the avoidance of read/write and write/write conflicts [Lea 1996]. To address this issue, we
decided in the current implementation of CAAS to use fully synchronized methods.
Although this property does not guarantee the system to be free of liveliness failures such
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as deadlocks and resource starvation, it does guarantee consistency of values at the level of
Java language object. Synchronized object instances are ready to be used in concurrent set-
tings [Lea 1996] but this introduces unnecessary synchronization, which can affect overall
run time performance because invocations of synchronized methods are more expensive,
than to regular ones. If operations on CAAS components are synchronized, the granularity
of synchronization should be carefully considered. Otherwise it can cause threads to block
and unblock unnecessarily. The research issue, which is beyond the scope of this work, is
the design of a RAD-based service optimized for concurrent access by multiple applica-
tions.
7.7 Conclusions
The main question about the feasibility of RAD approach, after its functional suffi-
ciency, is whether RAD-based authorization services can deliver required performance.
We have used CAAS to study the performance aspects of RAD architecture and found that
there is no simple answer to the question. The experiments suggest that the two main factors
affecting the performance are the ratio of the application execution time to the number of
authorization requests and CAAS distribution configuration. Due to the variations of these
factors the overall response time experienced by the application clients can increase as high
as 600% and drop to as little as 1%. We identified several groups of applications that differ
in their use of authorization service and the performance constraints. For each group, we
determined what is required in order to assure adequate performance when RAD-based
authorization service is used.
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The service performance can be improved further if well-known techniques for opti-
mizing distributed systems are used. For instance, utilization of the ORBs that optimize
communications between objects located on the same host have the potential to signifi-
cantly improve the response time. In situations when this is not possible, co-locating most
CAAS components in the same address space in order to avoid middleware overhead will
improve the performance as well. Also, caching the results previously obtained from vari-
ous CAAS components will enhance the performance. These optimizations should focus
on components with high rate of interaction such as DC and PE components. However, the
performance might degrade when such properties as security of middleware communica-
tions are imposed.
Our measurements results are not only relevant to CORBA-based systems using RAD
approach. The performance results for Process/Object and Host/Object configurations
(Figure 7-3-B,D) can be used to estimate the response time increase for authorization serv-
ers in general.
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8 Conclusions
Existing middleware technologies are necessary but not sufficient for effectively pro-
tecting the resources of distributed enterprise applications. In this dissertation, we proposed
a two-tier approach that allows a comprehensive solution to the problem.
Foremost, we showed the adequacy of the CORBA authorization mechanism for the
support of RBACO--RBAC 3 models and developed a framework for implementing them
using CORBA Security. This delivers all the advantages of the external, scalable and yet
comparatively fine-grain AC of CORBA Security along with the well studied powerful
modeling concepts of RBAC. But our solution does not stop here because there are appli-
cations with more advanced requirements.
For those applications which require finer granularity than operation level and/or pro-
tection according to the policies that are difficult or impossible to model using just RBAC,
we developed an architecture, RAD, for furnishing authorization decisions to such applica-
tions. It was shown via modeling, prototypical implementation, and performance experi-
ments that the architecture features a number of important characteristics. These include
separation of application and authorization logic, arbitrary granularity of protected
resources, the use of information specific to the application domain, policy-neutrality,
inherent consistency of AC enforcement across multiple applications, and high adaptability
to various changes experienced by the enterprise environment.
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Achieved via the use of either the CORBA authorization mechanism or a RAD-based
service, the separation of authorization and application logic simplifies the development of
both distributed systems and their security functions, and therefore makes it easier to
enhance their quality. Equally important, it paves the way for uniformly utilizing authori-
zation mechanisms across (heterogeneous) system boundaries, as well as for centralizing
enterprise security administration and management, traditionally time consuming, costly
and error prone processes.
By defining the state of the CORBA protection system, mapping it into RBAC models
and developing RAD approach for application-level authorization, we created a structural
foundation for modeling authorization architectures, which are central to the design of
secure distributed enterprise applications.
8.1 Open Problems
Although our approach addresses the needs of most applications, the problem of engi-
neering access control for distributed enterprise application resources is far from being
solved. There are numerous open questions and opportunities for future research. Here we
suggest some.
We developed two separate yet related steps. Each addresses the needs of a particular
application group. An important question is how to integrate AC administration in uniform
way if both solutions are employed. We can see two distinct ways. One is the use of a RAD-
based service to furnish authorization decisions not only to application systems but also to
middleware layers, and maybe even network, DBM and operating systems. Another fol-
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lows the approach of policy agents where authorization rules are administered in a central
location and then propagated into middleware and application AC mechanisms with the
help of agents. Which of these two, or maybe some other, approaches is more attractive?
When authorization decisions are delegated to a service, one more potential perfor-
mance and availability bottleneck emerges. New research is needed in order to understand
how and what distribution techniques can be applied for achieving performance scalability
and availability of authorization services based on RAD architecture.
The RAD approach is valuable for the solutions based on most middleware technolo-
gies. We implemented and conducted performance experiments with a CORBA-based pro-
totype. Because information enterprises usually use more than one middleware technology,
it is interesting to see how complex a design of multi-technology authorization service
could be?
As with any complex software systems, the composition of applications with RAD-
based services is not only to make constituent components work together, but also to ensure
that the composition as a whole behaves consistently and guarantees certain end-to-end
properties. Although this goal is beyond the scope of this dissertation, it is critical to model
and design such compositions with the properties guaranteed even before the actual sys-
tems are deployed and composed.
The RAD approach has been proposed in the context of access control. However, we
believe the approach can be applied to other security functionalities, for instance audit, non-
repudiation, and communication protection. Can the architecture be re-used without any
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significant changes? If not what should be different? Can a unified solution be proposed
that would uniformly and comprehensively support the decisions regarding not only AC
but most security functionalities that tend to be re-implemented in applications?
200
Bibliography
[Abrams 1991] M. Abrams, J. Heaney, O. King, L. J. LaPadula, M. Lazear, and I. Olson,
"A Generalized Framework for Access Control: Towards Prototyping
the Orgcon Policy," In Proceedings of National Computer Security Con-
ference, 1991, pp. 257-266.
[Abrams 1990a] M. D. Abrams, K. W. Eggers, L. J. LaPadula, and I. W. Olson, "A Gen-
eralized Framework for Access Control: an Informal Description," The
MITRE Corporation, McLean, Virginia, USA MP-90W00043, August
1990.
[Abrams 1989] M. D. Abrams, A. B. Jeng, and I. M. Olson, "Generalized Framwork for
Access Control: An Informal Description," The MITRE Corporation,
Springfield, VA, USA MTR-89W00230, September 1989.
[Abrams 1990b] M. D. Abrams, L. J. LaPadula, and I. M. Olson, "Building Generalized
Access Control on UNIX," In Proceedings of USENIX workshop on
UNIX Security, Portland, Oregon, USA, 1990, pp. 65-70.
[Amoroso 1994] E. Amoroso, Fundamentals of Computer Security Technology. Prentice
Hall, 1994.
[Anderson 1972] J. Anderson, "Computer Security Technology Planning Study," Air
Force Electronic Systems Division ESD-TR-73-51, Vols. I and II, 1972.
[Ashley 1997] P. Ashley, "Authorization for a Large Heterogeneous Multi-Domain
System," In Proceedings of Australian Unix and Open Systems Gorup
National Conference, 1997.
[Awischus 1997] R. Awischus, "Role Based Access Control with Security Administration
Manager (SAM)," In Proceedings of the Second ACM Workshop on
Role-Based Access Control, Fairfax, Virginia, USA, 1997, pp. 61-68.
[Barkley 1995] J. Barkley, "Implementing Role-based Access Control Using Object
Technology," In Proceedings of The First ACM Workshop on Role-
Based Access Control, Fairfax, Virginia, USA, 1995, pp. 93-98.
201
[Barkley 1999] J. Barkley, K. Beznosov, and J. Uppal, "Supporting Relationships in
Access Control Using Role Based Access Control," In Proceedings of
ACM Role-based Access Control Workshop, Fairfax, Virginia, USA,
1999, pp. 55-65.
[Barkley 1998] J. Barkley and A. Cincotta, "Managing Role/Permission Relationships
Using Object Access Types," In Proceedings of The Third ACM Work-
shop on Role-Based Access Control, Fairfax, Virginia, USA, 1998, pp.
73-80.
[Bell 1975] D. E. Bell and L. J. LaPadula, "Secure Computer Systems: Unified
Exposition and Multics Interpretation," MITRE, Bedford, MA, USA,
Technical Report ESD-TR-75-306, March 1975.
[Benantar 1996] M. Benantar, R. Guski, and K. M. Troidle, "Access control systems:
From host-centric to network-centric computing," IBM Systems Jour-
nal, vol. 35(1), pp. 94-112, 1996.
[Bertino 1996a] E. Bertino, C. Bettini, E. Ferrari, and P. Samarati, "Supporting Periodic
Authorizations and Temporal Reasoning in Database Access Control,"
In Proceedings of 22th International Conference on Very Large Data
Bases, Mumbai (Bombay), India, 1996, pp. 472-483.
[Bertino 1996b] E. Bertino, S. Jajodia, and P. Samarati, "Supporting Multiple Access
Control Policies in Database Systems," In Proceedings of the IEEE
Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy, Oakland, California,
1996.
[Beznosov 1997] K. Beznosov, "Applicability of CORBA Security to the Healthcare
Problem Domain," Object Management Group corbamed/97-09-11,
September 1997.
[Beznosov 1998a] K. Beznosov, "Issues in the Security Architecture of the Computerized
Patient Record Enterprise," In Proceedings of Second Workshop on
Distributed Object Computing Security, Baltimore, Maryland, USA,
1998.
[Beznosov 1998b] K. Beznosov, "Requirements for Access Control: US Healthcare
Domain," In Proceedings of Third ACM Workshop on Role-Based
Access Control, Fairfax, Virginia, USA, 1998, pp. 43.
[Beznosov 2000] K. Beznosov, "Information Enterprise Architectures: Problems and Per-
spectives," School of Computer Science, Florida International Univer-
sity, Miami technical report 2000-06, June 2000.
202
[Beznosov 1999a] K. Beznosov and Y. Deng, "A Framework for Implementing Role-based
Access Control Using CORBA Security Service," In Proceedings of
Fourth ACM Workshop on Role-Based Access Control, Fairfax, Vir-
ginia, USA, 1999, pp. 19-30.
[Beznosov 1999b] K. Beznosov, Y. Deng, B. Blakley, C. Burt, and J. Barkley, "A Resource
Access Decision Service for CORBA-based Distributed Systems," In
Proceedings of Annual Computer Security Applications Conference,
Phoenix, Arizona, USA, 1999, pp. 310-319.
[Blakley 1999] B. Blakley, CORBA Security: an Introduction to Safe Computing with
Objects, First ed. Addison-Wesley, 1999.
[Bloomer 1992] J. Bloomer, Power Programming with RPC. O'Reilly & Associates,
1992.
[BullSoft 1995] BullSoft, "AccessMaster," Bull Soft, 1995.
[Burrows 1990] M. Burrows, M. Abadi, and R. Needham, "A Logic of Authentication,"
ACM Transaction on Computer Systems, vol. 8(1), pp. 18-36, 1990.
[CA 1998a] CA, "CA-ACF2 for OS/390," Computer Associates International,
1998.
[CA 1998b] CA, "CA-Top Secret for OS/390," Computer Associates International,
1998.
[CA 1999] CA, "Unicenter TNG: Product Information," Computer Associates
International, 1999.
[Caswell 1995] D. L. Caswell, "An Evolution of DCE Authorization Services,"
Hewlett-Packard Journal: technical information from the laboratories
of Hewlett-Packard Company, vol. 46(6), pp. 49--54, 1995.
[CIST-NRC 1999]CIST-NRC, Trust in Cyberspace. Committee on Information Systems
Trustworthiness, National Research Council. National Academy Press,
1999.
[Curry 1992] D. A. Curry, UNIX System Security: A Guide for Users and System
Administrators. Addison-Wesley, 1992.
[DeBoever 1997] L. R. DeBoever, "Concept of "Highly Adaptive" Enterprise Architec-
ture," In Proceedings of Enterprise Architecture Conference, 1997.
[DEC 1989] DEC, "Guide to VAX/VMS System Security --- Version 5.2," Digital
Equipment Corporation, 1989.
203
[DHHS 1998] DHHS, "Secumty and Electronic Signature Standards; Proposed Rule,"
45 CFR Part 142, Department of Health and Human Services, 1998.
[DHHS 1999] DHHS, "Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Infor-
mation; Proposed Rule," Department of Health and Human Services,
1999.
[Eddon 1999] G. Eddon, "The COM+ Security Model Gets You out of the Security
Programming Business," Microsoft Systems Journal, vol. 1999(11),
1999.
[Epstein 1995] J. Epstein and R. Sandhu, "NetWare 4 as an Example of Role-Based
Access Control," In Proceedings of Proceedings of the First ACM
Workshop on Role-Based Access Control, Gaithersburg, Maryland,
USA, 1995, pp. 71-82.
[Espinal 2000] L. Espinal, K. Beznosov, and Y. Deng, "Design and Implementation of
Resource Access Decision Server," Center for Advanced Distributed
Systems Engineering (CADSE) - Florida International University,
Miami technical report 2000-01, January 2000.
[Filman 1996a] R. Filman and T. Linden, "Communicating Security Agents," In Pro-
ceedings of The Fifth Workshop on Enabling Technologies: Infrastruc-
ture for Collabarative Enterprises, Stanford, CA, USA, 1996, pp. 86-91.
[Filman 1996b] R. Filman and T. Linden, "SafeBots: a Paradigm for Software Security
Controls," In Proceedings of New Security Paradigms Workshop, Lake
Arrowhead, CA USA, 1996, pp. 45-51.
[Fowler 1997] M. Fowler, Analysis Patterns: Reusable Object Models, First ed. Addi-
son Wesley Longman, 1997.
[Gamma 1995] E. Gamma, R. Helm, R. Johnson, and J. Vlissides, Design Patterns: Ele-
ments of Reusable Object-Oriented Design. Addison-Wesley, 1995.
[Gittler 1995] F. Gittler and A. C. Hopkins, "The DCE Security Service," Hewlett-
Packard Journal, vol. 46(6), pp. 41-48, 1995.
[Giuri 1998] L. Giuri, "Role-Based Access Control in Java," In Proceedings of Pro-
ceedings of the Third ACM Workshop on Role-Based Access Control,
Fairfax, Virginia, USA, 1998, pp. 91-99.
[Gligor 1986] V. Gligor, C. Burch, R. Chandersekaran, L. Chanpman, M. Hecht, W.
Jiang, G. Luckenbaugh, and N. Vasudevan, "On the Design and the
Implementation of Secure Xenix Workstations," In Proceedings of
204
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, Oakland, CA, 1986, pp. 102-
117.
[Gong 1997] L. Gong, M. Mueller, H. Prafullchandra, and R. Schemers, "Going
Beyond the Sandbox: An Overview of the New Security Architecture in
the Java Development Kit 1.2," In Proceedings of The USENIX Sym-
posium on Internet Technologies and Systems, Monterey, California,
1997, pp. 103-112.
[Grampp 1984] F. T. Grampp and R. H. Morris, "UNIX Operating System Security,"
AT& Bell Laboratories Technical Journal, vol. 63(8), pp. 1649-1672,
1984.
[Grand 1998] M. Grand, Patterns in Java: A Catalog of Reusable Design Patterns
Illustrated with UML, vol. 1. Wiley Computer Publishing, 1998.
[Grimes 1997] R. Grimes, Professional DCOM Programming. Wrox Press Inc., 1997.
[Grimm 1999] R. Grimm and B. Bershad, "Providing Policy-Neutral and Transparent
Access Control in Extensible Systems," Lecture Notes in Computer Sci-
ence, pp. 317-338, 1999.
[Grimshaw 1998] A. S. Grimshaw, M. J. Lewis, A. J. Ferrari, and J. F. Karpovich, "Archi-
tectural Support for Extensibility and Autonomy in Wide-Area Distrib-
uted Object Systems," Department of Computer Science, University of
Virginia CS-98-12, 1998.
[Grimshaw 1997] A. S. Grimshaw and W. A. Wulf, "The Legion Vision of a Worldwide
Virtual Computer," Communications of the ACM, vol. 40(1), pp. 39-45,
1997.
[Grimson 2000] J. Grimson, W. Grimson, and W. Hasselbring, "The System Integration
Challange in Health Care," Communications of the ACM, vol. 43(6), pp.
48-55, 2000.
[Hailpern 1990] B. Hailpern and H. Ossher, "Extending Objects to Support Multiple
Interfaces and Access Control," IEEE Transactions on Software Engi-
neering, vol. 16(11), pp. 1247-1257, 1990.
[Hale 1999] J. Hale, P. Galiasso, M. Papa, and S. Shenoi, "Security Policy Coordi-
nation for Heterogeneous Information Systems," In Proceedings of
Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, Phoenix, Arizona,
USA, 1999, pp. 219-228.
[Heydon 1994] A. Heydon and J. D. Tygar, "Specifying and Checking UNIX Security
Constraints," Computing Systems, vol. 7(1), pp. 9-12, 1994.
205
[Hommes 1990] R. Hommes, "VMS Security Architecture," In Proceedings of DECUS
Europe Symposium, Cannes, France, 1990.
[HP 1996] HP, "HP Adds Value to DCE Security Framework with Praesidium
Authorization Server," DCE application development trends Magazine,
1996.
[IBM 1976] IBM, Resource Access Control Facility (RACF). General Information.
IBM Red Books, 1976.
[IEEE ] IEEE, IEEE P1003.6.1 Standard for Information Technology: Portable
Operating System Interface (POSIX): Protection, Audit, and Control
Interfaces. IEEE Computer Society Press.
[IETF 1993] IETF, "RFC 1510, The Kerberos Network Authentication Service, V5,"
Internet Engineering Task Force, 1993.
[Jonscher 1995] D. Jonscher and K. R. Dittrich, "Argos -- A Configurable Access Con-
trol System for Interoperable Environments," In Proceedings of IFIP
WG11.3 Ninth Annual Working Conference on Database Security,
Rensselaerville, NY, 1995, pp. 39-66.
[Kaijser 1998] P. Kaijser, "A Review of the SESAME Development," Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, vol. 1438, pp. 1-8, 1998.
[Karger 1991] P. A. Karger, M. E. Zurko, D. W. Bonin, A. H. Mason, and C. E. Kahn,
"A Retrospective on the VAX VMM Security Kernel," IEEE Transac-
tions on Software Engineering, vol. 17(11), pp. 1147-1165, 1991.
[Karjoth 1998] G. Karjoth, "Authorization in CORBA Security," In Proceedings of
Fifth European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESO-
RICS), 1998, pp. 143-158.
[Kleinoder 1996] J. Kleinoder and M. Golm, "MetaJava: An Efficient Run-Time Mete
Architecture for Java," In Proceedings of Fifth IEEE International
Workshop on Object-Orientation in Operating Systems, Seattle, WA,
USA, 1996.
[Kong 1995] M. M. Kong, "DCE: An Environment for Secure Client/Server Comput-
ing," Hewlett-Packard Journal, vol. 46(6), pp. 6-15, 1995.
[Lai 1999] C. Lai, L. Gong, L. Koved, A. Nadalin, and R. Schemers, "User 
Authen-
tication And Authorization In The Java Platform," In Proceedings of
Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, Phoenix, Arizona,
USA, 1999, pp. 285-290.
206
[Lampson 1991] B. Lampson, M. Abadi, M. Burrows, and E. Wobber, "Authentication in
Distributed Systems: Theory and Practics," In Proceedings of ACM
Symposium on Operating Systems Principles, Asilomar Conference
Center, Pacific Grove, California, 1991, pp. 165-182.
[Lampson 1971] B. W. Lampson, "Protection," In Proceedings of 5th Princeton Confer-
ence on Information Sciences and Systems, Princeton, 1971, pp. 437.
[LaPadula 1990] L. J. LaPadula, "Formal modeling in a Generalized Framework for
Access Control," In Proceedings of Computer Security Foundation
Workshop III, 1990, pp. 100-109.
[Lea 1996] D. Lea, Concurrent Programming in Java: Design Principles and Pat-
terns. Addison-Wesley, 1996.
[Linn 1993] J. Linn, "Generic Security Service Application Program Interface,"
Internet Engineering Task Force, Internet Draft RFC 1508, September
1993.
[Linn 1997] J. Linn, "Generic Security Service Application Program Interface,"
IETF RFC 2078, January 1997.
[Luckenbaugh 1986]G. L. Luckenbaugh, V. D. Gligor, L. J. Dotterer, and C. S. Chander-
sekaran, "Interpretation of the Bell-LaPadula Model in Secure Xenix,"
In Proceedings of DoD-NBS Conference on Computer Security, 1986.
[Maes 1987] P. Maes, "Computational Reflection," in Artificial Intelligence Labora-
tory. Vrije Universiteit Brussel, 1987.
[McCauley 1979] E. J. McCauley and P. J. Drongowski, "KSOS -- The Design of a Secure
Operating System," In Proceedings of National Computer Conference,
1979.
[McInerney 1999] M. J. McInerney, Windows NT Security. Prentice Hall, 1999.
[McMahon 1995] P. McMahon, "Making the Internet Safe for Business," ICL Systems
Journal, vol. 10(2), 1995.
[Meyers 1997] W. J. Meyers, "RBAC Emulation on Trusted DG/UX," In Proceedings
of Proceedings of the Second ACM Workshop on Role-Based Access
Control, Fairfax, Virginia, USA, 1997, pp. 55-60.
[Microsoft 1998] Microsoft, "DCOM Architecture," Microsoft, 1998.
[Molva 1992] R. Molva, G. Tsudik, E. V. Herreweghen, and S. Zatti, "KryptoKnight
Authentication and Key Distribution System," In Proceedings of Euro-
207
pean Symposium on Research in Computer Security, Toulouse, France,1992.
[Mowbray 1997] T. J. Mowbray and R. C. Malveau, CORBA Design Patterns. Wiley
Computer Publishing, 1997.
[Mowbray 1995] T. J. Mowbray and R. Zahavi, The Essential CORBA: Systems Integra-
tion Using Distributed Objects. Wiley Computer Publishing, 1995.
[Mullender 1990] S. J. Mullender, G. v. Rossum, A. S. Tanenbaum, R. v. Renesse, and H.
v. Staveren, "Amoeba: A Distributed Operating System for the 1990s,"
Computer, vol. 23(5), pp. 44-53, 1990.
[NCSC 1987] NCSC, "A Guide to Understanding Discretionary Access Control in
Trusted Systems," National Computer Security Center NCSC-TG-003,
September 30 1987.
[Neuman 1993] B. C. Neuman, "Proxy-Based Authorization and Accounting for Dis-
tributed Systems," In Proceedings of International Conference on Dis-
tributed Computing Systems, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 1993.
[Neuman 1994a] B. C. Neuman and T. Ts'o, "Kerberos: an Authentication Service for
Computer Networks," IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 32(9), pp.
33-38, 1994.
[Neuman 1994b] B. C. Neuman and T. Y. Ts'o, "Kerberos: an Authentication Service for
Computer Networks," University of Southern California, Information
Sciences Institute ISI/RS-94-399, 1994.
[Notargiacomo 1995]L. Notargiacomo, "Role-Based Access Control in ORACLE7 and
Trusted ORACLE7," In Proceedings of the First ACM Workshop on
Role-Based Access Control, Gaithersburg, Maryland, USA, 1995, pp.
65-69.
[NSF 1999] NSF, "Information Technology Research Program Requirements,"
National Science Foundation, 1999.
[Nutt 1997] G. Nutt, Operating Systems: A Modern Perspective. Addison-Wesley,
1997.
[OMG 1996a] OMG, "CORBAservices: Common Object Services Specification,"
Object Management Group, 1996.
[OMG 1996b] OMG, "Security Service Specification," Object Management Group,
1996.
208
[OMG 1997] OMG, "Clinical Observations Access Service RFP," Object Manag-
ment Group December 1997.
[OMG 1998a] OMG, "Interoperable Naming Service, Joint Revised Submission,"
Object Management Group, document orbos/98-10-11, October 1998.
[OMG 1998b] OMG, "Person Identification Service," Object Management Group,
specification corbamed/98-02-29, February 1998.
[OMG 1999a] OMG, "The Common Object Request Broker: Architecture and Speci-
fication," Object Management Group, Specification formal/99-10-08,
1999.
[OMG 1999b] OMG, "IDL to Java Language Mapping," Object Management Group,
Specification formal/99-07-53, 1999.
[OMG 1999c] OMG, "Resource Access Decision Facility," Object Management
Group OMG document number: corbamed/99-05-04, May 1999.
[OSF 1996] OSF, "Authentication and Security Services," Open Software Founda-
tion, 1996.
[Parker 1995] T. Parker and D. Pinkas, "SESAME V4 - Overview," SESAME Decem-
ber 1995.
[Pedrick 1998] D. Pedrick, J. Weedon, J. Goldberg, and E. Bleifield, Programming with
VisiBroker: A Developer's Guide to Visibroker for Java. Wiley Com-
puter Publishing, 1998.
[Pfleeger 1989] C. P. Pfleeger, Security in Computing. Prentice-Hall, 1989.
[Postel 1982] J. B. Postel, "RFC 821: Simple Mail Transfer Protocol," University of
Southern California Information Sciences Institute RFC 821, August
1982.
[Postel 1983] J. B. Postel, "TELNET Protocol Specification," DDN Network Infor-
mation Center, Request for Comments 854, May 1983.
[Postel 1985] J. B. Postel, "File Transfer Protocol," DDN Network Information Cen-
ter, Request for Comments 959, October 1985.
[Quarterman 1985]J. S. Quarterman, A. Silberschatz, and J. L. Peterson, "4.2BSD and
4.3BSD as Examples of the UNIX System," ACM Computing Surveys,
vol. 17(4), pp. 379-418, 1985.
209
[Riechmann 1997]T. Riechmann and F. J. Hauck, "Meta Objects for Access Control:
Extending Capability-based Security," In Proceedings of New Security
Paradigms Workshop, Langdale, Cumbria, UK, 1997, pp. 17-22.
[Riechmann 1998]T. Riechmann and F. J. Hauck, "Meta Objects for Access Control: A
Formal Model for Role-based Principals," In Proceedings of New Secu-
rity Paradigms Workshop, Charlottesville, VA USA, 1998, pp. 30-38.
[Rubin 1999] W. Rubin and M. Brain, Understanding DCOM. P T R Prentice Hall,
1999.
[Ryutov 2000a] T. Ryutov and C. Neuman, "Access Control Framework for Distributed
Applications (Work in Progress)," Internet Engineering Task Force,
Internet Draft draft-ietf-cat-acc-cntrl-frmw-03, March 9 2000.
[Ryutov 2000b] T. Ryutov and C. Neuman, "Generic Authorization and Access control
Application Program Interface: C-bindings," Internet Engineering Task
Force, Internet Draft draft-ietf-cat-gaa-bind-03, March 9 2000.
[Ryutov 2000c] T. Ryutov and C. Neuman, "Representation and Evaluation of Security
Policies for Distributed System Services," In Proceedings of DARPA
Information Servability Conference Exposition, Healton Head, South
Carolina, 2000.
[Saltzer 1974] J. H. Saltzer, "Protection and the Control of Information Sharing in Mul-
tics," Communications of the ACM, vol. 17(7), pp. 388-402, 1974.
[Sandhu 1996] R. Sandhu, E. Coyne, H. Feinstein, and C. Youman, "Role-Based
Access Control Models," IEEE Computer, vol. 29(2), pp. 38-47, 1996.
[Sandhu 1998a] R. Sandhu and Q. Munawer, "How to Do Discretionary Access Control
Using Roles," In Proceedings of ACM Workshop on Role-based Access
Control, Fairfax, Virginia, USA, 1998, pp. 47-54.
[Sandhu 1998b] R. Sandhu and J. S. Park, "Decentralized User-Role Assignment for
Web-based Intranets," In Proceedings of the Third ACM Workshop on
Role-Based Access Control, Fairfax, Virginia, USA, 1998, pp. 1-12.
[Sandhu 1994] R. Sandhu and P. Samarati, "Access Control: Principles and Practice,"
IEEE Communications Magazine, vol. 32(9), pp. 40-48, 1994.
[Schiller 1988] J. I. Schiller, S. P. Miller, B. C. Neuman, and J. H. Salzer, "Project
Athena Technical Plan - Kerberos Authentication and Authorization
System," 1988.
210
[Schmidt 1999] D. C. Schmidt, "Dove: A Distributed Object Visualization Environ-
ment," C++ Report, vol. 11(3), 1999.
[Schmidt 1998] D. C. Schmidt, D. L. Levine, and S. Mungee, "The Design of the TAO
Real-time Object Request Broker," Computer Communications, vol.
21(4), 1998.
[Simon 1997] R. Simon and M. E. Zurko, "Adage: An Architecture for Distributed
Authorization," OSF Research Institute, Cambridge 1997.
[Soley 1996] R. M. Soley and C. M. Stone, Object Management Architecture Guide,
3 ed. John Wiley & Sons, 1996.
[Stevens 1993] W. R. Stevens, Advanced Programming in the UNIX Environment.
Addison-Wesley, 1993.
[Sumner 1999] M. Sumner, "Critical Success Factors in Enterprise Wide Information
Management Systems Projects," In Proceedings of ACM SIGCPR Con-
ference on Computer Personnel Research, 1999, pp. 297 - 303.
[Tardo 1991] J. J. Tardo and K. Alagappan, "SPX: Global Authentication Using
Public Key Certificates," In Proceedings of IEEE Symposium on
Research in Security and Privacy, Oakland, California, USA, 1991, pp.
232-244.
[Thomas 1994] R. K. Thomas and R. S. Sandhu, "Conceptual Foundations for a Model
of Task-based Authorizations," In Proceedings of IEEE Computer
Security Foundations Workshop, Franconia, NH, USA, 1994, pp. 66-79.
[USA 1996] USA, "Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Public Law
104-191," US Goverment, 1996.
[Varadharajan 1998]V. Varadharajan, C. Crall, and J. Pato, "Authorization in Enterprise-
wide Distributed System: A Practical Design and Application," In Pro-
ceedings of 14th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference,
1998.
[Walker 1980] B. J. Walker, R. A. Kemmerer, and G. J. Popek, "Specification and Ver-
ification of the UCLA Unix Security Kernel," Communications of the
ACM, vol. 23(2), pp. 118, 1980.
[Weiderhold 1992]G. Weiderhold, "Mediators in the Architecture of Future Information
Systems: A New Approach," IEEE Computer, vol. 25(3), pp. 38-49,
1992.
211
[Wilson 1997] W. Wilson and K. Beznosov, "CORBAmed Security White Paper,"
Object Management Group corbamed/97-11-03, November 1997.
[Wong 1997] R. K. Wong, "RBAC Support in Object-Oriented Role Databases," In
Proceedings of the Second ACM Workshop on Role-Based Access
Control, Fairfax, Virginia, USA, 1997, pp. 109-120.
[Woo 1992] T. Y. C. Woo and S. S. Lam, "Authentication for Distributed Systems,"
Computer, vol. 25(1), pp. 39-52, 1992.
[Woo 1993a] T. Y. C. Woo and S. S. Lam, "Authorizations in Distributed Systems: A
Formal Approach," In Proceedings of The 13th IEEE Symposium on
Research in Security and Privacy, Oakland, CA, USA, 1993, pp. 33-50.
[Woo 1993b] T. Y. C. Woo and S. S. Lam, "Authorizations in Distributed Systems: A
New Approach," Journal of Computer Security, vol. 2(3), pp. 107-136,
1993.
[Woo 1993c] T. Y. C. Woo and S. S. Lam, "Designing a Distributed Authorization
Service," University of Texas at Austin, Computer Sciences Department
TR93-29, September 1993.
[Woo 1993d] T. Y. C. Woo and S. S. Lam, "A Framework for Distributed Authoriza-
tion," In Proceedings of Conference on Computer and Communications
Security, Fairfax, Virginia, USA, 1993, pp. 112-118.
[Woo 1998] T. Y. C. Woo and S. S. Lam, "Designing a Distributed Authorization
Service," In Proceedings of IEEE INFOCOM, San Francisco, 1998.
[Wreder 1998] K. Wreder, K. Beznosov, A. Bramblett, E. Butler, A. D'Empaire, E. Her-
nandez, E. Navarro, A. Romano, M. Tortolini-Taylor, E. Urzais, and R.
Ventura, "Architecting a Computerized Patient Record with Distributed
Objects," In Proceedings of Health Information Systems Society Con-
ference, 1998, pp. 149-158.
[Wulf 1996] W. A. Wulf, C. Wang, and D. Kienzle, "A New Model of Security for
Distributed Systems," In Proceedings of New Security Paradigms
Workshop, Lake Arrowhead, CA USA, 1996, pp. 34-43.
[Yoder 1997] J. W. Yoder and J. Barcalow, "Archictectural Patterns for Enabling
Application Security," In Proceedings of Pattern Languages of Pro-
gramming, Monticello, Illinois, USA, 1997.
[Zachman 1997] J. A. Zachman, "Enterprise Architecture: The Issue of the Century,"
Database Programming and Design, pp. 44-53, 1997.
212
[Zurko 1998] M. E. Zurko, R. Simon, and T. Sanfilippo, "A User-Centered, Modular
Authorization Service Built on an RBAC Foundation," In Proceedings
of Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, Phoenix, Ari-
zona, 1998.
213
VITA
KONSTANTIN BEZNOSOV
Born, Novosibirsk, Siberia, Russia
1987-1989 Military Service, Siberia, Russia
1991-1994 Assistant System Administrator and Analyst
Information Technology, Budker Institute of Nuclear Physics
Akademgorodok, Siberia, Russia
1993 B.S., Physics
Novosibirsk State University
Akademgorodok, Siberia, Russia
1994-1998 Research Assistant
High Performance Database Research Center
School of Computer Science (SCS)
Florida International University (FIU)
Miami, Florida, USA
1997 M.S., Computer Science
FIU
Miami, Florida, USA
1997-1999 Information Security Architect
Information Technology
Baptist Health Systems of South Florida
Miami, Florida, USA
1998-1999 Co-chair, Security Special Interest Group
Object Management Group (OMG)
1998-2000 Research Associate
Center for Advanced Distributed System Engineering
SCS, FIU
Miami, Florida, USA
1999 Program Committee member
OMG Workshop on Distributed Object Computing Security
July 12-15, Baltimore, Maryland, USA
214
PUBLICATIONS
J. Barkley, K. Beznosov, and J. Uppal, "Supporting Relationships in Access Control
Using Role Based Access Control," In Proceedings of ACM Role-based Access Control
Workshop, Fairfax, Virginia, USA, 1999, pp. 55-65.
K. Beznosov, Y. Deng, B. Blakley, C. Burt, and J. Barkley, "A Resource Access Deci-
sion Service for CORBA-based Distributed Systems," In Proceedings of Annual Computer
Security Applications Conference, Phoenix, Arizona, USA, 1999, pp. 310-319.
K. Beznosov and Y. Deng, "A Framework for Implementing Role-based Access Con-
trol Using CORBA Security Service," In Proceedings of Fourth ACM Workshop on Role-
Based Access Control, Fairfax, Virginia, USA, 1999, pp. 19-30.
K. Beznosov, "Requirements for Access Control: US Healthcare Domain," position
paper, In Proceedings of Third ACM Workshop on Role-Based Access Control, 1998, p.
43.
K. Beznosov, "Taxonomy of CPR enterprise security concerns at Baptist Health Sys-
tems of South Florida," Baptist Health Systems of South Florida, 1997.
K. Beznosov, "CPR Security CORBA-based Security and Intranet Services: Object
Technology Group Position Paper," Baptist Health Systems of South Florida, 1997.
K. Beznosov, "Issues in the Security Architecture of the Computerized Patient Record
Enterprise," In Proceedings of Second Workshop on Distributed Object Computing Secu-
rity, Baltimore, Maryland, USA, 1998.
L. Espinal, K. Beznosov, and Y. Deng, "Design and Implementation of Resource
Access Decision Server," Center for Advanced Distributed Systems Engineering, FIU,
Miami, Technical Report 2000-01, January 2000.
OMG, "Resource Access Decision Facility," Object Management Group, corbamed/
99-05-04, May 1999.
K. Wreder, K. Beznosov, A. Bramblett, E. Butler, A. D'Empaire, E. Hernandez, E.
Navarro, A. Romano, M. Tortolini-Taylor, E. Urzais, and R. Ventura, "Architecting a
Computerized Patient Record with Distributed Objects," In Proceedings of Health Infor-
mation Systems Society Conference, 1998, pp. 149-158.
W. Wilson and K. Beznosov, "CORBAmed Security White Paper," Object Manage-
ment Group, document corbamed/97-1 1-03, November 1997.
215
